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Abstract 
Offshoring can be defined as the relocation of organizational tasks and services to foreign 
locations. Increasingly, firms experience that unforeseen costs and difficulties of managing 
offshoring undercut anticipated benefits; that unexpected challenges of offshoring jeopardize and 
eventually undermine initial objectives. Guided by the research question—what are the 
organizational consequences of offshoring?—the purpose of this thesis is to investigate why 
some firms fail when offshoring and other do not. 
 The thesis consists of four research papers using various datasets and methodologies that 
investigate offshoring in an organizational context. The first paper investigates how the 
complexity of offshoring leads to ‘hidden costs’ of implementing offshoring activities. The 
second paper looks at how these hidden reconfiguration costs influence the process performance 
of the offshored activity and how this relationship is moderated by the modularity of that 
activity. The third paper investigates the effect of the organizational reconfiguration of 
offshoring on firms’ strategies. The final paper studies different strategies of adaptation in 
offshoring. 
 Taken together, this thesis argues that whether firms relocate activities with the purpose 
of accessing resources or as a response to political pressures, the process of offshoring presents 
firms with the challenge of coordinating and integrating offshoring activities in a global 
organization. The complexities and uncertainties of an organization consisting of a number of 
offshored activities (in contrast to an organization with only co-located activities) require firms 
to invest additional resources in coordination mechanisms so that an efficient reintegration can 
be achieved.  
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Abstrakt  
Offshoring kan defineres som relokaliseringen av organisatoriske oppgaver til utlandet. 
Virksomheter opplever ofte at uforutsette omkostninger og vanskeligheter oppstår når man 
offshorer. Dette kan underminere forventede gevinster og til slutt undergrave det opprinnelige 
formålet med å flytte aktiviterer til utlandet. Med problemstillingen—hva er de organisatoriske 
konsekvensene av offshoring?—er hensikten med denne oppgaven å undersøke hvorfor noen 
virksomheter mislykkes med offshoring og andre ikke. 
Oppgaven består av fire forskningsartikler som tar i bruk forskjellige datasett og metoder 
for å undersøke offshoring i en organisatorisk kontekst. Den første artikkelen undersøker 
hvordan kompleksiteten i offshoring fører til `skjulte omkostninger´ som oppstår når 
virksomheter implementerer aktiviteter i utlandet. Den andre artikkelen ser på hvordan disse 
skjulte rekonfigureringomkostningene påvirker prosessytelsen til den relokaliserte aktiviteten, 
samt hvordan dette forholdet er moderert av aktivitetens modularitet. Den tredje artikkelen 
undersøker effekten av den organisatoriske rekonfigurering av offshoring på virksomheters 
strategier. Den siste artikkelen ser på forskjellige tilpasningsstrategier i offshoring. 
Et gjennomgående argument i oppgaven er at prosessen med å offshore gir nye 
utfordringer bundet til å koordinere og reintegrere de relokaliserte aktivitetene i en global 
organisasjon. Dette er uavhengig om virksomheter offshorer aktiviteter for å få tilgang til nye 
ressurser eller som et svar på politisk press. En høy grad av offshoring (i motsetning til en 
organisasjon med bare samlokaliserte aktiviteter) fører til mer kompleksitet og usikkerhet. Dette 
betyr at virksomheter må investere ytterlige ressurser i å koordinere aktiviteter på tvers av 
landegrenser for at en effektiv reintegrering skal oppnås. 
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Chapter 1  
 
 
 
 The organizational design of offshoring:  
An introduction 
 
 
 
 
1.1  PURPOSE OF THESIS 
This thesis investigates offshoring in an organizational context. Offshoring can be defined as the 
relocation of organizational tasks and services supporting domestic and global operations to 
foreign locations (Lewin and Peeters, 2006; Contractor et al., 2010). This can be done internally 
in the firm or externally with an outsourcing partner. Driven by objectives such as cost reduction, 
market proximity, and access to strategic resources, the scale and scope of offshoring as a 
business practice has in recent years reached unprecedented levels with firms relocating tasks 
and activities from the entire value chain, including research and development, manufacturing, 
distribution, services and back-office functions (e.g., Doh et al., 2009; Lewin et al. 2009).  
Increasingly, however, firms are caught up by the “harsh realities of offshoring” (Aron 
and Singh, 2005: 135). A number of firms experience that unforeseen costs and difficulties of 
managing offshoring undercut anticipated benefits (Barthélemy, 2001; Dibbern et al., 2008; 
Stringfellow et al., 2008). Reports suggest how firms are increasingly concerned by how factors 
such as service quality and operational control and efficiency may be undermined when 
offshoring (Lewin and Couto, 2006). For example, many firms fail to pick up the right processes 
and calculate the operational and structural risks to live up to their initial expectations of the 
offshoring activities (Aron and Singh, 2005). Firms experience that costs erupt beyond 
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expectations relating to controlling the performance and coherency of the offshored activities, 
coordinating and integrating the domestic and foreign resources to achieve the specified 
objectives, accurately specifying and designing the business tasks to be offshored, and 
transferring and communicating knowledge between the domestic and foreign location (Dibbern 
et al., 2008). Consequently, many firms find that unexpected challenges of offshoring jeopardize 
and eventually undermine initial objectives. 
The overall purpose of this thesis is to investigate why some firms fail when offshoring 
and others do not. In fulfilling this purpose, offshoring is conceptualized as an organizational 
reconfiguration. In contrast to a firm consisting of only co-located activities, offshoring implies 
an organizational change in which firms must coordinate and integrate geographically dispersed 
activities across distances. This raises a number of challenges. For example, how does the added 
distance between the organizational activities signified by offshoring impact task 
interdependencies? How do bounded rational decision makers account for and plan the 
organizational change from co-location to geographical dispersion? How do firms accumulate 
architectural knowledge so that efficient design decisions can be taken when relocating certain 
activities to foreign locations? This thesis consists of four distinct research papers using various 
datasets and methodologies that investigate different aspects of the organizational process of 
relocating firm activities to locations outside the home country. The research question guiding 
this thesis can therefore be formulated as follows: What are the organizational consequences of 
offshoring? 
The remainder of this introduction chapter is organized in three parts: First, to place the 
thesis into a larger context, the next section presents the evolution of offshoring as a business 
practice and extant offshoring research. Second, the theoretical perspective applied in this thesis 
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is presented. Finally, the research design including the empirical foundation and the content of 
the four research papers is presented. 
 
1.2  CONTEXTUALIZING THE THESIS 
The evolution of a practice  
Over the last decade, a substantial amount of research has been devoted to understand the 
offshoring phenomenon.
1
 Research in fields such as international business and strategic 
management has looked into questions relating to the antecedents of why firms relocate activities 
abroad, the characteristics of the specific implementations, and the outcomes of offshoring. The 
practice of offshoring is not new, however. Over the last 50 years, firms have practiced various 
forms of offshoring. In the 1960s, firms (particularly from the U.S.) began to relocate blue-collar 
manufacturing activities to low costs countries, such as Singapore and South Korea (Ferdows, 
1997). In order to cut production and labor costs, firms would close domestic facilities by instead 
setting up factories in locations with favorable factors markets. This early offshoring trend was 
also picked up by scholarly communities. For example, Vernon (1966) notes that production is 
typically moved to developing countries toward maturity stage of the product life cycle. In the 
1970s, scholars like Leontiades (1971) and Moxon (1975) began to recognize the strategic 
importance of relocating labor-intensive activities from developed countries to less-developed 
countries, in which “soaring wage costs in the industrialized countries raise the prospects of 
wholesale movements of industrial facilities across national boundaries” (Leontiades, 1971: 20). 
                                                 
1
 Many different terminologies have been used to describe offshoring, such as international and global outsourcing, 
offshore outsourcing, captive offshoring, international sub-contracting, far-shoring, near-shoring, etc. While the 
different terminologies may point to different aspects of offshoring (e.g., mode of governance; choice of location), 
they all point to the process in which firms relocate activities to foreign locations in support of domestic or global 
operations. 
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In the early 1990s, the information and communication technologies revolution 
increasingly enabled firms to rapidly organize and locate activities and processes almost 
anywhere in the world (UNCTAD, 2004). Factors such as dramatic drops in IT costs, domestic 
shortages of skilled technological and managerial personnel, accelerated rates of technological 
change, and greater codification of corporate knowledge enabled firms to relocate tasks and 
activities to more distant and preferable locations (Contractor et al., 2011). Consequently, firms 
went beyond the mere relocation of labor-intensive manufacturing activities, and to a larger 
extent began to relocate services activities such as information technology and other business 
processes, but also more complex and higher value-added tasks, such as innovation and product 
development, to attractive locations (Lewin and Peeters, 2006; Manning et al., 2008). For 
example, Lewin et al. (2009) find that Western firms are due to domestic shortages of qualified 
personnel increasingly offshoring innovation activities such as engineering, research and 
development and product design.  
Accordingly, offshoring practice has shifted from the sole relocation of labor-intensive 
manufacturing activities to also encapsulate more knowledge-intensive business service 
activities. Moreover, offshoring as a business practice is no longer only confined to restricted 
labor intensive firm activities such as scale production and call-center activities, but essentially 
encompasses the reallocation of firm tasks and activities from the entire value chain. Contractor 
et al. (2011: 39) argue that “The explosive increase in the geographical relocation and 
reorganization of economic activity in the last two decades is a reflection of (i) necessity (the 
intensification of competition faced by companies because of globalization and liberalization of 
trade and investment regimes); and (ii) the means to do so (i.e., the precipitous drop in 
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transport, data transmission, and tariff  costs—so that output can be relocated much farther 
afield from consumers than ever before).”  
This discontinuity in the evolution of offshoring practice has spurred much research 
seeking to understand the magnitude, characteristics and consequences of offshoring (see next 
section for a review). This thesis should be read as a continuation of and contribution to this 
scholarly debate. 
 
Research on offshoring 
Offshoring research can be divided into three major streams (see Table 1.1 for an overview). 
These are: the antecedents of offshoring, the characteristics of the offshoring implementation, 
and the outcomes of offshoring. 
 
Antecedents 
Research investigating why firms relocate activities abroad emphasizes three broad factors: 
environmental factors, firm strategy, and organizational factors. First, much research has 
investigated how home and host country environmental factors such as institutional frameworks 
and macro-economic contingencies drive firms to offshore activities (Contractor et al., 2010; 
Dossani and Kenney, 2006; Lewin et al., 2009). For example, Lewin et al. (2009) point out that 
restrictive home country immigration policies have reduced the supply of talented scientists and 
engineers, and, as a result, firms must relocate innovation activities abroad in a “global race for 
talent.” Manning et al. (2008) find that national development policies in host locations have led 
to the emergence of new geographic clusters in emerging economies that are being used as 
offshoring hubs by global firms. Research has also pointed out how general advancements in 
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ICT and the modularization and commodification of firm activities lead firms to offshoring 
(Contractor et al., 2010; Dossani and Kenney, 2006). 
 
Table 1.1 – Important offshoring research topics and contributions 
Antecedents 
Implementation 
characteristics 
Performance 
Environmental 
• Macro (Dossani and Kenney, 
2006; Lewin et al., 2009). 
• Institutional (Manning et al. 
2008). 
 
Strategic orientation 
• Efficiency-seeking (Manning 
et al., 2008, Kedia and Lahiri, 
2007). 
• Market-seeking 
(Hutzschenreuter et al. 
2011a; Martinez-Noya and 
Garcia-Canal, 2011). 
• Resource-seeking (Javalgi et 
al., 2009; Lewin et al., 2009). 
 
Firm-level effects 
• Experience (Hätönen, 2009; 
Jensen, 2009; Maskell et al., 
2007). 
• Size (Roza et al. 2011). 
 
Activities 
• Services (Jensen and 
Pedersen 2011; Manning et 
al., 2008). 
• Production (Mudambi and 
Venzin 2010). 
• R&D (Nieto and Rodriguez 
2011). 
 
Location 
• Local factor markets 
(Demirbag and Glaister, 
2010; Hahn et al., 2011; Graf 
and Mudambi, 2005). 
• Cultural distance 
(Hutzschenreuter et al., 
2011a). 
• Far and near-shoring 
(Bunyaratavej et al. 2008; 
Hahn et al. 2011). 
 
Governance mode  
• Captive (Lewin and Peeters, 
2006). 
• Outsourced (Manning et al., 
2011). 
 
Coordination 
• Tacit coordination (Srikanth 
and Puranam, 2011). 
• Task interdependency 
(Kumar et al., 2009). 
Financial 
• Cost savings (Lewin and 
Peeters, 2006). 
• Export performance 
(Bertrand, 2011). 
• Return on investment 
(Mol et al. 2005). 
 
Non-financial  
• Innovation (Nieto and 
Rodriguez 2011). 
• Learning (Jensen 2009). 
• Implementation time 
(Hutzschenreuter et al. 
2011b). 
• Hidden costs (Dibbern et 
al. 2008). 
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 Second, much research has emphasized a number of strategic drivers underlying firms’ 
offshoring decisions (Manning et al., 2008, Kedia and Lahiri, 2007). Perhaps the most acute 
driver of offshoring is the desire to exploit global competitive costs advantages (Manning et al., 
2008, Lewin and Couto, 2006; Roza et al., 2011). This relates to cutting labor and resource costs 
(Roza et al., 2011), but also to access new and important markets (Hutzschenreuter et al., 2011a, 
Martinez-Noya and Garcia-Canal, 2011). It has also been argued that firms offshore firm 
activities as part of a resource-seeking strategy, in which particularly qualified personnel is a 
main driver (Lewin et al., 2009; Javalgi et al., 2009).  
 Third, research suggests how firm-level heterogeneity such as firm size and past 
experience drives firms to engage in offshoring (Hutzschenreuter et al., 2011b; Lewin et al., 
2009; Roza et al., 2011). For example, there are studies suggesting that firm size has a significant 
impact on which activities are offshored as well as the motivation for offshoring (Roza et al., 
2011). Moreover, firms’ past offshoring experience is argued to have an important effect on the 
degree and success of future offshoring (Hätönen, 2009; Jensen, 2009; Maskell et al., 2007), the 
types of activities being offshored (Lewin et al., 2009), and the governance modes chosen 
(Hutzschenreuter et al., 2011a; Martinez-Noya and Garcia-Canal, 2011). 
 
Implementation characteristics 
Another offshoring research stream looks more into the characteristics of firms’ offshoring 
implementation, and emphasizes factors such as the governance mode of the implementation, the 
type of activities being offshored, the locations chosen, and the coordination mechanisms used. 
First, much research has focused on explaining why firms choose certain governance mode over 
others (Griffith et al., 2009; Gopal et al., 2003; Hutzschenreuter et al., 2011a; Vivek et al., 
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2009). For example, using transaction cost economics logic, Griffith et al., (2009) suggest that 
the asset specificity and uncertainty of the transaction has a direct impact on whether the activity 
is implemented internally in the firm or in an outsourced arrangement. There is also research 
analyzing factors that determine the probability of contract renewal in offshore outsourcing 
arrangements (Manning et al., 2011). Finally, papers have investigated shifts in offshoring 
governance modes (Vivek et al., 2009; Petersen et al., 2010).  
 Much attention has also been devoted to understanding why firms choose certain 
locations when offshoring (Demirbag and Glaister, 2010; Bunyaratavej et al., 2008; Hahn et al., 
2011; Fuchs and Kirchain, 2010; Graf and Mudambi, 2005). For example, firms are argued to 
offshore to locations with favorable wage differentials, knowledge infrastructure, availability of 
qualified personnel, and preferable country risks relative to the home country (Bunyaratavej et 
al., 2008; Doh et al., 2009). Research has also investigated how cultural distance impacts the 
location choice (Hutzschenreuter et al., 2011a). Finally, firms are argued to offshore to locations 
in which they have previous experience (Demirbag and Glaister, 2010) or ethnic ties (Zaheer et 
al., 2009).  
 Further, there is much research investigating which types of tasks are being offshored 
(Jensen and Pedersen, 2011; Lewin and Peeters, 2006; Maskell et al., 2007). For example, 
research looks at factors leading firms to offshore services (Jensen and Pedersen, 2011), 
production (Mudambi and Venzin, 2010), and research and development (Nieto and Rodriguez, 
2011). Moreover, over time firms are found to increase the number of activities offshored (Lewin 
and Peeters, 2006; Manning et al., 2008) as well as the sophistication of the offshored activities 
(Jensen, 2009; Maskell et al., 2007).  
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Finally, a stream of research investigates the relationship between offshoring and firms’ 
coordination and integration efforts (e.g., Dibbern et al., 2008; Kumar et al., 2009; Srikanth and 
Puranam, 2011). For example, Kumar et al. (2009) argue that existing interdependency 
typologies are inadequate in explaining task interdependencies in globally distributed work. 
Srikanth and Puranam (2011) argue that the new interdependencies that arise between the 
offshore and onshore tasks negatively impact the performance of the offshored process, and that 
investing in coordination mechanisms such as modularity, ongoing communication and tacit 
coordination mechanisms has a positive moderating impact on this relationship. 
 
Performance 
There are also a number of research contributions that investigate the outcomes of offshoring. In 
this respect, different studies have provided different financial and non-financial 
operationalizations and results on offshoring performance. Research employing financial 
measures to investigate offshoring performance has looked at aspects such as corporate financial 
performance (Mol et al., 2005), cost savings (Lewin and Peeters, 2006), export performance 
(Bertrant, 2011), and sales growth (Murray et al., 1995). Papers employing non-financial 
measures to investigate offshoring performance has emphasized aspects such as learning and 
organizational transformation (Jensen, 2009; Maskell et al., 2007), innovation performance 
(Nieto and Rodríguez, 2011), market shares (Kotabe and Murray, 1990), and implementation 
time (Hutzschenreuter et al., 2011b). 
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1.3  THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS  
An organizational design perspective on offshoring  
As evidenced by the previous section, extant research has made important contributions in 
understanding why firms offshore, the characteristics of the offshoring implementation, and the 
outcomes of offshoring. This thesis seeks particularly to draw and build on the research 
investigating the organizational design of offshoring (see e.g., Dibbern et al., 2008; Kumar et al., 
2009; Srikanth and Puranam, 2011, for similar perspectives regarding the relationship between 
offshoring and firms’ coordination and integration efforts). Specifically, offshoring is regarded 
as an organizational reconfiguration in which co-located organizational activities are relocated to 
foreign locations. Whether firms relocate activities with the purpose of accessing resources or as 
a response to political pressures, this perspective stresses a process in which firms are presented 
with new challenges of coordinating and integrating offshoring activities in a global 
organization. The added complexities and uncertainties of coordinating an organization 
consisting of a number of offshored activities, in contrast to an organization with only co-located 
activities, require firms to invest additional resources in coordination mechanisms so that an 
efficient reintegration can be achieved. Thus, offshoring can be described as an organizational 
reconfiguration in which the relocated activities must subsequently be reintegrated to optimize 
performance (Mudambi and Venzin, 2010). 
To elaborate, organizations can be viewed as systems of interdependent activities that 
must be coordinated to optimize organizational performance (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; 
Galbraith, 1977; Thompson, 1967). Due to this emphasis on interdependencies, organizations are 
inherently complex. For example, Thompson (1967) portrays a complex organization as a set of 
many interdependent parts. Simon (1962: 468) defines complexity in systems as “a large number 
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of parts that interact in a nonsimple way.” The consequences of complexity can be severe unless 
appropriately managed. For example, since organizational activities require ongoing 
communication to coordinate decisions and behaviors, a growing number of interdependencies 
increases the number of channels to coordinate joint and interdependent organizational actions 
(Thompson, 1967), which in turn affect the organizational ability to process information (Simon, 
1955), and eventually increases the likelihood of decision errors (Levinthal, 1997). Moreover, 
with growing complexity, there is a larger risk of organizational inefficiencies, inertia and lack of 
response capacity (Anderson, 1999; Moldoveanu and Bauer, 2004; Park and Ungson, 2001; 
Robson et al., 2008). Thus, a main task for the firm is to manage the complexity and uncertainty 
inherent in the organization. According to Thompson (1967: 13), “the central problem for 
complex organizations is one of coping with uncertainty.” Firms need to design their 
organizations so that interdependent work is coordinated and supportive of organizational goals 
(Van de Ven et al., 1976).  
In this respect, firms’ level of architectural knowledge—their understanding of how 
components in an organizational system are related to each other—is important (Baldwin and 
Clark, 2000; Brusoni and Prencipe, 2006; Ethiraj and Levinthal 2004a; Henderson and Clark, 
1990; Puranam et al., 2012). To make effective design decisions, firms need knowledge about 
the individual activities and about the ways that the different activities are integrated and linked 
together in a coherent organizational system. Without knowledge on how the organization with 
its activities and interdependencies function, the risk that incorrect and even deteriorating design 
decisions are taken increases. 
This view is important when considering offshoring. A major consequence of offshoring 
is the relocation of originally co-located activities to foreign locations. When activities are co-
12 
 
located, firms may tend not to see the rationale of formalizing organizational mechanisms for 
coordination and knowledge transfer through standardized interfaces and clear divisions of labor 
since day-to-day problems and challenges can more easily be solved in an informal face-to-face 
manner (Storper and Venables 2004). However, when distinct organizational activities are 
relocated to foreign locations, firms face increasing complexity and coordination challenges 
(Kumar et al., 2009; Srikanth and Puranam, 2011). With offshoring, opportunities for informal 
coordination are reduced (Allen, 1997) and project teams may find it more difficult to build 
collegial social environments and common ground due to less communication and shared context 
(Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Clark and Brennan, 1991; Kraut et al., 2002; Martinez and Jarillo, 
1989). In contrast to a firm consisting of only co-located activities, a firm that relocates 
organizational tasks and sub-components abroad must thus coordinate an international network 
of activities across cultures and different institutional systems (Kumar et al., 2009; Niederman et 
al. 2006; Srikanth and Puranam, 2011). This may prove challenging on a number of dimensions. 
For example, not only may offshoring provoke internal resistance (e.g., Lewin and Couto, 2007), 
but it may also hamper operational efficiency due to lack of trust, status differences between 
domestic and foreign units, and lack of understanding and communication in the process of 
delivering tasks, and interacting with offshore units (e.g., Vlaar et al., 2008; Levina and Vaast, 
2008). Employees with cultural and language differences at geographically dispersed locations 
are refrained from informal face-to-face coordination, and are forced to rely on less superior 
technology-based coordination mechanisms (Storper and Venables, 2004). Above all, the 
dispersion of organizational activities challenges bounded rational decision makers’ ability to 
understand the true interdependency structure underlying various design efforts (cf., Simon, 
1955). As firms are required to implement coordination mechanisms that accommodate for the 
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added distance between interdependent activities, decision makers’ need knowledge of how the 
underlying components in the organizational system are related to each other. 
Conceptually, offshoring can therefore be regarded as a three-staged process of 
organizational reconfiguration that must all be effectively managed to optimize performance: 
disintegration, relocation, and re-integration (cf., Mudambi and Venzin, 2010). First, offshoring 
entails that firms dispatch co-located organizational activities. Driven by the potential of 
economizing the organizational structure by identifying specific tasks to be offshored, firms 
consequently break down their organizational activities into a larger number of sub-processes. 
For example, rather than offshoring production as one distinct activity, firms typically offshore 
activities such as fabrication, assembly, and maintenance. Second, offshoring describes a 
relocation of the disaggregated business tasks and activities from the home country to a foreign 
host location so that objectives such as access to lower cost levels, new resources and markets 
can be achieved. The organization is reconfigured on issues such as the contractual ownership 
and relationship of the offshoring setup (Hutzschenreuter et al., 2011a), the geography of the 
host location (Graf and Mudambi, 2005), the interdependencies and coordination mechanisms 
between the spatially differentiated organizational tasks and activities (Kumar et al., 2009; 
Srikanth and Puranam, 2011), and the overall coherence of the globally dispersed organizational 
system (Ernst and Kim, 2002). Third, once the disaggregated activities are relocated, firms need 
to re-integrate with the remaining organizational activities so that coordinated action may be 
fulfilled. As such, firms need to ensure that aspects such as knowledge transfer, coordination, 
and control are not obscured by the geographic, political and institutional distances between the 
onsite organization and offshoring activities. 
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1.4  RESEARCH DESIGN  
This thesis consists of four distinct research papers that each investigates respective research 
questions relating to the organizational design and consequences of offshoring. While each paper 
is written to be self-contained and can be read separately, the intention of the thesis is that the 
individual contributions together scrutinize the organizational consequences of offshoring and as 
such provide a coherent answer to the overarching research question. In the following, the 
empirical foundation of the thesis is elaborated on before the individual research papers are 
introduced and summarized. 
 
Empirical foundation 
The empirical foundation of this thesis resolves around two survey based databases (Offshoring 
Research Network and Global Operations Network) and a number of case studies.  
 
Offshoring Research Network 
The first database used in this thesis comes from the Offshoring Research Network (ORN). ORN 
is an international network of firms and scholars studying the emergence of recent trends of 
services offshoring and outsourcing (see e.g., Lewin and Peeters, 2006; Lewin et al., 2009). 
Since its foundation in 2004, the ORN research team has primarily conducted two major annual 
surveys based on which offshoring-related data has been collected: a corporate client survey and 
a service provider survey. Both the client and provider surveys are taken online, in which 
respondents reach the survey through external links or e-mail invitations. Once registered and 
approved by the ORN survey team, respondents are added to the database. The corporate client 
survey collects data from U.S. firms and European firms on their offshore implementations, 
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including information on tasks offshored, launch year, location choice, choice of delivery model 
(both captive and outsourced) and performance data. The service provider survey annually 
collects a range of firm- and service-specific data from service providers in the U.S., Western 
and Eastern Europe, India, China, Latin America and other regions. The survey informs about 
features of services provided, locations from which services are provided, and performance of 
service delivery. In this thesis, the ORN surveys are used for the papers in Chapter 2 and 4. 
 
Global Operations Network 
The second database comes from the Global Operations Network (GONe); a research network of 
different Scandinavian universities
2
 established in 2009 that study industries and companies that 
been intensively exposed to globalization. Among other activities, the network has conducted a 
survey among firms from Denmark and Sweden that focuses on the process of relocating 
activities to foreign locations (targeting the latest offshoring implementation in the respective 
firms). Assuming that the process of offshoring challenges firms’ ability to coordinate a globally 
concerted organization (Kumar et al., 2009; Srikanth and Puranam, 2011), the purpose of this 
survey is to unravel the organizational consequences of offshoring on issues such as different 
organizational mechanisms that firms employ to manage their offshoring activities as well as to 
investigate performance implications and capability development. The population of the study 
consists of all Danish firms across industries with more than 50 employees (2,908 companies) 
and all Swedish manufacturing firms with more than 50 employees (1,549 companies). The 
survey was conducted among these 4,457 companies in the time period from September 2011 to 
January 2012, where the CEOs of the companies were invited to participate in an online survey 
                                                 
2
 Aalborg University, Chalmers University of Technology, Copenhagen Business School, and University of 
Southern Denmark. 
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per postal mail and e-mail. In the survey, the respondents were asked about the characteristics of 
the offshoring implementations, the coordination of the offshoring activities, the 
interdependencies between domestic and offshored activities, and the effects of offshoring the 
activities. All in all, 1,086 usable questionnaires were received, which represents a response rate 
of 24.4%. Out of these, 379 companies (34.9%) reported that they have experience with 
offshoring. This data is used in Chapter 3. 
 
Case studies 
Finally, a number of case studies on the offshoring experiences of Danish companies have been 
conducted (see e.g., Larsen et al., 2010; Larsen and Pedersen, 2012a; Larsen and Pedersen, 
2012b, for teaching cases). A recurring theme in the case studies is the evolution of offshoring 
practices within the firms. For example, a case study of LEGO (Larsen et al., 2010) describes the 
evolution of the company’s offshoring practice over a period of seven years, and stresses how 
complexity and uncertainty led to significant reconfiguration efforts. The data for the cases 
consists of a number of in-depth semi-structured interviews with respective managers in the 
companies and rich secondary data such as annual reports and industry descriptions. Although 
the cases do not form the empirical backbone of the thesis, Chapter 4 draws explicitly on a case 
study of Nokia with the purpose of building theory, and Chapter 5 uses the LEGO case as an 
example to illustrate theory. In general, though, the purpose of the case studies is to understand 
the broader organizational impact of offshoring in a narrative form. 
 
 
 
17 
 
Summary of the research papers 
While the four research papers deviate in their focus, a common thread relates to the notion that 
offshoring signifies an organizational reconfiguration with consequences for areas such as 
decision-making, architectural knowledge, and performance. The first paper investigates how the 
organizational complexity of offshoring leads to ‘hidden costs’ of reconfiguring the organization, 
i.e., deviations between expected and realized costs of implementing activities abroad. The 
second paper looks at how these hidden reconfiguration costs influence the process performance 
of the offshored activity, and how this relationship is moderated by the modularity of that 
activity. The third paper investigates the effect of the organizational reconfiguration of 
offshoring on firms’ strategies. The final paper studies performance implications of how firms 
adapt when offshoring. The four papers are summarized in Table 1.2 and are elaborated on in the 
following.   
 
Chapter 2: Uncovering the hidden costs of offshoring: The interplay of complexity, 
organizational design, and experience (co-authored with Stephan Manning and Torben 
Pedersen) 
The first research paper studies hidden costs of implementing offshoring activities abroad (e.g., 
Dibbern et al., 2008; Stringfellow et al., 2008). A key function in strategic decision-making is 
the ability to estimate the costs of implementing strategic decisions (Durand, 2003; Makadok and 
Walker, 2000). It is argued that certain costs of implementation are neglected in strategic 
decision-making processes, and as such can be regarded as hidden. Since offshoring is seen as an 
organizational reconfiguration in which originally co-located activities are relocated across 
distances in captive or outsourced arrangements, the challenges of coordinating and integrating 
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offshoring activities in globally organized firms make the efficient ex ante estimation of future 
costs more difficult. Specifically, the growing configuration and task complexity of offshoring 
has a negative impact on decision makers’ ability to estimate the future costs of offshoring, 
resulting in cost estimation errors. However, it is also argued that the organizational design 
orientations of firms’ offshoring strategies and offshoring experience have a positive moderating 
role on the relationship between complexity and cost estimation errors. Firms with strategies 
characterized by a strong orientation toward an overall system of structures and processes and 
with prior experience are more likely to anticipate and align offshoring complexity with 
corresponding organizational structures and processes, and thus reduce the negative impact of 
complexity.  
These arguments are supported by comprehensive data from the Offshoring Research 
Network. However, the data also suggest that while captive offshoring is much more responsive 
to broader configuration and design factors, hidden costs in offshore outsourcing are more driven 
by task- and transaction-related factors. In sum, these findings have important implications for 
ongoing research on hidden costs of globally dispersed and complex operations (e.g., Kumar et 
al., 2009; Srikanth and Puranam, 2011) and for research on estimation biases in strategic 
decision-making (e.g., Durand, 2003; Hogarth and Makridakis, 1981; Kahneman and Lovallo, 
1993; Makadok and Walker, 2000; March and Simon, 1958). 
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Table 1.2 – Overview of research papers 
 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5 
Title (co-
authors) 
“Uncovering the 
hidden costs of 
offshoring: The 
interplay of 
complexity, 
organizational design, 
and experience” (with 
Stephan Manning and 
Torben Pedersen). 
“Foreseeing 
reconfiguration costs 
and the role of 
modularity: A study 
on offshoring process 
offshoring” (single-
authored). 
“Organizational 
reconfiguration and 
strategic response: 
The case of 
offshoring” (with 
Torben Pedersen). 
“Organizational 
adaptation in 
offshoring: The 
difference between 
an experimental 
and experiential 
learning strategy” 
(with Christian G. 
Asmussen and 
Torben Pedersen). 
Research 
question 
What are factors that 
cause hidden costs and 
why do some firms 
encounter higher 
hidden costs than 
others? 
What are performance 
implications of 
reconfiguration cost 
estimation errors? 
How does the 
organizational 
reconfiguration of 
offshoring influence 
firms’ strategies? 
What is the 
difference between 
an experimental 
and experiential 
learning strategy 
when offshoring? 
Methods Quantitative using 
data from the ORN. 
Quantitative using 
data from the GONe. 
Qualitative case on 
Nokia Denmark and 
quantitative using 
data from the ORN. 
Formal modeling 
of organizational 
adaptation. 
Findings Offshoring complexity 
is positively associated 
with cost estimation 
errors, while design 
orientation and 
experience negatively 
moderate this effect. 
Reconfiguration costs 
estimation errors 
negatively impact 
process performance 
consequences, while 
modularity positively 
influence this effect 
As firms’ offshoring 
increases, they will 
growingly 
acknowledge 
organizational 
objectives in their 
strategies. 
The attractiveness 
of an experiential 
strategy decreases 
with distance and 
coordination costs 
but increases with 
the uncertainty of 
the underlying 
technological 
landscape. 
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Chapter 3: Foreseeing reconfiguration costs and the role of modularity: A study on offshoring 
process offshoring (single-authored) 
Following up on the first research paper, this second research paper investigates performance 
implications of hidden costs, i.e., the situations where decision makers’ estimations of the 
reconfiguration costs of implementing strategic decisions are surpassed by actual cost levels. 
Embedded in literature that investigates the relationship between firms’ estimation ability and 
performance (Durand, 2003; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Makadok and Walker 2000), it is 
argued that decision makers’ inability to effectively estimate the reconfiguration costs of 
implementing an activity in a foreign location has a negative impact on the process performance 
of that activity. As firms underestimate reconfiguration costs, they incur substantial opportunity 
costs by allocating and investing unexpected additional resources in personnel training, facilities, 
and materials which may eventually result in economic and cognitive barriers (Lavie, 2006). 
Consequently, reconfiguration cost estimation errors will likely make the operations of the 
activity less prioritized, and this will have a negative impact on the process performance of that 
activity.  
However, it is further argued that this relationship is positively moderated by the 
modularity of the activity. Building the argument developed in the first research paper that the 
complexity of coordinating an offshoring organization lead to cost estimation failures, the extent 
to which the activities that are relocated offshore are modularized—i.e., the interdependencies 
specified and standardized (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Sanchez and Mahoney 1996)—should 
positively moderate the negative relationship between cost estimation errors and process 
performance. By more easily facilitating aspects such as organizational reintegration, knowledge 
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transfer, and effective division of labor between the domestic and foreign activities, the negative 
impact of reconfiguration cost estimation errors is undermined. 
These arguments are supported by comprehensive data on 221 offshoring 
implementations from the GONe survey, and contribute to ongoing research on offshoring by 
emphasizing the importance of reconfiguration costs estimation in the offshoring processes (e.g., 
Lewin and Peeters, 2006; Mol et al. 2005; Massini et al., 2010). Moreover, this paper contributes 
more generally to research on hidden costs and firms’ estimation ability (Durand, 2003; 
Makadok and Walker, 2000; Stringfellow, et al., 2008) by emphasizing the importance of 
estimating the costs of internal organizational change (cf., Karim and Mitchell, 2004) while at 
the same time aligning firms’ coordination mechanisms to the new organizational requirements. 
 
Chapter 4: Organizational reconfiguration and strategic response: The case of offshoring (co-
authored with Torben Pedersen) 
The third research paper investigates the effect of the organizational reconfiguration of 
offshoring on firms’ strategies. When firms reconfigure their organizations, they need knowledge 
on how different activities are integrated and linked together in a coherent organizational system 
(Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001; 2006; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Puranam et al., 2012). Since a 
consequence of relocating activities to foreign locations is the need to reintegrate the 
geographically relocated organizational activities into a coherent organizational architecture 
(Mudambi and Venzin, 2009), firms thus need architectural knowledge. In this respect, 
cumulative learning-by-doing over time is important (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Adler and Clark, 
1991). As firms gain experience with the offshoring implementation, decision makers will 
increasingly understand the true nature of the organizational activities and the interdependencies 
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between these and as such accumulate architectural knowledge. Consequently, as firms’ 
experience with particular offshoring implementations increases they will begin to consider 
organizational objectives in their strategies. 
This idea is developed using a mixed-method approach based on a qualitative case study 
of Nokia, one of the worlds’ largest mobile phone manufacturers, and data from the ORN survey. 
First, the findings of an in-depth case study of offshoring in a product development project in 
Nokia are presented. The case shows how the decision to offshore was initially driven by 
locational objectives, such as lower costs and access to strategic resources, but that this changed 
over time towards organizational objectives that could increase organizational performance. 
Second, ORN data suggest that firms with more experience with a specific offshoring project is 
more likely to encapsulate objectives such as enhancing efficiency through business process 
redesign and reduced system redundancy in their strategies. These findings contribute to research 
on the role of architectural knowledge in offshoring and more broadly to literature that seeks to 
understand how different architectural forms and practices correlate to organizational 
performance (e.g., Datta, 1991, Foss et al., 2011, Zott and Amit, 2008, Sah and Stiglitz, 1986). 
 
Chapter 5: Organizational adaptation in offshoring: The difference between an experimental 
and experiential learning strategy (co-authored with Christian Geisler Asmussen and Torben 
Pedersen) 
The final paper builds on the third research paper, but argues that architectural knowledge 
accumulation is not necessarily always a result of cumulative learning-by-doing over long 
periods of time. In contrast, firms can pursue an experimental learning strategy in which they 
seek to accumulate architectural knowledge before the actual offshoring relocation takes place. 
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Here, firms can accumulate architectural knowledge by experimenting with different 
configurations while the activities are still co-located at home. 
By juxtaposing the experiential learning strategy (learning-by-doing after offshoring 
implementation) and the experimental learning strategy (home-based learning before offshoring 
implementation), this paper builds a formal model that examines the performance implications of 
how firms adapt to an underlying technological landscape through the accumulation of 
architectural knowledge in the context of offshoring. In contrast to other perspectives on the 
organizational change and adaptation (Brusoni and Prencipe, 2006; Eisenhardt and Brown, 1999; 
Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004a; Karim, 2006; 2009; Zhou, 2011), the context of offshoring has the 
benefit of adding the element of distance to the interdependent organizational system (Kumar et 
al., 2009; Niederman et al. 2006; Srikanth and Puranam, 2011). It is argued that the relative 
attractiveness of the experiential strategy decreases with distance and coordination costs but 
increases with the uncertainty of the underlying technological landscape. Uncertainty creates 
noise that makes it increasingly difficult for firms to estimate the impact and consequences of the 
organizational reconfiguration. Moreover, it is argued that uncertainty has a positive moderating 
effect on the relationship between distance and the experiential strategy. Uncertainty signifies a 
lower signal-to-noise ratio which leads to situations of causal ambiguity (Lippman and Rumelt, 
1982), and the value of accumulating architectural knowledge through the experimental learning 
strategy is undermined. 
This paper contributes to research on architectural knowledge (Ethiraj and Levinthal 
2004a; Henderson and Clark, 1990) by proposing a performance trade-off between the 
experimental and experiential learning strategy. Moreover, by stressing the performance 
implications of how firms gain architectural knowledge when going abroad, this paper extends 
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existing views on internationalization that emphasize how firms need to accumulate local market 
knowledge to adapt to new foreign environments (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Lord and Ranft, 
2000; Makino and Delios, 1996).  
 
1.5  FINAL REMARKS 
This thesis investigates offshoring in an organizational context. Adapting the view that 
offshoring signifies an organizational reconfiguration, this thesis seeks to understand how the 
organization is affected by the decision to relocate firm activities to foreign locations. In so 
doing, it intends to understand why some firms fail when offshoring and others do not. The four 
research papers constituting this thesis are presented in the following chapters. In the final 
chapter, the thesis is concluded by discussing its implications. 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
 
Uncovering the hidden costs of offshoring:  
The interplay of complexity, organizational 
design, and experience1 
 
 
Marcus Møller Larsen
2
 
Stephan Manning
3
 
Torben Pedersen
4
 
 
Abstract: This study investigates estimation errors due to hidden costs—the costs of 
implementation that are neglected in strategic decision-making processes—in the context of 
services offshoring. Based on data from the Offshoring Research Network, we find that decision 
makers are more likely to make cost-estimation errors given increasing configuration and task 
complexity in captive offshoring and offshore outsourcing, respectively. Moreover, we show that 
experience and a strong orientation toward organizational design in the offshoring strategy 
reduce the cost-estimation errors that follow from complexity. Our findings contribute to 
research on the effectiveness of sourcing and global strategies by stressing the importance of 
organizational design and experience in dealing with increasing complexity. 
 
Keywords: hidden costs; offshoring; complexity; estimation errors; organizational design.  
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2.1  INTRODUCTION 
Many firms find that the implementation of strategic decisions can trigger substantial hidden 
costs that negatively affect firm performance. For example, a firm may find that the 
implementation of a diversification strategy requires substantially more coordination than 
initially expected. A firm may also discover that knowledge transfer in the context of 
internationalizing business activities is more costly than expected. By hidden costs, we refer to 
the unanticipated costs of implementation that arise in strategic decision-making processes (see 
Dibbern et al., 2008; Reitzig and Wagner, 2010; Stringfellow et al., 2008). In this paper, we 
investigate the nature of estimation errors due to hidden costs. In particular, we seek to better 
understand why certain costs are hidden from managerial attention and thus not accounted for in 
initial cost estimations. 
We study hidden costs in the context of offshoring of administrative and technical 
services, that is, the sourcing of business services supporting domestic and global operations 
from abroad in internal or external arrangements (Contractor et al., 2010; Manning et al., 2008). 
The offshoring of service activities has gained momentum in recent years. Today, many western 
firms not only offshore standardized IT and business processes but also more complex, 
knowledge-intensive activities and product development (Lewin et al., 2009). However, many 
firms have begun to realize that managing an increasingly globally dispersed organization is 
more difficult and costly than initially expected (Dibbern et al., 2008; Stringfellow et al., 2008). 
In particular, decision makers often fail to accurately estimate the costs of offshoring and are 
therefore surprised by unexpected—or hidden—costs of implementing offshoring decisions.  
Most research on offshoring to date has focused on why firms offshore particular 
functions, the governance modes they choose, the locations they select to host offshored 
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activities, and the outcomes that they achieve (e.g., Lewin et al., 2009; Kedia and Mukherjee, 
2009; Mol et al., 2005). In this paper, we focus on the organizational design of offshoring, and 
the challenge of coordinating and integrating offshoring activities in globally organized firms 
(Srikanth and Puranam, 2011). In this regard, offshoring can be described as an organizational 
reconfiguration in which originally co-located activities are relocated across distances in captive 
or outsourced arrangements, which must subsequently be reintegrated (Mudambi and Venzin, 
2010). Consequently, firms are often presented with new complexities and uncertainties, which 
have an impact on decision makers’ abilities to estimate the costs of offshoring.  
Using comprehensive data from the Offshoring Research Network, we argue that the 
increased complexity that follows from offshoring involves a number of operational challenges 
and related costs, part of which are ignored or not anticipated when offshoring decisions are 
made. As a result, we observe a significant gap between expected and achieved performance, as 
measured by the distance between expected and achieved cost savings. However, we also argue 
that this relationship is moderated by the organizational design orientations of firms’ offshoring 
strategies and by firms’ offshoring experience. Firms with strategies characterized by a strong 
orientation toward an overall system of structures and processes, and firms with prior experience 
are more likely to anticipate and align offshoring complexity with corresponding organizational 
structures and processes. Thus, organizational design orientation and experience nurture decision 
makers’ abilities to anticipate the costs of complex organizations. 
Our findings contribute to the growing stream of literature on the operational challenges 
of offshoring (Srikanth and Puranam, 2011; Stringfellow et al., 2008) by emphasizing the 
importance of hidden costs, complexity, design strategies, and experience. On a more general 
level, these findings have important implications for estimation biases in strategic decision 
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making, and improve our understanding of the role of experience and organizational design 
orientation in relation to those biases (e.g., Durand, 2003; Hogarth and Makridakis, 1981; 
Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993; Makadok and Walker, 2000; March and Simon, 1958). This 
research emphasizes the organizational design of a firm and highlights how organizational 
changes should be incorporated into strategic analyses. This may stimulate future research on the 
evolution of global firm designs and architectures by stressing the role, magnitude, and 
consequences of complexity in organizations (e.g., Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004a; Nadler and 
Tushman, 1997; Sinha and Van de Ven, 2005). 
 
2.2  THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Hidden costs, complexity, and bounded rationality 
Hidden costs can be understood as implementation costs that are not anticipated in the various 
stages of strategic decision making. A key function in strategic decision making—defined as the 
commitment to important decisions in terms of actions to be taken, resources to be devoted, or 
precedents set (Dean and Sharfman, 1996; Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992; Mintzberg, 
Raisinghani, and Théorêt, 1976)—is the ability to estimate the costs of implementing a strategic 
decision (Durand, 2003; Makadok and Walker, 2000). Often, however, firms find that 
unanticipated costs or ‘post-decision surprises’ (Harrison and March, 1984) erupt and challenge 
the strategic intent and rationale of the decision. In such cases, these costs have been ignored or 
overlooked—thus hidden—by the decision maker in the strategic decision-making process. 
Hidden costs are thus ex ante unaccounted for, which is why they materialize ex post as a 
discrepancy between expected and realized costs. 
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A direct consequence of hidden costs is a negative effect on a decision maker’s ability to 
estimate the impact of strategic decisions, as important costs are hidden from managerial 
attention. Previous research has emphasized that individual biases may impact decision makers’ 
estimation abilities (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; Das and Teng, 1999), that routines may 
short-circuit individuals’ autonomous judgments (Nelson and Winter, 1982), and that dominant 
logic may result in blind spots in decision making (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986). In this paper, 
however, we focus on the role of the organizational context in decision makers’ estimation 
abilities (e.g., Durand, 2003; Hogarth and Makridakis, 1981; March and Simon, 1958) and, in 
particular, on how organizational complexity influences decision makers’ abilities to account for 
costs of implementation. Thus, we seek to understand the impact of complexity on the ability of 
firms to anticipate the actual costs of a strategic implementation. In this regard, we are able to 
explain how decision makers systematically ignore or overlook important costs in strategic 
decision-making processes. 
The organizational impacts and consequences of complexity have long been part of the 
research tradition (Langlois and Robertson, 1992; Loasby, 1976; Nickerson and Zenger, 2002; 
Rawley, 2010; Simon, 1962; Williamson, 1975). Simon (1962: 468) defines complexity in 
systems as “a large number of parts that interact in a nonsimple way.” If organizations are 
viewed as networks of tasks (Grandori 2001; Thompson 1967), then complexity exists when a 
large number of tasks are interdependent. For example, an organization is complex if change in 
one unit requires change in many other units. Moreover, a growing number of interdependent 
parts in an organization increases combinatorial complexity, as the addition of one element 
results in an exponential increase in the number of possible interfaces and interdependencies 
(Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004a).  
30 
 
A firm’s complexity can affect its decision making in many ways. For example, a firm 
that decides to disaggregate its organization into a number of smaller, semiautonomous units will 
experience a rise in the total number of interfaces within the organizational system. As 
organizational tasks and activities require ongoing communication to coordinate decisions and 
behaviors, interdependencies arise along with a growing number of channels to coordinate joint 
and interdependent organizational actions (Thompson, 1967). This has consequences for 
information-processing demand (Simon, 1955), which, in turn, increases the likelihood of 
decision errors (Levinthal, 1997). As such, increasing complexity progressively creates 
difficulties for decision makers attempting to grasp and anticipate the effects of emerging 
interdependencies on system behavior and performance (Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004a; Zhou, 
2011). Complexity limits the ability of managers to rationally account for all important decision 
factors (March and Simon, 1958), which increases the risk that certain performance-detrimental 
consequences will remain hidden in the strategic decision-making process. Hidden costs, 
therefore, relate to implementation costs that are hidden from managerial attention at the point of 
strategic decision making (see Ocasio, 1997). 
 
The hidden costs of offshoring 
We investigate hidden costs in the context of services offshoring. Offshoring refers to the 
internal and external sourcing of tasks and services from a location outside the home country in 
support of domestic and global operations (Contractor et al., 2010; Manning et al., 2008). Many 
offshored activities are interlinked with domestic processes and often require complex 
coordination (Srikanth and Puranam, 2011). This setting is therefore suitable for investigating the 
interplay between complexity and hidden costs.  
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A substantial body of research has demonstrated that offshoring decisions are driven by a 
number of factors, including expectations of lower labor and production costs (Dossani and 
Kenney, 2003), access to talent and qualified labor (Lewin et al., 2009), and opportunities to 
learn (Jensen, 2009). At the same time, however, there are also indications that the initial 
objectives of offshoring are not always achieved and that offshoring decisions may eventually 
prove more costly than expected (Dibbern et al., 2008; Massini et al., 2010; Stringfellow et al., 
2008). For instance, the multinational information technology (IT) corporation Dell Inc. decided 
to back-source its Indian service centers after encountering unexpected challenges of cultural and 
geographic distance (Frauenheim, 2003).  
The concept of hidden costs can be related to three streams of offshoring research (see 
Table 2.1). The first stream focuses on the impact of hidden costs on the financial value of 
offshore outsourcing (e.g., Barthélemy, 2001; Overby, 2003)—a question of interest to business 
practitioners, in particular. In emphasizing the challenges of offshoring, these practitioner-
oriented articles have attempted to specify and quantify the hidden financial costs of offshoring. 
 The second stream discusses hidden costs in relation to strategic choices between 
international outsourcing and vertical integration, where outsourcing—and the resulting loss of 
control and transaction costs resulting from the shift of ownership to an external partner—might 
erode firms’ capabilities and resources (e.g., Bettis et al., 1992; Hendry, 1995; Reitzig and 
Wagner, 2010). For example, Stringfellow et al. (2008: 166) label “invisible costs in offshoring 
services work” as “hidden communication-related costs associated with the use of foreign service 
providers.” Reitzig and Wagner (2010) argue that hidden outsourcing costs can disrupt 
incremental in-house learning processes. Dibbern et al. (2008: 333) identify four particular types 
of unexpected ‘extra costs’ arising from outsourcing software projects to third-party providers 
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abroad: “1) requirements specification and design, 2) knowledge transfer, 3) control, and 4) 
coordination.” 
 
Table 2.1 – Three streams of research on the hidden costs of offshoring 
 
 
Theoretical 
focus 
 
Research question 
 
Examples/consequences 
of hidden costs 
 
 
Indicative literature 
 
Performance 
indicator 
 
How might the practice of 
offshoring eventually 
undermine anticipated 
financial value? 
 
 
 Costs of selecting a 
vendor 
 Costs of layoffs 
 Cultural costs 
 Ramp-up costs 
 Costs of managing an 
offshore contract 
 
 
 Barthélemy (2001) 
 Overby (2003) 
 
Noncontractual 
costs 
 
How does international 
outsourcing (in contrast to 
vertical integration) create 
unexpected costs for 
firms? 
 
 
 Reduce learning 
capabilities 
 Reduce robustness 
 Reduce long-term 
responsiveness 
 Reduce coordination 
ability 
 Undermine core 
competences 
 
 
 Bettis et al. (1992) 
 Hendry (1995) 
 Reitzig and Wagner 
(2010) 
 
 
Costs of 
reconfiguration 
and relocation 
 
 
How does the global 
relocation and 
reconfiguration of 
business tasks and 
activities create 
unexpected costs for 
firms? 
 
 Coordination costs 
 Design/specification 
costs 
 Control costs 
 Knowledge transfer 
costs 
 
 
 Dibbern et al. 
(2008) 
 Kumar et al. (2009) 
 Stringfellow et al. 
(2008) 
 Srikanth and 
Puranam (2011) 
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 A third and more recent stream focuses more fundamentally on hidden costs associated 
with relocating and redesigning tasks and processes within an orchestrated value-generating 
system; that is, the costs of reconfiguring a firm’s internal and external value chains (e.g., Kumar 
et al., 2009; Levy, 1995; Srikanth and Puranam, 2011). According to this view, offshoring can be 
regarded as the process of reconfiguring value chain activities across dispersed locations 
regardless of whether outsourcing or an internal delivery model is chosen (Contractor et al., 
2010; Manning et al., 2008). Therefore, hidden costs might arise from unanticipated 
organizational needs, and can be related to areas such as knowledge transfer, new 
interdependencies, training and coaching, the protection of intellectual capital, or the monitoring 
of performance of offshore units. 
 In this study, we address all three research streams, but we focus in particular on the third 
stream by examining why certain costs of reconfiguring a firm’s value chain in the 
implementation of both captive offshoring and offshore outsourcing are hidden from managerial 
attention in decision-making processes and thus not accounted for in initial cost estimations. 
Obviously, the offshoring of services might also encapsulate hidden benefits, such as 
unanticipated advantages of relocating tasks and activities abroad. For instance, the well-known 
‘went for price, stayed for quality’ reference (Dossani and Kenney, 2003) captures a situation in 
which firms encounter ‘positive externalities’ of offshoring. In other words, firms may find that 
certain outcomes, such as higher service quality, exceed initially expected benefits, such as lower 
labor costs. However, in this paper we focus on a setting in which the practice of offshoring 
typically undermines initial objectives.  
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The complexity of offshoring 
We propose that cost-estimation errors as a manifestation of hidden costs can be explained by 
increasing offshoring complexity. In contrast to a company undertaking all of or the majority of 
its activities at home in proximity to its headquarters, a firm sourcing a large number of activities 
from multiple internal and external providers in different countries is likely to face higher 
complexity. In the following, we distinguish between two types of complexity in offshoring that 
challenge decision makers’ estimation abilities: configuration complexity and task complexity.  
Configuration complexity refers to complexity in terms of the interdependencies in the 
organizational configuration. In this regard, we distinguish between the structural, operational, 
and social layers of the organizational configuration, which together challenge decision makers’ 
cost-estimation abilities. First, structural complexity arises because new interdependencies 
emerge between functional units and across country borders as a consequence of offshoring. For 
instance, when an organizational subtask is relocated to a foreign location, its interdependencies 
with other organizational units are obscured by geographic, political, and institutional differences 
(Kumar et al., 2009). Similarly, prior research finds that extensive outsourcing of manufacturing 
creates new interdependencies, which increase the likelihood of delays and disruptions in global 
supply chains (e.g., Levy, 1995). 
 Second, research suggests that the process of offshoring presents companies with a higher 
number of tasks and activities (Contractor et al., 2010; Mudambi and Venzin, 2010), thus 
increasing operational complexity. Driven by the potential to lower costs and increase efficiency 
by identifying specific tasks to be offshored, firms break down and ‘fine slice’ value chain 
activities into a larger number of sub-processes. For example, while research and development 
(R&D) might constitute one distinct, integrated value chain activity in a home country context, 
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firms might choose to disaggregate the function into a number of more narrowly defined tasks 
and activities when subjecting them to captive and outsourced offshoring. As a result, firms face 
a higher number of interdependencies among processes and, hence, increased operational 
complexity. 
 Third, we argue that the two types of complexity identified above relate to a third type, 
which we call social complexity. Recent research indicates that offshoring may not only provoke 
internal resistance (Lewin and Couto, 2007) but also hamper operational efficiency due to a lack 
of trust, status differences between onsite and offshore units, and a lack of understanding and 
communication in the process of delivering tasks and interacting with offshore units (Vlaar et al., 
2008; Levina and Vaast, 2008). A lack of face-to-face interaction, as well as cultural and 
language differences among employees at geographically dispersed locations, may increase 
social complexity given the need for ‘non-simple’ practices of relationship-building between 
employees and teams. 
 Task complexity, in contrast, relates to the complexity of the individual offshoring 
implementations (e.g., Mudambi and Tallman, 2010; Kumar et al., 2009). A number of different 
task characteristics can influence the complexity of an offshoring implementation, including the 
task’s degree of standardized versus tacit knowledge flows; the presence of inexact and unknown 
means-ends connections; the number and interdependence of subtasks; and the existence of path-
goal multiplicity (e.g., Campbell, 1988; Wood, 1986). In comparison with simpler tasks for 
which such aspects as input and output requirements are easily defined, complex tasks with 
imprecise and ambiguous requirements are more likely to subject the decision maker to bounded 
rationality and uncertainty in the decision-making process. Indeed, research suggests that firms 
are increasingly offshoring more complex tasks, such as design, engineering, and analytical 
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services (Lewin et al., 2009). Accordingly, we argue that the task complexity of different 
offshoring implementations can challenge decision makers’ abilities to estimate the costs of 
relocating a service activity abroad. 
 In sum, we define offshoring complexity as a combination of configuration and task 
complexity. While task complexity resides within the actual implementation, configuration 
complexity occurs as a result of new interdependencies between countries, activities, and people. 
In line with research on complexity (e.g., Anderson, 1999; Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004a; Rawley, 
2010), we argue that a higher degree of offshoring complexity makes it difficult for decision 
makers to consider all important decision-making factors, especially the overarching 
organizational system and its effect on organizational behavior and performance, prior to an 
offshoring implementation. In particular, complexity has consequences for decision makers’ 
cost-estimation abilities, as the managerial task of understanding the globally reconfigured 
organization becomes complicated and is more likely to be misguided, thus resulting in costs that 
are hidden from the decision makers’ view. Therefore, there is a greater risk that decision makers 
facing a high degree of offshoring complexity will make cost-estimation errors in the decision-
making process. Accordingly: 
 
Hypothesis 1: A higher degree of offshoring complexity is likely to increase cost-
estimation errors. 
 
The moderating effect of organizational design orientation and experience 
A number of recent studies report that many firms experience improved performance as a result 
of offshoring, despite high complexity (e.g., Lewin et al., 2009; Massini et al., 2010). For 
37 
 
instance, firms taking a more strategic approach to offshoring, such as those adopting consistent 
ways of selecting locations, implementing projects, and coordinating operations, report better 
performance (Massini et al., 2010). Thus, we posit that the hypothesized relationship between 
offshoring complexity and cost-estimation errors is moderated by factors that explain why some 
firms are comparatively better than others in accounting for hidden costs of offshoring in the 
strategic decision-making process. In the following, we argue that firms’ organizational design 
orientation and offshoring experience help decision makers to better estimate costs as offshoring 
complexity increases.  
 Hidden costs become more likely as the complexity of an organizational system 
increases. This makes it difficult for decision makers to direct appropriate attention during the 
decision-making process to future changes in organizational structures and the interdependencies 
that may result from offshoring. In this respect, the congruence between different components in 
an organizational system spread across different locations becomes central (Nadler and 
Tushman, 1997; Russo and Harrison, 2005). Organizational congruence is defined as “the degree 
to which the needs, demands, goals, objectives, and/or structures of one component are 
consistent with those of the other” (Nadler and Tushman, 1997: 34). While typical models of fit 
look at dyadic relationships, such as the fit between strategy and structure (Chandler, 1962), the 
congruence model is based on the assumption that fit can be multifaceted, simultaneously 
encapsulating different organizational dimensions. Accordingly, we use the congruence model to 
portray the fit between globally dispersed organizational processes, activities, and people, that is, 
the degree to which structures and interdependencies across and within organizational 
boundaries remain consistent as offshoring complexity grows. High congruence corresponds to 
high consistency in the organizational system encapsulating the functional units and human 
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resources spanning national borders and the interdependencies among them. Similarly, a low 
degree of congruence corresponds to low consistency in the organizational system.  
 The degree to which organizational congruence is reflected in a firm’s offshoring strategy 
is important for how accurately decision makers estimate the consequences of offshoring 
complexity. A dominant perception has been that a firm’s primary objective when offshoring is 
to reduce labor costs by targeting low-wage sourcing destinations, such as China and India, and 
to access qualified personnel and new markets (Dossani and Kenney, 2003; Kedia and Lahiri, 
2007). However, research suggests that offshoring may also be motivated by the opportunity to 
improve a firm’s organizational system (Lewin and Couto, 2007). For example, a number of 
firms view the potential for increased organizational flexibility, business process reengineering, 
and reduced system redundancy as an important driver of offshoring. Moreover, firms with 
corporate-wide offshoring strategies report a range of offshoring outcomes besides reduced costs, 
such as organizational flexibility (Massini et al., 2010).  
 We therefore argue that offshoring strategies involving a strong orientation toward the 
overall system of structures and processes, rather than the mere relocation of particular tasks for 
resource-seeking reasons, are better able to account for the hidden costs that follow from 
increasing offshoring complexity, as managerial attention is directed toward how the 
organization and its interdependencies are affected by the offshoring decision (Ocasio, 1997). In 
such situations, decision makers can match the impact of the anticipated organizational changes 
caused by offshoring with resource allocations so that the main offshoring objectives can be met. 
Thus, a higher degree of orientation toward the organizational design of offshoring promotes the 
decision maker’s ability to align offshoring complexity with corresponding organizational 
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structures and processes, and consequently negatively moderates the positive relationship 
between complexity and cost-estimation errors. Hence:  
 
Hypothesis 2: The positive association between offshoring complexity and cost-
estimation errors is negatively moderated by firms’ strategic orientation toward 
organizational design. 
 
A necessary prerequisite for recognizing the most efficient mechanisms for managing 
complex organizations is extensive organizational system knowledge. Organizational system 
knowledge can be defined as knowledge about individual organizational activities comprising an 
organizational system and about how those activities are integrated into an orchestrated 
organizational system (Brusoni and Prencipe, 2006; Henderson and Clark, 1990). In order to 
make effective decisions based on expectations of how the organization is going to change, 
decision makers need knowledge about individual activities and about the ways in which 
different activities are integrated and linked together in a coherent organizational system. For 
example, Brusoni and Prencipe (2006) argue that knowledge evolution is a strong and important 
mediator in organizational change. Similarly, Haunschild and Sullivan (2002) suggest that 
complex and heterogeneous circumstances spur positive learning in organizations. Accordingly, 
firms’ abilities to estimate the consequences of the complexity of offshoring are affected by their 
organizational system knowledge, including knowledge of interdependencies and interfaces 
between different units and activities.  
Thus, a central question is the following: how do firms acquire and accumulate 
knowledge to successfully integrate a vast array of heterogeneous activities into an orchestrated 
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system? In this respect, offshoring is often portrayed as a learning-by-doing process (Jensen, 
2009; Maskell et al., 2007). In particular, research shows that firms with previous offshoring 
experience generally display better performance in new offshoring ventures (Hutzschenreuter et 
al., 2007; Manning et al., 2008). Hutzschenreuter et al. (2007) argue that firms’ past offshoring 
experience may influence the range of issues and possibilities that managers consider when 
making offshoring decisions. Thus, we argue that firms with prior offshoring experience are 
more likely to have accumulated organizational system knowledge and will therefore be 
comparatively better in estimating the costs of offshoring associated with complexity. In other 
words, firms with experience are more likely to anticipate the hidden costs of offshoring and 
therefore avoid estimation errors. We therefore hypothesize the following: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The positive association between offshoring complexity and cost-
estimation errors is negatively moderated by the firms’ offshoring experience. 
 
In sum, we derive a theoretical model of hidden costs in which offshoring complexity is 
likely to increase cost-estimation errors but is negatively moderated by organizational design 
orientation and experience (see Figure 2.1).  
 
2.3  DATA AND METHODS  
We examine both the effect of offshoring complexity on cost-estimation errors as a manifestation 
of hidden costs, and the moderating effects of design orientation and offshoring experience of the 
firm using primary data collected by the Offshoring Research Network (ORN) and data gathered 
from secondary sources (on distances). The ORN is a network of scholars and organizations  
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Figure 2.1 – Theoretical model: the hidden costs of offshoring 
 
 
based in the United States, Europe, and Australia that study the emergence of trends in services 
offshoring (e.g., Lewin et al., 2009; Massini et al., 2010; Manning et al., 2011). Since its 
foundation in 2004, the ORN research team has conducted two major surveys annually—a 
corporate client survey and a service provider survey—to collect offshoring-related data. As both 
the client and provider surveys are taken online, respondents reach the survey Web site through 
external links or e-mail invitations. Once registered and approved by the ORN survey team, 
respondents are added to the database. The fact that both surveys are utilized for this study, in 
combination with other secondary sources, helps us address the common method variance 
problem (Chang et al., 2010).  
The corporate client survey collects data from U.S. firms (since 2004) and European 
firms (since 2006) on their offshoring strategies, drivers, concerns, risks, outcomes, future plans, 
and concrete offshore implementations, including information on tasks offshored, launch years, 
Organizational design 
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H3 - 
Offshoring 
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location choices, delivery models (both captive and outsourced), and performance data. The 
dataset used for this study includes data from 183 firms, of which 102 are based in the United 
States and 81 are European. These firms are active in different industries: manufacturing (32%), 
software (18%), finance and insurance (18%), and technical services (14%). Thirty-five percent 
of the firms are large (>10,000 employees), 47 percent are medium size (500-10,000 employees), 
and 18 percent are small (<500 employees). These firms reported 531 offshore implementations, 
defined as the allocation of particular tasks or processes to a location outside the home country. 
This implies that each firm has provided data for an average of 3.2 offshore implementations. 
Offshored tasks may include IT services, administrative services (e.g., Human Resources, legal, 
finance, and accounting), call centers, software and product development, marketing and sales, 
and procurement. The three most common services offshored in our sample are IT services 
(22%), call centers (17%), and engineering services (10%). Offshoring implementations include 
captive offshoring projects (48%) as well as offshore outsourcing projects (52%). The statistical 
analysis is conducted on the level of (these 531) offshore implementations.  
In addition, we use data from the ORN service provider survey. The service provider 
survey has collected information from business service providers at the firm and services level 
since 2007. Survey participants provide information on the services they provide; the locations 
from which they provide those services; perceived client expectations and operational risks; the 
performance of service delivery; and various features of the services provided. The latter include 
such items as the degree of commoditization and the complexity of tasks. The service provider 
database contains data (as of 2011) from 755 providers based in different countries and regions, 
including the United States (32%), India (18%), China (4%), other Asian countries (8%), 
Western Europe (19%), Eastern Europe (7%), and Latin America (6%). The database contains 
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data from all major large providers (19% of the sample had more than 10,000 employees), 
including Infosys, Genpact, IBM Global Services, and Wipro. It also covers mid-size providers 
(37%; 500-10,000 employees) and small providers (44%; <500 employees). Providers in the 
database offer various services, such as IT services (74% of providers), software development 
(65%), call centers (48%), finance and accounting (41%), HR services (30%), engineering 
services (29%), marketing and sales (26%), procurement (25%), R&D (25%), design (19%), and 
legal (13%). Altogether, the database contains 3,399 service-specific entries, that is, observations 
related to particular services that providers offer.  
For the analysis, we use a hierarchical regression analysis with successive linear 
regression models, adding more explanatory variables to each model. Ordinary least squares 
(OLS) models are most suitable for this analysis, as we have a dependent variable with 
continuous values and as we propose a linear relationship between our dependent variable and 
the explanatory variables. The hierarchical feature refers to the gradual building of separate but 
related models with an increasing number of explanatory variables until we reach the final 
model. We use three different versions of the final model in which all explanatory variables are 
included. First, we include all implementations in our sample (N = 531) to investigate the 
hypotheses. This model contains both captive and outsourced implementations. However, 
because there are transactional differences between captive offshoring and offshore outsourcing 
(see Williamson, 1985), we also split the sample into captive implementations (N = 253) and 
outsourced implementations (N = 278), and run the full model for both samples. 
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Variable construction  
The variables, their sources, and their operationalization are presented in Table 2.2. Cost-
estimation error is measured as the difference between the cost savings expected from the 
offshoring project and the achieved cost savings. Most firms offshore with the objective of 
reducing costs (Manning et al., 2008). Thus, a strong empirical proxy of latent hidden costs is the 
deviation between expected and realized cost savings in offshoring. If expectations perfectly 
match the savings achieved through offshoring, then there has been no estimation error, but if 
expectations exceed achieved savings, then expectations have not been met and estimation error 
has occurred (costs are higher than expected). The few cases in which achieved savings are 
above expectations (‘hidden benefits’) are deleted from the sample, as this phenomenon might be 
explained by factors other than hidden costs. Both expected savings and achieved savings are 
measured as a share of total costs, so the value of cost-estimation error can vary from zero 
percent (when achieved savings are equal to expectations) to 100 percent (when expected 
savings are very high but no savings are actually achieved).  
Offshoring complexity is measured along two dimensions: configuration complexity and 
task complexity. Configuration complexity is a composite measure consisting of three 
dimensions with the purpose of capturing structural, operational, and social complexity, 
respectively: global diversity of offshore operations (i.e., the number of countries in which a firm 
is conducting offshoring), disaggregation of activities (the number of services for which a firm 
engages in offshoring), and spread of employees (the number of persons employed in offshore 
projects). After each of these dimensions is measured, they are then standardized and mean-
centered around zero. The measure of configuration complexity is constructed as the product of 
these dimensions, which all have an equal weight in the composite measure. This measure is 
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inspired by previous studies measuring organizational complexity as the degree of firms’ 
functional and occupational differentiation (e.g., Aiken et al., 1980; Blau and McKinley, 1979; 
Damanpour, 1996). Task complexity is measured as the degree to which service providers view a 
particular task or process as complex. Data on this item is collected in the service provider 
survey by asking service providers to rank the complexity of different types of tasks on a five-
point Likert scale (1 = not complex at all; 5 = very complex). The relatively low correlation of -
0.06 (see Table 2.3) between configuration complexity and task complexity indicates that these 
are two distinct dimensions of offshoring complexity. 
Offshoring experience is a simple measure made for each implementation. It is measured 
as the time (in years) between the launch of the first offshoring project by the focal firm and the 
initiation of the focal implementation. The assumption is that the longer the respective firm has 
been engaged in offshoring projects, the more experience it has accumulated. There may be other 
ways to measure experience, perhaps by taking the number of services offshored or the number 
of locations offshored to into account. However, as we distinguish between experience and 
offshoring complexity, we focus on years of experience. Importantly, some firms offshore a 
variety of services to different locations in a short period of time, so that they have little saturated 
experience. Other firms might focus on offshoring particular functions over a longer period of 
time. The approach adopted here is akin to that used in other papers (e.g., Lewin et al., 2009). 
Organizational design orientation is measured by asking respondents to indicate the 
extent to which ‘business process redesign’ is a driver for offshoring particular services on a 
five-point Likert scale (1 = not important at all; 5 = very important). The measure captures the 
extent to which offshoring projects that are related to particular services have been implemented 
in conjunction with optimizing the entire work process. In other words, we use this item as a 
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proxy for the level of managerial attention (Ocasio, 1997) given to the orchestration of globally 
distributed processes. The correlation of -0.21 (p < 0.001) between the ‘business process 
redesign’ and ‘labor cost savings’ drivers indicates that the business process redesign driver is 
clearly distinct from the cost driver. The latter primarily captures managerial attention given to 
the cost benefits of offshoring particular processes without necessarily considering the impact of 
any one project on the entire workflow. Therefore, the attention respondents pay to business 
process redesign when offshoring is viewed as a good proxy for whether they consider the 
organizational design in the offshoring process. 
In addition, a number of control variables are included. First, we control for cost 
orientation (in contrast to organizational design orientation) by including an item on ‘labor cost 
savings’ as a driver of offshoring implementation. We also include a number of variables from 
the ORN Service Provider Survey in order to control for different factors at the service level. We 
control for three transaction-related effects for each offshored service: the frequency of 
interactions with the client (as a proxy for frequency), interdependence of client activities (as 
proxy for asset specificity), and frequency of disagreements with the client (as a proxy for 
uncertainty) (Williamson, 1985). These are ranked on a five-point Likert scale by the service 
providers for each service in which they are engaged. We also include commoditization of tasks, 
which refers to the process by which processes become less specific to firm or product 
characteristics, thereby lowering transaction and coordination costs for those firms offshoring 
those processes (Davenport, 2005). Moreover, the use of collaborative technologies in the 
service is added to control for the use of information and communication technology in the firm. 
The abovementioned ORN Service Provider Survey control variables are measured using 
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service-specific variables based on the perception of service providers, which are ranked using 
five-point Likert scales. 
To capture other potential sources of hidden costs (e.g., Stringfellow et al., 2008), we add 
control variables for interaction distance. These are measured using secondary data on the 
distance between the home location and the foreign location of the offshore implementation. 
Interaction distance includes three dimensions: geographical distance, measured as air miles 
between the home location and the offshore location; cultural distance between two locations 
based on the Kogut and Singh index (Kogut and Singh, 1988); and language distance as a 
dummy variable indicating whether the same language is spoken both in the home and offshore 
locations.  
Controls are also included for the three most common services—IT, call center, and 
engineering—as the level of hidden costs might be affected by characteristics of particular 
services. As can be seen in the correlation matrix (Table 2.3), the nature of these services is 
rather distinct in terms of such factors as task complexity. For example, call center services are 
negatively correlated, engineering services are positively correlated, and IT services are between 
these extremes. The services are added as dummy variables. 
Along similar lines, we include the number of employees in the home country to control 
for firm size. We also control for the type of delivery model by using a dummy for captive 
offshoring versus offshore outsourcing. Finally, we control for the time passed (in months) since 
the project was implemented. As it can be more difficult to retrospectively assess discrepancies 
between expected and realized costs the older a project is, this control variable captures biases 
related to the perceptions of the respondents.  
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Table 2.2 – Operationalization of variables in the models 
Variable Operationalization Data Source 
Cost-estimation 
error 
Percentage of savings expected minus the percentage of savings achieved 
when offshoring 
ORN Client 
survey 
Configuration 
complexity 
The product of the number of services, number of countries, and number of 
employees (in thousands) that are offshored  
ORN Client 
survey 
Task complexity  The average scores at the service level of the provider’s assessment of ‘the 
complexity of tasks’ (on a five-point scale). 
ORN Provider 
survey 
Offshoring 
experience 
Years from the launch of the firm’s first offshoring project to the focal 
implementation 
ORN Client 
survey 
Organizational 
design 
orientation 
Based on the question: Please indicate the importance of enhancing 
efficiency through business process redesign as a strategic driver for the 
offshore implementations (1 = not important at all; 5 = very important) 
ORN Client 
survey 
Cost orientation Based on the question: Please indicate the importance of labor cost savings 
as a strategic driver for the offshore implementations (1 = not important at 
all; 5 = very important) 
ORN Client 
survey 
Interaction with 
client  
The average scores at the service level of the provider’s assessment of ‘the 
frequency of client interaction’ (on a five-point scale). 
ORN Provider 
survey 
Interdependency 
of client 
The average scores at the service level of the provider’s assessment of ‘the 
interdependency with processes in client organization’ (on a five-point 
scale). 
ORN Provider 
survey 
Disagreement 
with client 
The average scores at the service level of the provider’s assessment of ‘the 
frequency of disagreement with client in performing tasks’ (on a five-point 
scale). 
ORN Provider 
survey 
Commoditization The average scores at the service level of the provider’s assessment of ‘the 
extent of commoditization today’ (on a five-point scale). 
ORN Provider 
survey 
Use of 
collaborative 
technologies 
The average scores at the service level of the provider’s assessment of ‘the 
collaborative technologies used in performing tasks’ (on a five-point scale). 
ORN Provider 
survey 
Geographical 
distance 
The distance in air miles (in thousands km) between the home location and 
the offshore location 
Google 
distance 
calculator 
Cultural distance The Kogut-Singh index of distance between the home location and the 
offshore location 
Hofstede’s 
measures 
Language 
distance 
A dummy indicating whether the main language spoken in the home 
location is the same as the language spoken in the offshore location (1 = 
different) 
MLA language 
map 
Home 
employment 
Number of employees in home country in thousands ORN Client 
survey 
IT service A dummy indicating whether the implementation is an IT service (1 = IT 
service) 
ORN Client 
survey 
Call center 
service 
A dummy indicating whether the implementation is a call center service (1 = 
call center service) 
ORN Client 
survey 
Engineering 
service  
A dummy indicating whether the implementation is an engineering service 
(1 = engineering service) 
ORN Client 
survey 
Outsourcing  A dummy indicating whether the offshore implementation is captive 
offshoring (= 0) or offshore outsourcing (= 1) 
ORN Client 
survey 
Time Months since the respective offshoring project was implemented ORN Client 
survey 
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The correlation matrix and descriptive data (mean values, standard deviation, and 
minimum and maximum values) are provided in Table 2.3 and 2.4. In order to detect potential 
problems of multicolinearity, we look at the correlation coefficients among the independent 
variables in the models. None of the correlations are above the usual threshold of 0.4 that 
indicates a possibility of multicolinearity. Hence, the dataset does not seem to suffer from 
problems of multicolinearity. However, as the task complexity variable is relatively highly 
correlated with some of the control variables measured at the services level, we ran the models 
without these variables. All results were qualitatively the same.  
The mean value of our dependent variable—cost-estimation errors—is 6.68, indicating 
that, on average, firms achieved 6.7 percent less savings on their offshoring implementations 
than they expected. The standard deviation of 10.11 signifies that the observed firms vary in 
terms of their estimation accuracy, as actually achieved savings span from 25 percent to 100 
percent of expected savings. However, a closer look at the frequency of the cost-estimation error 
variable shows that 52 percent of the implementations (N = 278) show no cost-estimation errors 
at all (savings meet expectations), while 48 percent reveal different levels of cost-estimation 
errors (higher costs than expected). In 27 percent of cases, achieved cost savings are lower than 
expected, but not by more than 10 percent, while in approximately 21 percent of cases achieved 
savings are more than 10 percent lower than expected. These figures show that there is good 
variation in the dependent variable across the included firms and also provides evidence that 
cost-estimation errors are a significant problem facing many offshoring firms.  
 Moreover, if we divide the sample into captive offshoring and offshore outsourcing, our 
results show that relatively high cost-estimation error is more common in cases of offshore 
outsourcing than in cases of captive offshoring. The average levels of cost-estimation error are  
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Table 2.3 – Summary statistics (n=531) 
   Variables Mean 
Std. 
dev. 
Min. 
values 
Max. 
values 
1 Cost-estimation error 6.68 10.11 0 75 
2 Configuration complexity 0.04 1.01 -1.16 8.2 
3 Task complexity 3.55 0.46 2.88 4.47 
4 Offshoring experience 4.46 8.28 0 41 
5 Org. design orientation 3.32 1.27 1 5 
6 Cost orientation 4.24 1.02 1 5 
7 Interaction with client  3.89 0.25 3.57 4.36 
8 Interdependency of client 3.63 0.15 3.42 4 
9 Disagreement with client 2.45 0.24 2 2.83 
10 Commoditization 3.19 0.42 2.38 3.87 
11 Collaborative technology  3.36 0.14 2.97 3.75 
12 Geographical distance 8.52 4.19 0 16.24 
13 Cultural distance 8.89 5.49 2 31.48 
14 Language distance 0.56 0.5 0 1 
15 Home employment 21.8 41.1 1 385 
16 IT service 0.22 0.41 0 1 
17 Call center service 0.17 0.37 0 1 
18 Engineering service 0.1 0.3 0 1 
19 Outsourcing 0.52 0.5 0 1 
20 Time 7.4 4 2 38 
 
 
7.92 for offshore outsourcing and 5.32 for captive offshoring (which is a significant difference in 
an analysis of variance, p < 0.01). Furthermore, 26 percent of all offshore outsourcing cases 
report that costs were more than 10 percent higher than expected, while this is true for only 16 
percent of the captive offshoring cases. When expected and achieved savings are examined 
separately, we find that the difference in cost-estimation error is due to expected savings being 
significantly higher for offshore outsourcing, while the achieved savings are at the same level for 
captive and outsource offshoring. We explore this difference later in the paper.  
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Table 2.4 – Correlation matrix (n=531)* 
 
 
1 
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9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
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18 
19 
20 
1 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
0.11 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
0.09 
-0.06 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
-0.09 
-0.06 
-0.14 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
0.02 
0.07 
-0.07 
0.20 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
0.09 
0.06 
0.04 
-0.31 
-0.21 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
0.08 
-0.06 
0.31 
0.03 
-0.05 
-0.06 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
0.04 
-0.05 
0.21 
-0.02 
-0.01 
0.09 
0.31 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
0.05 
0.08 
0.10 
-0.12 
0.03 
0.09 
-0.15 
0.05 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 
-0.07 
0.13 
-0.32 
-0.09 
-0.05 
0.11 
-0.24 
-0.33 
-0.25 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
-0.07 
0.05 
-0.23 
0.04 
-0.06 
-0.07 
-0.05 
-0.19 
0.01 
0.30 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
0.04 
0.11 
0.08 
-0.30 
-0.08 
0.26 
-0.02 
0.08 
0.13 
-0.01 
0.01 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
-0.03 
-0.01 
0.03 
0.01 
0.01 
-0.02 
0.11 
0.03 
0.03 
-0.12 
0.11 
0.18 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
0.01 
-0.11 
0.06 
0.27 
0.01 
-0.25 
0.20 
0.01 
-0.12 
-0.17 
0.04 
-0.23 
0.29 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
-0.03 
0.23 
-0.15 
-0.12 
-0.04 
0.15 
-0.16 
-0.05 
0.01 
0.15 
0.04 
0.13 
-0.03 
-0.12 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
16 
0.04 
0.01 
-0.03 
-0.15 
-0.03 
0.14 
-0.31 
-0.27 
0.28 
0.33 
-0.21 
0.07 
-0.04 
-0.12 
0.10 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
17 
-0.05 
0.14 
-0.35 
0.06 
-0.01 
0.01 
-0.27 
-0.18 
-0.29 
0.38 
0.36 
-0.10 
-0.07 
-0.02 
0.12 
-0.23 
1.00 
 
 
 
18 
-0.06 
-0.02 
0.31 
0.04 
-0.05 
0.03 
0.11 
0.35 
-0.24 
-0.27 
-0.32 
0.07 
0.01 
0.02 
0.01 
-0.18 
-0.15 
1.00 
 
 
19 
0.13 
0.05 
0.03 
-0.19 
-0.07 
0.18 
-0.03 
-0.11 
0.01 
0.14 
0.06 
0.09 
-0.01 
-0.16 
0.01 
0.14 
0.07 
-0.07 
1.00 
 
20 
-0.14 
-0.01 
0.06 
0.12 
0.01 
-0.04 
0.16 
0.04 
-0.10 
-0.14 
-0.06 
-0.18 
-0.12 
0.15 
0.02 
-0.03 
-0.06 
-0.03 
-0.14 
1.00 
 
*A
ll values greater than 0.09 are significant at the 5%
 level. 
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2.4  RESULTS 
The results of the hierarchical regression model are presented in Table 2.5. Model 1 includes the 
control variables and the two explanatory variables reflecting offshoring complexity: 
configuration complexity and task complexity. We add the two moderating variables—
organizational design orientation and offshoring experience—in Model 2. In Model 3, we add 
the interaction effect between the two complexity variables and our two moderating variables.  
 In all three models, the two complexity variables are significant (p <0.05) and positive, 
which supports the hypothesis that offshoring complexity is an important determinant of cost-
estimation error as manifested in hidden costs of offshoring (Hypothesis 1). Model 1, which 
includes the two complexity variables, obtains an R
2 
value of 0.11. When the two moderating 
variables are added in Model 2, the R
2 
only increases to 0.12, which is due to the fact that none 
of the moderating variables are significant in this model. In Model 3, we go one step further and 
include the four interaction terms in order to test for the proposed moderating effects 
(Hypotheses 2 and 3). However, the model does not improve, as the R
2
 only increases to 0.13 
with the use of four additional degrees of freedom. Moreover, only the interaction terms between 
task complexity and organizational design orientation are negative and significant as expected (β 
= -1.78, p < 0.05). 
 Notably, some of the control variables are significantly related to cost-estimation error. 
Those factors increasing cost-estimation errors include cost orientation, task interdependence 
with client activities, cultural distance, language distance, and call center services, while 
commoditization and time passed since the initiation of the offshoring project lower cost-
estimation errors. These results support complementary explanations for cost-estimation error 
and hidden costs, as they highlight transactional factors, such as task interdependency with client  
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Table 2.5 – Hierarchical regression models (n=531) – standard errors in parenthesis 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 Cost-estimation error in decision making 
 All implementations Captive 
offshoring 
Offshore 
outsourcing 
Configuration complexity 0.19** 
(0.06) 
0.19** 
(0.06) 
0.40* 
(0.19) 
2.14*** 
(0.47) 
0.10 
(0.63) 
Task complexity 6.71* 
(2.73) 
6.41* 
(1.86) 
12.59** 
(3.86) 
7.46 
(5.02) 
23.09*** 
(5.53) 
Organizational design orientation  -0.13 
(0.35) 
-0.67* 
(0.28) 
-1.64 
(1.85) 
-1.09* 
(0.41) 
Offshoring experience  -0.04 
(0.06) 
-0.48 
(0.46) 
-0.12 
(0.08) 
-0.14 
(0.09) 
Configuration complexity* 
Organizational design orientation 
  -0.04 
(0.09) 
-0.29** 
(0.11) 
-0.02 
(0.17) 
Configuration complexity* 
Offshoring experience 
  -0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.06* 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.06) 
Task complexity*Organizational 
design orientation 
  -1.78* 
(0.78) 
0.60 
(1.04) 
-2.80* 
(1.11) 
Task complexity*Offshoring 
experience 
  0.13 
(0.14) 
0.01 
(0.14) 
-0.45† 
(0.26) 
Costs orientation 1.07* 
(0.47) 
0.98* 
(0.49) 
1.04* 
(0.50) 
-0.46 
 (0.55) 
2.25* 
(0.87) 
Commoditization -15.21*** 
(4.25) 
-15.01*** 
(4.29) 
-15.65*** 
(4.28) 
-4.37 
(5.46) 
-23.99*** 
(6.12) 
Use of collaborative technologies -1.77 
(4.77) 
-1.85 
(4.78) 
-1.61 
(4.79) 
-3.22 
(6.71) 
7.14 
(6.79) 
Interaction with client 9.31 
(5.98) 
8.88 
(6.03) 
9.13 
(6.03) 
2.03 
(7.55) 
19.83* 
(8.99) 
Interdependency of client 12.94** 
(4.62) 
12.91** 
(4.64) 
13.31** 
(4.63) 
2.60 
(5.73) 
25.16** 
(7.61) 
Disagreement with client 7.49 
(4.61) 
7.41 
(4.61) 
8.46 
(4.67) 
0.19 
(6.04) 
6.38          
(7.91) 
Geographical distance 0.21 
(0.14) 
0.20 
(0.14) 
0.21 
(0.14) 
0.39* 
(0.17) 
0.07 
(0.21) 
Cultural distance 0.23* 
(0.10) 
0.23* 
(0.10) 
0.24* 
(0.10) 
0.15 
(0.11) 
0.36* 
(0.16) 
Language distance 2.83* 
(1.28) 
2.93 
(1.29)* 
2.91* 
(1.28) 
3.89* 
(1.59) 
1.35 
(1.86) 
Call center service 16.45** 
(5.08) 
16.20** 
(5.11) 
18.02*** 
(5.19) 
0.95 
(6.81) 
25.22** 
(8.10) 
IT service 2.49 
(1.72) 
2.45 
(1.72) 
2.73 
(1.73) 
3.78† 
(2.11) 
2.42 
(2.88) 
Engineering service -2.68 
(2.01) 
-2.51 
(2.03) 
-2.42 
(2.03) 
-1.88 
(2.36) 
-2.59 
(3.31) 
Home employment -0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Time -0.39*** 
(0.11) 
-0.38*** 
(0.11) 
-0.38** 
(0.11) 
-0.37** 
(0.13) 
-0.29 
(0.19) 
Outsourcing 
 
1.78* 
(0.90) 
1.75† 
(0.90) 
1.47 
(0.90) 
  
Intercept 55.20*** 
(14.43) 
45.01** 
(18.00) 
35.32* 
(19.14) 
27.42 
(16.67) 
83.97† 
(44.62) 
N 
F-value 
R-square 
531 
4.07*** 
0.11 
531 
3.66*** 
0.12 
531 
3.38*** 
0.13 
253 
5.42*** 
0.34 
278 
2.86*** 
0.20 
†, *, **, and *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.1%, respectively. The significant hypothesized 
relationships are in bold. 
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operations and interaction distance like cultural and language distance (see Stringfellow et al., 
2008). In addition, the outsourcing variable is significant in Model 1 (β = 1.78, p < 0.05), which 
reflects the higher level of cost-estimation error for offshore outsourcing as compared to captive 
offshoring.  
 In order to go beyond just adding the outsourcing variable as a control variable, the full 
model is applied to the two samples of captive offshoring and offshore outsourcing in Models 4 
and 5, respectively. Interestingly, the R
2 
increases substantially in both cases, reaching 0.34 in 
the case of captive offshoring and 0.20 for offshore outsourcing. However, it is also obvious that 
the variables have different effects in the subsamples. In fact, no variable is significant in both 
subsamples. In the case of captive offshoring, configuration complexity significantly increases 
cost-estimation errors (β = 2.14, p < 0.001), while task complexity is insignificant. Both 
interaction terms—configuration complexity in terms of organizational design orientation and 
offshoring experience—are significant and negative (β = -0.29, p < 0.01 and β = -0.06, p < 0.05, 
respectively), while neither organizational design orientation nor offshoring experience by 
themselves have significant effects. These results are in line with Hypotheses 2 and 3, which 
propose that organizational design orientation and offshoring experience negatively moderate the 
positive relationship between complexity and hidden costs. Of the control variables, the most 
notable are the significant positive distance variables (geographical and language distance), 
which indicate that cost-estimation errors increase as the distance between the home location and 
the offshore location increases. 
 In the case of offshore outsourcing implementations, task complexity is significant and 
positive (β = 23.09, p < 0.001), while configuration complexity is insignificant. The two 
interaction terms with task complexity are also significantly negative, although the interaction 
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term between task complexity and offshoring experience is only moderately significant (β = -
0.45, p < 0.1). This provides further support for Hypotheses 2 and 3, indicating that 
organizational design orientation and experience mitigate cost-estimation errors in the case of 
offshore outsourcing as well. Of the control variables, it is evident that the more task-oriented 
variables (such as commoditization) and transaction-oriented variables (such as interaction with 
client and interdependency with client operations) are significant in predicting cost-estimation 
errors in outsourcing implementations.    
 In order to test the robustness of our findings, we conduct a number of alternative 
specifications of our models. These alternative specifications included Tobit models (as we have 
a skewed dependent variable), logistic models (a binary dependent model with or without hidden 
costs), and random coefficients models (controlling for firm effects). All of these models provide 
qualitatively similar, but weaker, results than the one reported here. In addition, we believe that 
from a theoretical point of view we have applied the most appropriate model in order to test the 
hypotheses, as our dependent variable is measured on a continuous scale, and as the question of 
whether hidden costs and cost-estimation error exist cannot be separated from the level of hidden 
costs. Both aspects are determined simultaneously in our preferred model.  
Furthermore, we have addressed the issue of endogeneity, that is, whether the complexity 
variables are endogenously determined by the same factors as the estimation errors, because 
those managers who underestimate costs might also offshore more and thereby increase the 
complexity. We did so by running simultaneous equation models with instrumental variables. 
For this purpose, we used a set of instruments that is correlated with the endogenous variable 
(complexity, in our case) but not correlated with the error from the regression in which the 
endogenous regressor appears (Stock et al., 2002). From a theoretical perspective, it seems likely 
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that the ‘objective’ instruments in our model—geographical distance, home employment, and 
call center service, which are all correlated with the complexity variables (see Table 2.3)—would 
pass this test. In addition, from an empirical perspective, there seems to be limited evidence of 
endogeneity problems as all of the results remain qualitatively the same in the simultaneous 
equation models with instrument variables. Accordingly, the Hausman test favors the use of OLS 
models, which is also hinted at by the low correlations (0.09-0.11) between the complexity 
variables and cost-estimation errors (see Table 2.4). In addition, to test for over-identifying 
restrictions, we regressed the residual from the cost-estimation error equation on the instruments 
for the model (Sargan, 1958). The R
2
 value in this regression is very low (0.0084) and none of 
the predictors are statistically significant. We also inspected the bivariate correlations between 
the instruments and the residuals, all of which were insignificant and close to zero. In 
combination, these tests do not provide absolute proof of the absence of endogeneity (see, e.g., 
Hahn et al., 2011), but they do suggest that the problem has been addressed in our model. 
 
2.5  DISCUSSION 
Firms and their managers often find that the initial objectives of strategic decisions are 
substantially undermined by hidden costs of implementation (e.g., Dibbern et al., 2008; Reitzig 
and Wagner, 2010; Stringfellow et al., 2008). In this paper, we have argued that hidden costs—
implementation costs that are neglected in strategic decision making—occur in situations of 
complexity in which decision makers are likely to be subject to bounded rationality. Faced with 
high complexity, decision makers are more likely to ignore the consequences of implementation 
and organizational change, and therefore fail to estimate the actual costs of a strategic decision. 
Hence, estimation errors are the manifestation of underlying and latent hidden costs.  
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We have studied the phenomenon of such estimation errors in the context of the 
offshoring of administrative and technical services. Firms offshore service activities for a 
number of reasons: to reduce costs, to acquire strategic resources, and to gain market proximity 
(e.g., Lewin et al., 2009). Accordingly, we have argued that hidden costs occur in offshoring 
when the relocation of service activities abroad entails implementation costs that are initially 
ignored or unanticipated by decision makers.  
Based on comprehensive data from the ORN, we have developed a model of hidden costs 
that highlights the roles of offshoring complexity (task and configuration complexity), 
organizational design orientation, and experience in explaining why decision makers 
systematically fail to estimate the actual costs of services offshoring. In general, we find 
empirical support for our model: offshoring complexity increases cost-estimation errors 
(Hypothesis 1), whereas design orientation (Hypothesis 2) and experience (Hypothesis 3) 
negatively moderate this relationship. However, while captive offshoring is much more 
responsive to broader configuration and design factors, hidden costs in offshore outsourcing are 
more driven by task- and transaction-related factors. 
Our findings correspond to recent research suggesting that firms with a strategic, rather 
than opportunistic, approach to offshoring decisions are not only likely to generate higher 
savings but are also more accurate in their savings expectations (e.g., Lewin and Couto, 2007; 
Massini et al., 2010). However, rather than looking at strategies in general, we focus on 
indicators of a firm’s orientation toward improving and orchestrating organizational processes 
and structures through and alongside offshoring. Interestingly, a design orientation does not seem 
to reduce hidden costs per se; only when the complexity of offshore operations increases does a 
strong orientation toward orchestrating different structures and processes reduce hidden costs. 
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This can be partly explained by the fact that as firms increase the scale and scope of offshoring, 
they may reach a tipping point where existing processes and structures conflict with the new 
setup of the globally dispersed operations (Massini et al., 2010). At this point, only those firms 
actively seeking to reorganize their structures and processes in a coherent way may benefit from 
an increased scale and scope of offshoring. While this clearly hints at the transformational 
potential of offshoring, it also points to the need for firms to actively manage this potential, and 
to match the increasing relocation of processes with the adaptation of organizational structures 
and capabilities (Manning et al., 2008).  
In addition, we find that cost-estimation errors due to hidden costs are significantly 
higher in offshore outsourcing implementations than in captive offshore implementations. Our 
results also indicate that in the case of captive (internal) offshoring, hidden costs increase with 
configuration complexity, whereas hidden costs result from increased task-level complexity in 
the case of offshore outsourcing. This highlights that task- and relationship-specific uncertainty, 
along with transaction costs, strongly affect overall operational costs in the case of outsourcing. 
In this regard, several studies show how certain design capabilities and mechanisms at the task 
level, such as contract design (Argyres and Mayer, 2007) and the alignment of client and vendor 
operations (Manning et al., 2011), can help firms better anticipate and manage operational costs 
outside their immediate control. Similarly, outsourcing typically involves tasks that are more 
standardized than those in captive offshoring (as indicated by the significant positive correlation 
of 0.14 between task commoditization and outsourcing in Table 2.4). In contrast, captive 
offshoring is more exposed to configuration complexity issues, which increase the role of 
organizational design, as the decision maker has more discretion to make changes in the 
organization of internal activities. In comparison, task complexity in the case of captive 
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operations does not significantly increase hidden costs, which indicates a greater internal 
capacity to manage (and plan for) complex tasks. Importantly, however, as offshoring 
complexity grows beyond certain tasks, hidden costs become an issue in captive operations, a 
finding that points to the roles of design and experience in safeguarding operations as offshoring 
increases in scale and scope. 
The present study has important implications for ongoing research on hidden costs of 
globally dispersed and complex operations. The concept of hidden costs in the offshoring 
literature is new and has so far only been used conceptually to underscore how the relocation of 
activities abroad might be more challenging than initially expected (e.g., Dibbern et al., 2008; 
Stringfellow et al., 2008). We contribute to this research by uncovering drivers of estimation 
errors and the potential to foresee hidden costs when integrating globally dispersed and 
disaggregated operations into an orchestrated organization (Kumar et al., 2009; Srikanth and 
Puranam, 2011).  
On a more general level, this study helps us better understand estimation biases in 
strategic decision making, and the effects of experience and organizational design orientation on 
those biases (e.g., Durand, 2003; Hogarth and Makridakis, 1981; Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993; 
Makadok and Walker, 2000; March and Simon, 1958). A firm’s estimation ability captures how 
accurately it can estimate and forecast the outcomes of organizational changes resulting from the 
implementation of a strategic decision (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984). However, while the 
inhibiting role of complexity in decision-making processes is well established (Langlois and 
Robertson, 1992; Loasby, 1976; Nickerson and Zenger, 2002), we have shown that this 
relationship is negatively moderated by the organizational design orientation of the decision 
maker (Ocasio, 1997). As the implementation of a strategic decision, such as the relocation of 
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activities abroad, entails organizational changes, the decision maker must direct attention to how 
these changes might affect such aspects as the coordination of joint and interdependent 
organizational action (Thompson, 1967), information processing demand (Simon, 1955), and 
organizational response capacity (Anderson, 1999). 
Moreover, we have argued that the accumulation of organizational system knowledge 
(Brusoni and Prencipe, 2006; Henderson and Clark, 1990) is necessary for the decision maker to 
make effective strategic decisions in a context of complexity. Decision makers need experience 
and knowledge about the aspects of organizational design that deserve their attention. Thus, in 
viewing a firm’s estimation ability as a distinctive organizational competence (Durand, 2003; 
Hogarth and Makridakis, 1981; Makadok and Walker, 2000), this study implies that the fit 
between complexity and organizational design plays a key role in the implementation of 
strategies and should therefore be incorporated in strategic analyses. 
Our findings also add to research on appropriate organizational designs in complex 
environments (Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004a; Nadler and Tushman, 1997) by stressing that the 
recent offshoring trend challenges the capacity of conventional organizational forms and 
structures to facilitate and safeguard globally dispersed operations (Srikanth and Puranam, 
2011). Future research should aim to better understand the effects of different design alternatives 
and mechanisms that firms utilize when they reach a certain level of complexity. A related issue 
is the extent to which design elements can be ‘firm specific’—reflecting more or less specific 
locations and processes across countries and locations.  
In addition, we emphasize the role of experience in strengthening the moderating effect 
of complexity on hidden costs. In this regard, we support research that underscores the central 
role of knowledge evolution in organizational change and design (Brusoni and Prencipe, 2006; 
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Henderson and Clark, 1990). We can assume that different forms of experience and learning 
might contribute differently to organizational behavior and performance (Haunschild and 
Sullivan, 2002; Madsen and Desai, 2010). Future research could therefore investigate which 
types of experience and learning contribute the most to the identification of organizational forms 
and structures in increasingly complex firms. 
 
Limitations and future research 
Our study has some limitations that should be addressed in future research. First, the concept of 
hidden costs is difficult to measure. We operationalized it as the respondents’ perceptions of the 
difference between the expected and realized savings of offshoring, using cross-sectional 
observations. However, this operationalization might be skewed (Golden, 1992), especially as 
we ask for retrospective views about initial expectations. As a result, hidden costs might be 
underestimated in our study (although our results still hold despite the possible conservative bias 
of the dependent variable). A research design using observations collected before and after the 
offshoring implementation would have obvious advantages compared to the design used in this 
study. Also, as we primarily relied on survey data, we were unable to analyze the actual 
decision-making process and we did not look at specific implementation processes in detail. 
Future studies can use qualitative research designs to better address the various factors 
contributing to the ignorance of implementation costs in decision-making processes under 
conditions of complexity. 
We have also limited the theoretical explanation of our dependent variable to the role of 
the organizational context in the decision maker’s estimation ability, thus leaving out an 
important discussion on intentionality (Hutzschenreuter et al. 2007; Salas et al., 2010). For 
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instance, situations of complexity may entail increased uncertainty, which invites political 
processes in decision making. In such situations, stakeholders may seek influence by 
emphasizing arguments that serve their own interests while downplaying others (Eisenhardt and 
Bourgeois, 1988). Decision makers may also follow institutional norms, bureaucratic procedures, 
and prior strategic commitments to reduce uncertainty and ambiguity (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983), thereby allowing for solutions that might be inefficient. Thus, while we assume that the 
organizational environment has a significant influence on decision-making processes in which 
some cost factors are unintentionally ignored, other cost factors may be intentionally 
downplayed in order to promote particular decisions. In this sense, a strong orientation toward 
organizational design could be a way to address politics within the organization. Future research 
could therefore investigate the ramifications of intentional underestimations of costs in complex 
organizations. For instance, is there evidence that decision makers intentionally underestimate 
the costs of implementing strategic decisions? How might variables such as complexity, 
organizational design orientation, and experience affect decision makers in terms of intentionally 
underestimating future costs? 
 
Concluding remarks 
In conclusion, by explaining deviations between strategic objectives and actual performance 
through the concept of hidden costs, an important field of research is unlocked that can more 
accurately clarify unintended consequences of firms’ strategic behavior. While we found that 
complexity, along with experience and orientation toward organizational design, explained much 
of this deviation, a number of other contingencies should be examined in future research. In this 
regard, our study suggests that drivers of hidden costs within the boundary of the firm may differ 
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from hidden costs in the context of interorganizational arrangements. This difference deserves 
further exploration. Finally, our study highlights services offshoring as an increasingly important 
empirical field for investigating strategic decision making, complexity, and design in 
contemporary organizations. 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
 
Foreseeing reconfiguration costs and the role 
of modularity: A study on offshoring process 
performance 
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Abstract: Decision makers’ estimations of the costs of implementing strategic decisions are 
often surpassed by actual cost levels. This paper investigates the performance consequences of 
these situations. Using unique data on 221 offshoring implementations, it is argued that 
reconfiguration cost estimation errors of implementing an activity in a foreign location have a 
negative impact on the process performance of that activity as operations are likely to be 
disrupted by opportunity costs and managerial responses. However, this relationship is mitigated 
by the degree of modularity in the activity as it reduces the need for costly coordination in 
offshoring. This paper contributes to research on offshoring and strategic decision-making by 
emphasizing the importance of organizational design and of estimating the costs of internal 
organizational change. 
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3.1  INTRODUCTION 
In strategic decision-making, a main function relates to decision makers’ accurate estimation of 
the costs of implementing strategic decisions (Durand, 2003; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; 
Makadok and Walker, 2000). For example, when firms diversify their operations, decision 
makers need to make important cost estimations on the changes in the organization and the 
environment so that future resource allocations can be planned and aligned. Often, however, 
firms experience that actual costs of implementing strategic decisions outweigh expected costs. 
In particular, firms find that certain costs remain hidden in the decision making process, and are 
only realized as ‘post decision surprises’ (Harrison and March, 1984) after the decision has been 
implemented (see e.g., Dibbern et al., 2008; Larsen et al., 2012; Reitzig and Wagner, 2010; 
Stringfellow et al., 2008). 
 The purpose of this paper is to investigate the performance consequences of these ‘hidden 
costs,’ i.e., the situations where decision makers’ fail to effectively estimate the costs of 
implementing strategic decisions. Prior research has investigated the link between firms’ 
estimation ability and performance (e.g., Durand, 2003; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Makadok 
and Walker, 2000), but has predominantly focused on the estimation of external events such as 
future changes in markets and industries, and less on internal organizational changes and 
reconfigurations. However, firms continuously reconfigure and change their organizations to 
optimize performance through measures such as the patching, recombination and reconfiguration 
of firm activities (Eisenhardt and Brown, 1999; Karim and Mitchell, 2004), resources 
(Henderson and Clark, 1990; Galunic and Rodan, 1998), and divisional boundaries (Hoskisson 
and Johnson, 1992; Birkinshaw and Lingblad, 2005). In these processes, firms incur 
reconfiguration costs such as financial costs, temporal costs, cognitive learning costs and 
66 
 
opportunity costs (Lavie, 2006; Zollo and Winter, 2002). Thus, reconfiguration costs are the 
costs that occur as a result of the organizational reconfiguration. This paper investigates the 
performance consequences of the situations where reconfiguration costs are underestimated. 
Specifically, this paper uses the context of offshoring to investigate the process performance 
effects of the situations in which decision makers’ fail to correctly estimate the costs of 
relocating organizational activities to foreign locations. 
 Offshoring is an organizational reconfiguration in which tasks and services are relocated 
to locations outside the home country in internal, outsourced or collaborative governance modes 
(Lewin and Peeters, 2006; Contractor et al., 2010). While the majority of offshoring research has 
focused on questions relating to offshoring drivers, governance modes, location choice, and 
immediate outcomes (e.g., Lewin et al., 2009; Kedia and Mukherjee, 2009; Mol et al., 2005), 
recent research has pointed out that firms often find actual costs levels of implementing 
offshoring activities abroad higher than expected (Dibbern et al., 2008; Larsen et al., 2012; 
Stringfellow et al., 2008). For example, firms experience that the local labor costs increase 
beyond expectations and that offshoring operations require substantially more knowledge 
transfer and control than originally accounted for. As such, bounded rational decision makers are 
unable to foresee the full consequences of offshoring and are, as a result, incapable of making 
precise estimations of the costs of implementing offshoring activities abroad. 
Using unique data on 221 offshoring implementations, it is argued that decision makers’ 
inability to effectively estimate the reconfiguration costs of implementing an activity in a foreign 
location has a negative impact on the process performance of that activity. Specifically, the 
opportunity costs of wrongly estimating reconfiguration costs negatively influence the process 
performance of the activity as the operations of the activity are likely to be disrupted by 
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managerial responses to the cost estimation errors. However, it is also argued that process 
performance is positively moderated by the modularity of the offshored activities. Assuming that 
complexity and the increased need for coordination are important sources of cost estimation 
failures (Larsen et al., 2012), modularity offers an important mechanism to reduce the need for 
coordination when offshoring (Srikanth and Puranam, 2011), and as such positively moderates 
process performance. 
These findings contribute to ongoing research on offshoring by emphasizing the 
importance of reconfiguration costs estimation in the offshoring processes, and particularly to 
research that investigates offshoring performance (e.g., Lewin and Peeters, 2006; Mol et al. 
2005; Massini et al., 2010). Moreover, this paper adds to research on hidden costs by 
emphasizing how modularity may positively moderate the negative consequences of 
reconfiguration cost estimation errors (e.g., Dibbern et al., 2008; Larsen et al., 2012; 
Stringfellow et al., 2008). Finally, this research contributes more generally to research on firms’ 
estimation abilities (Durand, 2003; Makadok and Walker, 2000), strategic decision-making 
effectiveness (Dean and Sharfman, 1996), and organizational reconfiguration (Karim and 
Mitchell, 2004) by emphasizing the importance of estimating the costs of internal organizational 
change, while, at the same time, aligning firms’ coordination mechanisms to the new 
organizational requirements. 
The paper is organized as follows: First, the theory on decision making and performance 
is discussed. Second, the hypotheses explaining the relationship between reconfiguration cost 
estimation errors and performance and the moderating effect of modularity are developed. Third, 
the dataset and methods used to explain process performance is introduced. Finally, the results 
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are presented before the findings are discussed and related more broadly to research on 
offshoring and decision making. 
 
3.2  THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Estimation and performance 
Strategic decision-making describes the commitment to important decisions in terms of actions 
taken, resources devoted or precedents set (Dean and Sharfman, 1996; Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 
1992; Mintzberg et al., 1976). A main function in strategic decision-making is the ability to 
estimate and forecast the costs of implementing the strategic decision (Durand, 2003; Makadok 
and Walker, 2000). Firms’ estimation ability thus refers to how accurately the consequences of 
implementing a strategic decision can be estimated and forecasted. 
Much research has focused on factors that influence the decision-making process, such as 
the organizational environment (March and Simon, 1958), routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982), 
managerial dominant logic (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986), individual biases (Das and Teng, 1999), 
and politics (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988). However, there is only limited evidence on how 
firms’ estimation ability influences performance. For example, Dean and Sharfman (1996) 
investigate the relationship between the strategy process and decision-making effectiveness, and 
find that procedural rationality and political behavior are significantly related to the extent to 
which the objectives of strategic decisions are effectively met. However, they do not provide any 
causal argumentation of whether strategic decision-making effectiveness eventually corresponds 
with performance. Equally, in a study on firms’ forecasting ability, Durand (2003) investigates 
the role of organizational illusion of control and organizational attention in pinpointing firms’ 
ability to forecast future industry growth rates, but leaves out the effects on performance. 
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There are some important exceptions that discuss and investigate the relationship 
between estimation ability and performance, however. For example, Eisenhardt and Martin 
(2000) suggest that the performance of a firm is strongly influenced by its ability to match its 
resource allocation pace to the anticipated changes of its environment. Makadok and Walker 
(2000) investigate forecasting ability in the money fund industry, and find a positive relationship 
between the funds’ ability to forecast changes in monetary markets and their subsequent 
economic surplus and growth. This may also relate more generally to studies that investigate the 
relationship between firms’ capabilities and performance. For example, Henderson and 
Cockburn (1994) measure firms’ ability to integrate knowledge within the firm at the R&D 
program level to predict patenting productivity. Ethiraj et al. (2005) examine the choices made 
by a single firm over time and evaluate the performance trade-offs of the marginal returns to the 
different capabilities that it seeks to build. 
 Accordingly, there are indications in the literature that firms’ ability to estimate and 
anticipate changes in the environment has important effects for firm performance (e.g., Makadok 
and Walker, 2000). This paper aims to build on this literature. Specifically, while the majority of 
extant literature investigates decision effectiveness in relation to forecasting external events such 
as industry growth and market changes, little research has investigated firms’ estimation ability 
in regards to the costs of organizational reconfiguration. This is nonetheless an important topic to 
investigate. Organizational reconfiguration can be defined as the changes to firms’ organization, 
such as resource allocations, use of internal routines and communication network, and the flow 
of information and tasks, with the purpose of increasing effectiveness and efficiency (Chandler 
1962, Levitt and March 1988, Galunic and Eisenhardt 1996, Helfat and Eisenhardt 2004; Karim 
2009). Organizational reconfiguration does not come without costs, however. Lavie (2006), for 
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example, argue that a reconfiguration process entails costs such as monitoring, evaluation, 
termination, learning, unlearning, adaptation, integration, deliberation, and codification. A firm 
that reconfigures may experience that the costs of unlearning old routines and learning new 
routines increases (Zollo and Winter, 2002). A firm may also experience that the costs of control 
and coordination increases as a results of reconfiguring the organization (Dibbern et al., 2008). 
At the same time, however, Lavie (2006: 161) stresses that too little research analyzes 
reconfiguration costs and their implication, and suggests that “an intendedly rational choice of 
reconfiguration mechanism takes into account the associated costs and risks.” 
 In an attempt to address this gap, this paper investigates the relationship between the 
estimation of the costs of reconfiguring the organization by relocating and implementing a given 
activity in a foreign location (i.e., offshoring) and the process performance of that activity.  
 
Estimating reconfiguration cost in offshoring 
Offshoring—i.e., the relocation of firm activities to foreign locations (Contractor et al., 2010)—
can be seen as an organizational reconfiguration to the extent that it requires change in the 
geographical location of an activities that the firm already is in possession of. Firms relocate 
activities to foreign locations with purposes such as lowering labor and production costs 
(Dossani and Kenney, 2003) and accessing to talent and qualified labor (Lewin et al., 2009). 
Research has also pointed out that offshoring decisions are often taken as bottom-up 
opportunistic decisions, without the support of a corporate strategy guiding offshoring practices 
(Lewin and Peeters, 2006; Massini et al., 2010).  
A firm engaging in offshoring must make important decisions on a number of operational 
issues. For example, decisions must be made regarding the contractual ownership and 
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relationship of the offshoring setup (Vivek et al., 2009), the host location (Graf and Mudambi, 
2005), the level of disaggregation or ‘fine-slicing’ of the overall value chain to identify the 
specific tasks to be offshored (Mudambi and Venzin, 2010), the choice of different coordination 
mechanisms (Kumar et al., 2009), and the overall coherence and integration of the globally 
dispersed organizational system (Srikanth and Puranam, 2011).  
Important for decisions like these is the decision makers’ ability to effectively estimate 
the costs of reconfiguring the organization when implementing the offshoring activity abroad. In 
order to match future resource allocations to the anticipated changes in the organization resulting 
from offshoring, decision makers must make important estimations regarding the implementation 
costs of relocating the activities abroad. During the onshore transition phase concerning the 
preparation of moving activities from the onsite location to the offshore location, the decision 
maker needs to estimate the organizational demands and consequences of relocating the activity 
abroad. This way, the firm can invest in the necessary resources in order to arrange for an 
efficient relocation and subsequent organizational reintegration (Mudambi and Venzin, 2010).  
 
Table 3.1 – Reconfiguration costs 
Reconfiguration costs Explanation 
Control costs The costs of controlling the performance and coherency of the 
offshored activity. 
 
Coordination costs The costs of coordinating and integrating the domestics and 
foreign resources to achieve the specified objectives. 
 
Design costs The costs of accurately specifying and designing the business 
tasks to be offshored. 
 
Knowledge transfer costs The costs of the transferring and communicating knowledge 
between the domestic and foreign location. 
 
Adapted from Dibbern et al. (2008). 
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However, in contrast to situations where decision makers effectively foresee and estimate 
the costs of implementing the activity in an offshore location so that expectations can be met, 
situations with high cost estimation errors suggest that decision makers are unable to account for 
the organizational requirements and demands of the offshoring activity prior to implementation. 
As such, decision makers are faced with ‘post-decision surprises’ (Harrison and March, 1984). 
For example, firms may experience that local labor and resource costs inflate beyond initial 
estimations. The offshoring implementation may turn out to require additional personnel and 
training than was originally anticipated and budgeted for to facilitate an effective offshoring 
operation (Lewin and Peeters, 2006). Different integration mechanisms may prove inferior in 
comparison to expectations so that additional resources must be invested in new mechanisms 
(Srikanth and Puranam, 2011). Dibbern et al. (2008) argue that unexpected reconfiguration costs 
in offshoring can be distinguished between coordination costs, control costs, design costs, and 
knowledge transfer costs (see Table 3.1).  
In general, these reconfiguration costs estimation errors suggest that the presence of 
bounded rational decision makers (Simon, 1955), who are due to reasons such as complexity not 
at the point of decision making able to foresee and estimate the consequences of relocating an 
offshoring activity in a foreign location (Larsen et al., 2012). 
 
3.3  HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Offshoring process performance consequences 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the performance consequences of this type of cost 
estimation errors. Different studies have provided different financial and non-financial measures 
and results on offshoring performance. On the one hand, research employing financial measures 
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to investigate offshoring performance has looked at aspects such as corporate financial 
performance (Mol et al., 2005), cost savings (Lewin and Peeters, 2006), export performance 
(Bertrant, 2011), and sales growth (Murray et al., 1995). On the other hand, research employing 
non-financial measures to investigate offshoring performance has emphasized aspect such as 
learning and organizational transformation (Jensen, 2009; Maskell et al., 2007), innovation 
performance (Nieto and Rodríguez, 2011), market shares (Kotabe and Murray, 1990), and 
implementation time (Hutzschenreuter et al., 2011b).  
The focus of this paper, however, is to investigate how reconfiguration cost estimation 
errors affect the process performance of an activity after it has been relocated to a foreign 
location. Following Srikanth and Puranam (2011), the activity’s process performance is defined 
as “cost reductions and/or performance improvements that occur in the immediate aftermath of 
moving the process offshore” and may relate to factors such as the cost demand, service quality 
improvements, and satisfaction with service of a given activity. For example, firms may 
experience that the relocation of a given activity to a low-cost country decreases the cost demand 
of the activity due to preferable labor, production and resources costs levels compared to the 
country it was moved from (Kedia and Lahiri, 2007; Manning, et al., 2008). Firm may also 
experience that the operational flexibility and production quality will improve by moving the 
activity offshore due to superior technologies in the host location (e.g., Lewin and Peeters, 
2006). As such, process performance refers to the isolated performance of a given activity, and 
the purpose of this paper is to investigate how the failure to effectively estimate the costs of 
reconfiguration (e.g., Lavie, 2006) when implementing an activity in a foreign location 
influences this.  
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When decision makers fail to correctly estimate the actual reconfiguration costs of 
implementing an offshoring activity abroad, a typical response would be to take different 
measures to best accommodate for these estimation errors. For example, a firm that experience 
that reconfiguration costs relating to knowledge transfer are much higher than initially expected 
may decide to down-scale the offshoring operations. A firm that experiences that the costs of 
coordinating and controlling a foreign instead domestic activity exceed expectations may fail to 
implement an appropriate coordination mechanism, and as a result the more likely is 
coordination failure. In some cases, firms may also decide to ‘backsource’ or re-nationalize the 
previously offshored activities due to exceeding levels of reconfiguration costs (Chadee and 
Raman, 2009).  
In these situations of reconfiguration cost estimation errors, firms incur substantial 
opportunity costs. For example, rather than on allocating appropriate resources to the offshoring 
operations, the attention of the decision maker is likely to be directed at adjusting the 
expectations (e.g., Ocasio, 1996). The benefits of using low-cost production may be offset by 
unexpected additional resources invested in personnel training, facilities, and materials which 
may result in economic and cognitive barriers (e.g., Lavie, 2006). The failure of accounting for 
the costs of implementing appropriate global integration mechanisms may lead to additional 
investments in coordination mechanisms that deteriorate the performance of the activity (e.g., 
Srikanth and Puranam, 2009). The offshored activity may also require substantially more 
communication and knowledge transfer between home and host location due to unexpected 
cultural differences which make the organization more inert and less responsive (Kumar et al., 
2009).  
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Thus, the opportunity costs of reconfiguration cost estimation errors negatively influence 
the process performance of the activity. The operations of the activity are likely to be disrupted 
by managerial responses of the reconfiguration cost estimation errors. Rather than allocating 
resources to the facilitation of the operations of the activity, resources are instead used for 
accommodating the reconfiguration cost estimation error. Indeed, Lavie (2006) argue that major 
risks of reconfiguration costs include unsuitable response to technological change, unsuccessful 
integration, and undetected technological change. As a consequence, reconfiguration cost 
estimation errors will likely make the operations of the activity less prioritized, and this will have 
a negative impact on the process performance of that activity. The following hypothesis can 
therefore be formulated: 
 
Hypothesis 1: A higher degree of offshoring implementation cost estimation errors is 
likely to have a negative effect on the process performance of the activity. 
 
The moderating role of modularity 
The foregoing argument suggests that the process performance of the offshored activity is 
negatively affected by situations where decision makers systematically underestimate the costs 
of reconfiguration. However, it is also plausible to expect that firms can experience positive 
process performance despite estimation errors. For example, a firm may discover that while an 
offshoring decision was initially driven by cost-reducing objectives, the implementation may 
turn out to give access to new resources, knowledge and markets. Hence, it is assumed that the 
relationship between firms’ cost estimation ability and offshoring process performance is 
positively moderated by factors that explain why some offshoring implementations display 
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increased performance despite cost estimation errors. In particular, this paper focuses on the 
organizational design of offshoring, and, specifically, the role of modularity in the activities. 
Prior research argues that hidden costs and cost estimation errors can largely be explained 
by the degree of organizational complexity in the firm and its impact on the ability of the 
decision maker to rationally account for all important decision factors (Larsen et al., 2012). A 
growing number of ‘non-simple’ interdependencies (Simon, 1962) to coordinate joint action 
increase the likelihood for decision errors (Levinthal, 1997). In respect of offshoring, a 
consequence of relocating organizational tasks to foreign locations is the increased need for 
international coordination (Kumar et al., 2009; Srikanth and Puranam, 2011). An organization 
with only domestically located activities can to a larger extent rely on informal and tacit 
coordination mechanisms, where project teams find it easier to build collegial environments and 
common ground due to rich communication and shared contexts (Allen, 1997; Storper and 
Venables 2004). As firms begin to relocate and disperse activities abroad, the act of coordination 
becomes more challenging and costly as firms need to ensure that the growing numbers of 
international interdependent activities are coordinated and contribute to joint organizational 
action (Srikanth and Puranam, 2011). Cost estimation errors occur as bounded rational decision 
makers are not able to foresee and estimate the consequences of relocating an offshoring activity 
in a foreign location (cf., Simon, 1955). In order to understand factors that moderate the 
relationship between cost estimation errors and the activity’s process performance, it is therefore 
necessary to investigate how firms can manage the complexity of offshoring.  
In this respect, the organizing principle of modularity becomes important. Modularity 
describes structures (products, production systems and organizations) based on minimized and 
standardized interactions and interdependencies between units (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Ethiraj 
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and Levinthal, 2004b; Sanchez and Mahoney 1996). By carefully specifying, standardizing and 
enforcing the interfaces of interdependent organizational activities, modularity intentionally 
reduces the need for costly coordination as it entails hierarchies with property of near-
decomposability that simplifies their behavior (see Simon, 1962). In the case of offshoring, 
modularity can be seen as a mechanism that counters and reduces the increased need for 
coordination when relocating organizational activities abroad (Mithas and Whitaker, 2007; 
Srikanth and Puranam, 2011). Since the opportunities for informal face-to-face coordination is 
undermined when moving an activity abroad, firms benefit from using the coordination 
principles of modularity that promote structures with pre-specified interdependencies that are not 
subject to continuous negotiation. Firms can more easily decouple and disintegrate modular 
activities (Sanchez and Mahoney 1996) and subsequently relocate these to foreign locations.  
Thus, assuming the increased complexity of coordinating an offshoring organization can 
lead to cost estimation failures (Larsen et al., 2012), the extent to which the activities that are 
relocated offshore are modularized—i.e., the interdependencies specified and standardized—
should positively moderate the negative relationship between cost estimation errors and process 
performance. By more easily facilitating aspects such as organizational reintegration, knowledge 
transfer, and effective division of labor between the domestic and foreign activities, the negative 
impact of reconfiguration cost estimation errors is undermined. These arguments lead to the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The degree of modularity in the offshored activities has a positive 
moderating effect on the relationship between reconfiguration cost estimation errors and 
process performance of the activity. 
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In sum, the foregoing hypotheses form a theoretical model suggesting that cost estimation 
errors have a negative impact on the process performance of the activity being offshored, but that 
this is positively moderated by the modularity of the activity. This model is illustrated in Figure 
3.1. 
 
Figure 3.1 – Theoretical model 
 
 
3.3  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Sample and survey design 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the offshoring process performance consequences of 
cost estimation errors and the moderating role of modularity. The hypotheses are tested on a 
dataset based on the Global Operation Network (GONe) survey. The survey collects data on 
Danish and Swedish companies, and focuses on the process of relocating activities from 
Denmark and Sweden to foreign locations. It targets the latest offshoring implementation in the 
respective firms. As the process of offshoring challenges firms’ ability to coordinate a globally 
concerted organization (Kumar et al., 2009; Srikanth and Puranam, 2011), the purpose of the 
survey is to unravel the organizational consequences of offshoring on issues such as different 
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organizational mechanisms that firms employ to manage their offshoring activities, performance 
implications and capability development. 
The population of the study consists of all Danish firms across industries with more than 
50 employees (2,908 companies) and all Swedish manufacturing firms with more than 50 
employees (1,549 companies). The survey was conducted among these 4,457 companies in the 
time period from September 2011 to January 2012, where the CEOs of the companies were per 
postal mail and e-mail invited to participate in an online survey. In the survey, the respondents 
were asked about the characteristics of the offshoring implementations, the coordination of the 
offshoring activities, the interdependencies between domestic and offshored activities, and the 
effects of offshoring the activities. All in all, 1,086 usable questionnaires were received, which 
represents a response rate of 24.4%. Out of these, 379 companies (34.9%) reported that they 
have experience with offshoring.  
The sample used for this study consists of data on specific offshoring implementation 
from 221 companies (161 Danish companies; 60 Swedish companies) across different functions 
and industries (smaller sample due to different missing values). 62.0% of the implementations 
are captive offshoring and 38.0% are offshore outsourcing. 64.4% of the implementations are 
production tasks (e.g., fabrication, assembly, and maintenance), 21.9% are service tasks (e.g., 
finance, marketing and sales, IT and call centers), and 13.7% are R&D tasks (e.g., product 
design, product development, and software development). The firms are based in different 
industries, primarily manufacturing (34.2%), wholesale (15.2%), information and 
communication technology (11.4%), and finance and insurance (8.9%). 26.7% are small (< 150 
employees), 29.4% medium (< 500 employees), and 43.9% large (≥ 500 employees). These firms 
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offshore to 43 different countries, where China (21.4%), India (11.0%) and Poland (9.9%) are 
the most frequently used locations. 
 
Variable construction 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable in this study is the process performance of the activity that is relocated to 
an offshore location. This variable is inspired by previous research that investigates how the 
implementation has created a positive impact on an activity being relocated to a foreign location 
(e.g., Scott, 2005; Srikanth and Puranam, 2011). For example, Srikanth and Puranam (2011) 
measure process performance by composing an aggregate construct of following four items: 1) 
cost savings; 2) service quality improvements; 3) rapid growth; and 4) satisfaction with service. 
In a similar vein, process performance is in this paper measured using the average of five survey 
items in which respondent are asked to indicate on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = worse; 4 = no 
changes; 7 = better) the general effect of the activity post offshoring implementation. The five 
items are: 1) flexibility; 2) quality; and 3) productivity 4) profitability; and 5) costs demand.
2
 
These items produce a single construct with a Cronbach alpha α = 0.77.  
 
Independent variable 
The independent variable is cost estimation errors of implementing an offshoring activity abroad 
and follows previous research that investigates hidden costs (Larsen et al., 2012) and firms’ 
forecasting ability (Durand, 2003; Makadok and Walker, 2000). The variable is measured by 
                                                 
2
 It should be noted that the performance items in this paper are perceptual measures. While these may be biased, 
perceptual measures of performance have been widely used in strategic management literature and most studies find 
high convergent validity with objective measures such as publicly available accounting data (e.g. Powell and Dent-
Micallef, 1997; Hart and Banbury, 1994; Dess and Robinson, 1984; Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1987). 
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asking respondents on a 7-point Likert scale about the extent to which the decision maker was at 
the point of decision-making able to foresee the costs of implementing the offshoring activity in 
the light of the realized costs of offshoring ex post implementation (1=actual cost levels lower 
than expectations; 4=actual cost levels meet expectations; 7=actual costs levels higher than 
expectations). The higher the value of variable, the higher is the degree to which the decision 
maker wrongly estimates the cost of implementing an offshoring decision. As such, as the 
variable is intended to capture variations in the extent to which firms can estimate the costs of an 
organizational reconfiguration when implementing an offshoring activity abroad. 
 
Moderating variable 
The moderating variable is modularity and is intended to capture how firms reduce the need for 
costly coordination across distance through the standardization and minimization of task 
interdependencies (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996). The variable is 
measured using the average of five survey items inspired by previous operationalizations of 
modularity (e.g., Srikanth and Puranam, 2011; Worren et al., 2002). These are the degree to 
which the offshoring task is 1) specified with the purpose of easing coordination; 2) defined 
through overarching goals and guidelines; 3) the interfaces are defined through procedures, 
manuals and blueprints; 4) integrated with remaining activities at home (inversed item); and 5) 
coordinated based on formalization. For each of these items, respondents answer on a 7-point 
Likert scale (1=nothing; 7=to a large extent). The five items produce a single construct with a 
Cronbach alpha α = 0.72. The questions used to measure the key constructs are summarized in 
Table 3.2. 
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Table 3.2 – Operationalization of key theoretical constructs 
Dependent 
variable 
Process performance post offshoring (α = 0.77) 
Please indicate on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = worse; 4 = no changes; 7 = better) 
the general effect of the offshoring activity post implementation regarding: 
1) Flexibility 
2) Quality 
3) Productivity 
4) Profitability 
5) Costs demand 
 
Independent 
variable 
Cost estimation errors 
Please indicate the degree to which you were able to foresee the costs of 
implementing the offshoring activity in the light of the realized costs of 
offshoring ex post implementation (1=actual cost levels lower than expectations; 
4=actual cost levels meet expectations; 7=actual costs levels higher than 
expectations). 
 
Moderating 
variable 
Modularity (α = 0.72) 
For each of these items, please indicate on a 7-point Likert scale (1=nothing; 7=to 
a large extent) the degree to which the offshoring task is: 
1) Specified with the purpose of easing coordination 
2) Defined through overarching goals and guidelines 
3) Defined through procedures, manuals and blueprints 
4) Integrated with remaining activities at home (inversed item) 
5) Coordinated based on formalization 
 
 
 
Control variables  
Lastly, a number of variables have been included to control for unobserved heterogeneity and 
alternative explanations. First, the governance mode of the implementation is measured as a 
dummy (1 = captive offshoring, 0 = offshore outsourcing). Second, the type of offshoring 
activity is measured as dummy variables. These are production and service (a third possible type  
R&D was omitted and therefore serves as the baseline when interpreting the coefficients of 
production and service). Third, a dummy variable captures whether the company is a 
manufacturing or a service company (1 = manufacturing; 0 = service). Fourth, the size of the 
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offshoring implementation is measured as the logarithm of the number of employees that are 
employed at the implementation. Fifth, the size of the offshoring company is measured as the 
logarithm of the total number of employees that are employed at the company. Sixth, since 
performance may change over time, the maturity of the offshoring implementation is measured 
as the logarithm of the time in years since the activity was implemented. Seventh, the offshoring 
experience of the company is measured as the logarithm of the difference in the number of years 
since the first offshoring implementation in the company and the respective offshoring 
implementation. Eighth, since research has pointed out that offshoring decisions supported by a 
corporate strategy generally perform better (Massini et al., 2011), the presence of a corporate 
strategy in the offshoring strategy is measured as a dummy (1 = yes; 0 = no). Ninth, the region 
where the offshoring implementation is location is controlled for by creating a dummy for each 
region. Finally, the firms’ home country is captured by a dummy variable (1 = Denmark; 0 = 
Sweden). 
 
Econometric specifications  
The statistical analysis is conducted on the level of the 221 offshoring implementations. A 
hierarchical regression analysis with successive linear regression (OLS) models each adding 
more explanatory variables is used to measure the dependent variables process performance. The 
hierarchical feature refers to the gradual building of separate, but related, models with added 
explanatory variables. In each step, an F-test for increment is conducted in order to test whether a 
significant improvement in the explanatory power has been gained. To reduce problems of 
multicolinearity inherent in moderator models, the independent and moderating variables have 
been centered and standardized. Moreover, to avoid problems of heteroscedasticity, the analyses 
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are conducted with robust standard errors. Lastly, the failure to find significant results in a 
skewness/kurtosis test suggests that the assumption of normality of the error term is not violated.  
 
3.4  RESULTS  
Descriptive statistics  
The descriptive data (mean values, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values) and 
correlation matrix are reported in Table 3.3.  
 As can be seen, there is considerable variation in the key variables: process performance, 
cost estimation error, and modularity. The implementations also vary in terms of size, maturity 
and experience. A closer inspection of the correlation matrix shows a low correlation between 
most variables. Hence, the dataset does not seem to involve problems of multicolinearity. When 
looking at cost estimation error, 11.7% reported that realized costs were lower than expected 
costs, 60.6% reported that realized costs met expected costs, and 27.7% reported realized costs 
were higher than expected costs. All observations are used in the analysis to capture the variation 
in the relative degree of cost estimation errors. However, as this variable is centered and 
standardized, the descriptive statistics show a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1. The average 
company has 5,859 employees on a world basis and the average implementation has 63 
employees.  
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Table 3.3 – Correlation matrix and descriptive statistics (n=221; region dummies are 
excluded)   
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Hypotheses testing 
The results of the OLS models are reported in Table 3.4. In all models for process performance 
(Model 1-3), cost estimation error is negative and significant as expected (β = -0.27; 0.27; 0.28, p 
<0.001). This provides support to Hypothesis 1, suggesting that a higher degree of cost 
estimation errors has a negative impact on the process performance of the offshored activity. 
 
 
Table 3.4 – Hierarchical regression models with offshore process performance as 
dependent variables (n=221) 
 
 
Offshore process performance 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Cost est. error -0.27*** (0.07) -0.27*** (0.07) -0.28*** (0.06) 
Modularity 
 
0.16* (0.07) 0.10 (0.08) 
Est. error * modularity 
  
0.12* (0.06) 
Production 0.13  (0.19) 0.06  (0.19) 0.11  (0.19) 
Service -0.16  (0.22) -0.21  (0.22) -0.13  (0.23) 
Captive -0.05  (0.14) -0.04  (0.14) -0.08  (0.14) 
Corp. strat. 0.24† (0.13) 0.20  (0.13) 0.19  (0.13) 
Impl.year  0.19† (0.11) 0.18  (0.11) 0.17  (0.11) 
Exper. 0.07  (0.06) 0.07  (0.06) 0.05  (0.06) 
Impl. size  0.12* (0.05) 0.11* (0.05) 0.12* (0.05) 
Comp. size -0.05  (0.04) -0.07† (0.04) -0.05  (0.04) 
Manufacturing -0.33* (0.16) -0.28† (0.16) -0.28† (0.16) 
Home country 0.16  (0.17) 0.25  (0.17) 0.22  (0.17) 
China -0.18  (0.22) -0.16  (0.21) -0.14  (0.21) 
India -0.34  (0.30) -0.35  (0.30) -0.31  (0.30) 
Poland 0.21  (0.22) 0.20  (0.22) 0.21  (0.22) 
Asia 0.10  (0.24) 0.06  (0.23) 0.11  (0.22) 
West Europe -0.03  (0.24) -0.06  (0.24) -0.13  (0.24) 
East Europe 0.03  (0.21) 0.11  (0.21) 0.10  (0.21) 
Other regions 0.25  (0.29) 0.22  (0.28) 0.26  (0.28) 
Intercept 4.53*** (0.40) 4.61*** (0.41) 4.52*** (0.41) 
F-values 3.07*** 4.01*** 5.37*** 
R-square 0.214 0.236 0.250 
F-test for increment 
 
5.90* 3.86† 
†, *, ** and *** indicate a significance level of 10%, 5%, 1% and 0.1%, respectively.  
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. 
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In order to test Hypothesis 2, the full model is used to see the effect of the interaction 
term. First, Model 1 with only the independent and control variables obtains an R-square of 
0.214. In order to test for the impact of the moderating variable, modularity is added in Model 2. 
Modularity is positive and significant (β=0.16, p <0.05), which suggests that it has a positive 
direct effect on the process performance of the offshored activity. Moreover, the R-square in 
Model 2 increases significantly to 0.236 compared to Model 1 (F-value for increment=5.90, p 
<0.05), suggesting that the explanatory power of the model with modularity is significantly 
higher than without modularity.  
In order to investigate the impact of the interaction term, the results of the full model with 
all variables are presented in Model 3. Here, the interaction term is positive and significant 
(β=0.12, p <0.05), while the moderating variable modularity turns out insignificant. Moreover, 
the R-square shows a slightly significant increase to 0.250 compared to Model 2 (F-value for 
increment=3.86, p <0.10). Thus, the full model with the interaction terms explains a fourth of the 
total variation in the dependent variable cost estimation errors, and is therefore according to the 
goodness-of-fit statistics (F-value, R-square, F-test for increment) superior to the other models in 
explaining process performance. Modularity is thus moderating the effect of cost estimation 
errors on process performance. These results are further illustrated in Figure 3.2, where the two-
way interaction between estimation error and modularity on process performance is depicted. 
Interestingly, in cases with low estimation error, it seems that low modularity obtains 
slightly higher performance than high modularity. However, as cost estimation errors increase, 
the performance benefit of high modularity rapidly surpasses low modularity. Thus, in cases of 
high estimation errors, high modularity obtains higher internal performance than low modularity. 
Moreover, it should be noted that although high modularity has a positive moderating effect, the 
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slope is still negative, but significantly less so than with low modularity. Thus, the moderation of 
modularity does not increase internal performance per se, but rather reduces the negative impact 
of cost estimation errors on performance.  
 
Figure 3.2 – Two-way interaction on process performance 
 
 
Among the control variables in the full model, only two come out with significant 
coefficients. These are: implementation size (β=0.12, p <0.05) and manufacturing (β=-0.28, p 
<0.10). This suggests that larger implementations (measured in terms of employees) in general 
display higher performance, and that firms in manufacturing industries (compared to service 
industries) have lower performance. Also, none of the region dummy variables turn out 
significant in the final model. In sum, the data suggest that reconfiguration cost estimation errors 
have a negative effect on the process performance of the offshored activity (Hypothesis 1), but 
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that this relationship is positively moderated by the degree of modularity in the activity 
(Hypothesis 2). 
 In order to test the robustness of the findings, a number of measures have been taken. 
First, in order to investigate whether cost estimation errors could be an endogenous choice 
variable that is correlated with unobservables relegated to the error term, a two-stage instrument 
variable approach has been conducted (Reeb et al., 2012). In the first stage, a model was run 
with cost estimation error as a function of the choice of location of the offshoring 
implementation (dummy variables indicating whether the activity was located in Asia and 
Western Europe) that was uncorrelated with the dependent variable but correlated with the cost 
estimation error (Stock et al., 2002). In the second stage, the residuals of the model in the first 
stage were included as a control variable in a full model of offshoring performance. The 
residuals turned out insignificant on process performance and an F-test to see whether the 
residuals were significantly different from zero also turned out insignificant (F = 0.11) (Sargan, 
1958). This therefore suggests that cost estimation error is not suffering from endogeneity. 
 Second, common method bias where the dependent and the independent variable stem 
from the same source is a substantial problem for cross-sectional studies like the present (Chang 
et al., 2010). Several measures were taken to investigate whether the present study suffers from 
common method bias. First, the complexity of model, particularly with the moderating variable, 
makes common method biases less of a problem (Harrison et al. 1996). Second, a Harman one-
factor test was conducted to see whether the majority of the covariance can be explained by a 
single factor (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). Using all the items of the model in the factor 
analysis, four factors with an eigenvalue greater than 1 emerged explaining between 26.4% and 
9.9% of the total variance. This indicates that the diversity of facets captured by the model 
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constructs makes it unlikely that a single factor explains all the covariance in the constructs. 
Third, a ‘marker variable’—a theoretically unrelated variable to the constructs of interest—as a 
proxy for common method variance has been investigated (Lindell and Whitney, 2001). A 
variable indicating whether the offshoring activity can only be conducted by personnel with a 
higher education was used for this purpose. Only marginal and non-significant correlations 
between the constructs of interest and the marker variable was found (process performance = 
0.04; cost estimation error = 0.02; modularity = -0.05; cost estimation error*modularity = 0.01). 
All in all, this suggests that the results are not contaminated by a common method bias.  
 
3.5  DISCUSSION  
As firms implement strategic decisions, important estimations on the costs of the organizational 
changes must be made (Durand, 2003; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Makadok and Walker, 
2000). Often, however, firms experience that factors such as complexity, biases and politics 
make the implementation of the strategic decisions more costly than expected (Dibbern et al., 
2008; Larsen et al., 2012; Stringfellow et al., 2008). In the context of offshoring, this paper 
argues that these reconfiguration cost estimation errors have detrimental consequences for the 
process performance of a given activity that is relocated abroad, but that this relationship is 
mitigated by the degree of modularity in the activity. Decision makers’ inability to effectively 
estimate the costs of reconfiguration by implementation an activity in a foreign location results in 
opportunity costs that negatively impact the process performance of the activity. Operations are 
likely to be disrupted by factors such as unexpected additional resources used to train and 
educate the local labor and the implementation of inappropriate global integration and 
communication mechanisms. At the same time, assuming that complexity and the increased need 
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for coordination are important sources of cost estimation failures, firms that offshores 
modularized activities requiring less coordination are likely to experience a positive moderating 
effect on performance. 
 Data on 221 offshoring implementations reported by Danish and Swedish firms support 
these arguments. The results suggest that cost estimation error has a negative impact on process 
performance of the offshored activity (Hypothesis 1) and that modularity has positive moderating 
effect on this relationship (Hypothesis 2).  
This study has important implications for research on the costs and performance of 
offshoring in particular, and for the role and consequences of decision-making in strategic 
management research in more general. Recent offshoring research investigates different factors 
that may explain variations in offshoring performance, such as the role of corporate strategies 
(Massini et al., 2010) and learning (Jensen, 2009; Maskell et al., 2007). This research adds to the 
literature by showing that the inability to estimate the costs of reconfiguration has a negative 
effect on the process performance of the activity that is being implemented abroad. In this 
respect, the cost estimation errors in decision making processes are critical to the extent that they 
result in lower process performance of a given activity, and as such can be a source of situations 
in which ‘hidden costs’ undermine the initial rationale for offshoring firm activities abroad 
(Dibbern et al., 2008; Larsen et al., 2012; Stringfellow et al., 2008). Evidence of offshoring 
failures and back-sourcing lends support to this argument (Chadee and Raman, 2009; 
Frauenheim, 2003). As companies expand the scale and scope of offshoring, many firms realize 
that managing an increasingly globally dispersed organization is more difficult and costly than 
initially expected. However, while previous research has explained hidden costs through 
measures such as complexity (Larsen et al., 2012) and interaction intensity and distance 
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(Stringfellow et al., 2008), this paper advances this debate by theoretically and empirically 
pinpointing the detrimental performance consequences of hidden costs (seen as cost estimation 
errors), and how modularity can positively moderate this relationship. Future research could 
therefore investigate the nature of different types of hidden offshoring costs, such as knowledge 
transfer, control and design (cf., Dibbern et al., 2008), and test how these impact performance 
individually. Moreover, future research could investigate the moderating role of costly 
investments in new offshoring coordination mechanisms and how this impact performance. This 
is important as it offers a perspective on the potential detrimental relationship between strategic 
decision-making and performance.  
Moreover, by stressing the organizational reconfiguration of offshoring and particularly 
the impact of new and international interdependencies between the spatially differentiated 
activities, this research suggests that the modularity of the offshored activities has a positive 
moderating effect on the relationship between cost estimation errors and process performance. 
Given the impact of complexity on estimation errors (Larsen et al., 2012), firms that reduces the 
need for coordination through modularity in the reconfiguration process will experience that the 
process performance is positively moderated. These results emphasize the importance of aligning 
firms’ coordination mechanism to the new organizational demands (Srikanth and Puranam, 
2011). However, while this research found modularity to positively moderate performance, 
future research could investigate other coordination mechanisms such as ongoing communication 
and IT-based coordination. Moreover, bounded rational decision makers may not grasp how the 
implementation of a strategic decision may impact new organizational demands (Ethiraj et al., 
2005). It is thus important to investigate how planned interdependency management (prior to the 
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implementation) versus emerging management (after the implementation) impact performance 
(see Manning et al., 2012).  
More generally, this research contributes to research on firms’ estimation abilities 
(Durand, 2003; Makadok and Walker, 2000) and strategic decision-making effectiveness (Dean 
and Sharfman, 1996). Besides adding to a broader debate on the causal relationship between firm 
capabilities and performance (e.g., Ethiraj et al., 2005; Henderson and Cockburn, 1994), this 
paper stresses the importance of effectively estimating future costs of implementing strategic 
decisions. This is of high importance in strategic management as it determines future resource 
allocations to the pace of anticipated changes in the organization and the environment, and, as 
such, is a significant determinant for performance (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). However, in 
contrast to similar research investigating forecasting in external environments, such as market 
and industry growth (e.g., Durand, 2003; Makadok and Walker, 2000), this research emphasizes 
the importance of estimating the costs of internal organizational change. This means that firms’ 
ability to foresee the costs and consequences of organizational change with a particular focus on 
the role of interdependencies and coordination is important to understand performance 
deviations. Initial cost estimations are likely to set expectations in the implementation process, 
and, as such, allocate and utilize resources in a most efficient manner. Future research could 
therefore put more emphasis on understanding the relationship between decision-making 
processes, the impact of the organizational design, and performance. In particular, questions 
relating to understanding the different factors that ensure more or less effective strategic 
decision-making (measured by fulfillment of strategic objectives, see Dean and Sharfman, 1996) 
provide valuable grounds for future research. For example, a qualitative research study 
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investigating an entire offshoring process—from decision-making through implementation to 
performance consequences—would be particularly well equipped to investigate topics like these. 
 
Limitations and future research 
Due to the nature of the data, reconfiguration cost estimation errors—operationalized as 
deviations between expected and realized costs of implementation—have been measured at a 
single point in time after the offshoring implementation. Asking retrospectively about initial 
expectations may lead to an underestimation of cost estimation errors (although the results still 
hold despite the conservative bias of the independent variable). Moreover, there is a theoretical 
time lag between cost estimation errors and performance that the data in this study do not 
capture. For example, the performance of the strategic decision may only materialize after a 
certain point of implementation maturity (that is not necessarily linear). Although the maturity of 
the project is controlled for, future research could pay more attention to how different time 
frames resonate with performance. In particular, future research could endeavor to collect data 
on expectations and actual costs of implementation before and after the offshoring 
implementation as well as subsequent performance data. This would have obvious advantages to 
the design used in this paper. 
Moreover, this paper relies dominantly on survey data. As such, this study is not able 
scrutinize the actual decision-making process leading up to offshoring implementation. Also, the 
data does not allow for an investigation of the actual implementation of the offshoring activity. 
Future research could therefore more carefully address how this process actually develops, the 
various factors contributing to the success of decision-making, and how this resonate with 
performance. An in-depth qualitative case study would have obvious advantages in this respect. 
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Lastly, while this research has investigated the moderating role of modularity on process 
performance, it has left out an important discussion and empirical investigation on the impact of 
location. For example, it can be assumed that environmental uncertainty should have a negative 
moderating role on the relationship between cost estimation errors and process performance. 
Previous studies show how foreign market entry mode choices and the effectiveness of these 
largely depend on the target country’s environmental uncertainty (Slangen and van Tulder, 
2009). As decision makers make important estimations regarding environmental factors when 
deciding to engage in offshoring, such as such as labor and resource cost inflation, exchange rate 
fluctuation, tax policies, etc., increased perceived environmental uncertainty would make it more 
difficult for the decision maker to effectively estimate the impact of these environmental factors. 
Following the logic of this paper, it can be assumed that the ability of firms to effectively 
coordinate and manage external factors such as the political environment (Oliver and Holzinger, 
2008) should have an important influence on the relationship between cost estimation errors and 
process performance. Accordingly, future research could investigate other factors that moderate 
performance as a result of cost estimation errors. 
 
Concluding remarks 
This paper investigates the relationship between cost estimation errors, modularity and offshore 
process performance, and as such contributes to an important discussion on the effectiveness of 
strategic decision-making. In particular, this paper argues that reconfiguration costs estimation 
errors create opportunity costs with detrimental process performance consequences, but that this 
is positively moderated by modularity. While this paper found the context of offshoring to be 
particularly beneficial for this purpose, especially as the phenomenon points to central added 
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complexities and challenges of managing global enterprises (Kumar et al., 2009, Srikanth and 
Puranam, 2011), the relationship between firms’ estimation abilities, organizational design and 
performance needs to be further explored in other contexts. 
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 Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of the organizational 
reconfiguration of offshoring on firms’ strategies. A consequence of offshoring is the need to 
reintegrate the geographically relocated organizational activities into a coherent organizational 
architecture. In order to do this, firms need a high degree of architectural knowledge which is 
typically gained through learning by doing. We therefore argue that firms with more offshoring 
experience are more likely to include organizational objectives in their offshoring strategies. We 
develop and find support for this hypothesis using a mixed-method approach based on a 
qualitative case study and comprehensive data from the Offshoring Research Network. These 
findings contribute to research on the organizational design and architecture of offshoring and 
the dynamics of organizational architectures. 
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4.1  INTRODUCTION 
How does the organizational reconfiguration of offshoring influence firms’ strategies? In recent 
years, the practice of offshoring administrative and technical services to foreign locations has 
gained vast popularity. Firms are not only offshoring standardized IT and business processes, but 
also more complex and knowledge-intensive activities such as product design and development 
(Kenney et al., 2009; Lewin et al., 2009). However, while much research has provided rich 
insights into questions such as which functions firms decide to offshore, which governance 
modes they choose, where they offshore to, and what outcomes they achieve (e.g., Doh et al., 
2009; Lewin et al., 2009; Mol et al., 2005), less research has been devoted to understanding the 
dynamics of offshoring (Contractor et al., 2010; Maskell et al., 2007; Kedia and Mukherjee, 
2009). In particular, little research has questioned how firms realize strategies of offshoring. Our 
paper contributes to filling this gap by studying firms’ strategies following the offshoring 
implementation.  
When firms implement offshoring activities abroad, they initiate an organizational 
reconfiguration where they relocate disaggregated organizational activities abroad to either 
independent suppliers, to wholly-owned subsidiaries or in joint-ventures (Bunyaratavej et al., 
2011, Contractor et al., 2010, Manning et al., 2008). Although the offshoring decision may 
provide firms with an array of advantages, such as lower costs, access to new resources, and 
markets (Dossani and Kenney, 2003; Lewin et al., 2009; Hutzschenreuter et al., 2011b), it also 
presents firms with substantial challenges. For example, Dell Inc., the U.S. based multinational 
IT corporation, decided in 2003 after much problems and challenges regarding cultural 
differences, language difficulties and time delays to eventually close and source back its Indian 
service centers that it had offshored and outsourced some years earlier (Graf and Mudambi, 
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2005). Aron and Singh (2005: 135) argue that many firms are caught up by the “harsh realities 
of offshoring” as they fail to pick up the right processes, calculate the operational and structural 
risks, and match organizational forms to live up to the initial expectations of the offshoring 
activities.  
Since the organizational reconfiguration of offshoring encapsulates new architectural 
challenges and complexities (Kumar et al., 2008; Srikanth and Puranam, 2011), firms 
subsequently need to reintegrate the geographically dispersed organizational elements so that 
they can be supportive of the organizational objectives (Mudambi and Venzin, 2010). In 
particular, firms need to identify and uncover the new international interdependencies spanning 
across geographies, cultures and institutions. In this respect, the role of architectural 
knowledge—knowledge on how different activities are integrated and linked together in a 
coherent organizational system (Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001; 2006; Henderson and Clark, 
1990)—is important. As firms gain experience with the offshoring implementation and thereby 
accumulate architectural knowledge, decision makers increasingly understand the true nature of 
the organizational activities and the interdependencies between these, and will therefore 
acknowledge this in their strategies. Hence, we propose that as firms’ experience with particular 
offshoring implementations increases they will growingly consider organizational objectives in 
their strategies. 
We develop this idea by employing a mixed-method approach (Edmondson and 
McManus, 2007). First, we report the findings of an in-depth case study of offshoring in a 
product development project in Nokia, the worlds’ largest mobile phone manufacturer. The case 
shows how the decision to offshore was initially driven by locational objectives such as lower 
costs and access to strategic resources but that this changed over time toward organizational 
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objectives that could increase organizational performance. We then test and find support for a 
hypothesis that offshoring experience is positively associated with firms’ organizational strategy 
orientation on comprehensive data from the Offshoring Research Network (ORN).  
A contribution of this paper is the emphasis on the role of knowledge accumulation in the 
offshoring process, where architectural evolution should be understood as an iterative process 
between decision makers’ accumulation of architectural knowledge and the deployment of this in 
their strategic behavior. This means that strategy follows structure (Chandler, 1962; Hall and 
Sajas, 1980), but only to the extent that the decision maker successfully accumulates 
architectural knowledge. Thus, rather than assuming that the effective architecture of firms’ 
offshoring activities can a priori be planned and implemented, we suggest that this is more a 
subject of learning. The locus of understanding the antecedents of different organizational 
architectures and their performance contingencies should therefore acknowledge the process in 
which decisions makers derive architectural knowledge on which decisions are taken. 
The paper proceeds as follows: First, we briefly introduce the literature on organizational 
architectures and the role of architectural knowledge, before we discuss how offshoring may be 
regarded as an organizational reconfiguration. Second, we present the research methodology, 
before we introduce the qualitative analysis (based on Nokia) and the quantitative analysis 
(based on large scale ORN-data). Finally, we conclude the paper by discussing its implications 
for theory on offshoring and architectural knowledge. 
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4.2  THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Organizational architecture and architectural knowledge 
An organizational architecture can be defined as decision makers’ more or less intentional 
choices to ensure that organizational components and activities co-exist and are linked to each 
other in the most effective way (Nadler and Tushman, 1997; Sah and Stiglitz, 1986). According 
to Sah and Stiglitz (1986: 716), “The [organizational] architecture describes how the constituent 
decision-making units are arranged together in a system, how the decision-making authority and 
ability is distributed within a system, who gathers what information, and who communicates to 
whom.” As such, the organizational architecture depicts the architectural decisions on how 
activities interact, how they are interdependent on one another, and where tasks and 
organizational boundaries are drawn (Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004a). 
Several different organizational architectures have been identified in the literature. For 
example, Sah and Stiglitz (1986) distinguish between the polyarchy architecture as a system in 
which there are several and possibly competing decision makers who can undertake projects or 
ideas independently of one another, and the hierarchy architectures where only a few individuals 
undertake projects while others provide support in decision making. Another example is the 
modular organizational architecture which can be characterized as a loosely coupled 
organizational form (Orton and Weick, 1990; Weick, 1976) with few and standardized interfaces 
between different organizational activities (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Kotabe et al., 2007; 
Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996). This can be seen in contrast to an integral organizational 
architecture consisting of a low degree of standardization of interfaces between the different 
organizational elements (Schilling, 2000; Ulrich, 1995).  
102 
 
Central to the organizational architecture is the underlying interdependency structure. 
Organizations can be viewed as systems of tasks and individuals that to various extents are 
interdependent on each other (Grandori, 2001; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Perrow, 1967; 
Thompson, 1967). Interdependencies link together individual parts of an organization in such a 
way that the joint outcome of the activities depends on the contributions of these individual parts 
(Van de Ven et al., 1976). Thus, a purpose of the organizational architecture is to meet the 
coordination requirements generated by individuals and groups undertaking interdependent 
activities. An essential role of interdependencies between tasks and individuals is therefore the 
“gathering, interpreting and synthesis of information in the context of organizational decision 
making” (Tushman and Nadler, 1978: 614) so that coordinated action can be exercised.  
In terms of making effective architectural decisions, decision makers thus need to 
understand the underlying interdependency structure of firms’ organizational architectures. For 
example, it is well established that the performance of the organizational architectures is highly 
correlated with the architectural fit (Siggelkow, 2002; Drazin and Ven, 1985, Khandwalla, 
1973), i.e., “an organizational system with no inconsistent core elements and a number of 
reinforcing core elements” (Siggelkow, 2002: 128). Architectural fit describes the degree to 
which the different architectural elements in the organization are consistent with one another and 
supportive of the organizational objectives. Modular architectural forms can be argued to be 
superior to integral forms in contexts of high organizational complexity due to standardization 
and minimization of interdependencies between different activities (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; 
Kotabe et al., 2007; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996), whereas it may be less beneficial in contexts 
with little complexity due to the costs of modularizing a system (Baldwin and Clark, 2003, 
Brusoni et al., 2007). However, in order to make effective decisions toward achieving fit in 
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modular systems (e.g., standardize interdependencies), decision makers need to know how 
changes within the parameters of an existing architecture as well as how broader changes in the 
architecture itself are geared towards improving organizational performance (Ethiraj and 
Levinthal, 2004a). For example, decision makers need to know where the organizational 
boundaries, and hence also interdependencies, are drawn, how change in one activity will 
influence another activity, and how change in the overarching architecture will impact 
organizational performance. 
Much research has emphasized firms’ architectural knowledge—i.e., the understanding of 
how components in an organizational system are related to each other (e.g., Baldwin and Clark, 
2000; Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001; 2006; Henderson and Clark, 1990)—as a crucial factor in 
taking effective architectural decisions. For example, Brusoni and Prencipe (2006) show how 
radical organizational evolution in the tire manufacturing industry is strongly mediated by the 
evolution of firms’ engineering knowledge. Indeed, deviations in the performance of 
organizational architectures have often been associated with the level of architectural knowledge 
of decision makers (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Von Hippel, 1990). 
Henderson and Clark (1990) refer to architectural knowledge in relation to product technologies 
as consisting of two parts: knowledge about the different components underlying a distinct 
system and knowledge about how the components are integrated into an orchestrated systemic 
whole. The same applies to architectural knowledge in an organizational context: To make 
effective architectural decisions, decision makers need knowledge about the individual activities 
and about the ways that the different activities are integrated and linked together in a coherent 
organizational system. Without knowledge on how the organization with its activities and 
interdependencies function—i.e., the underlying interdependency structure—there is a higher 
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risk that incorrect and even deteriorating architectural decisions are taken. Indeed, assuming that 
decision makers suffer from bounded rationality (Simon, 1955, Simon and March, 1958), the 
likelihood of making incorrect architectural decision increases with the lack of knowledge.  
By contrast, the more knowledge and experience the decision maker have, the more likely 
it is that effective architectural decisions are taken (Argyres, 2007; Gulati and Puranam, 2009; 
Jacobides, 2005; Tsoukas, 2001). Through cumulative learning-by-doing over time, firms gain 
experience with different organizational architectures in different contexts, and more knowledge 
is gained on what is effective and what is not (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Adler and Clark, 1991). 
This view is supported by Ethiraj and Levinthal (2004a: 411): “While bounded rationality 
suggests that they [decision makers] are unlikely to discover the appropriate structure in the first 
attempt, it is certainly possible that repeated, small adaptive attempts will generate progress 
toward the appropriate structure”. Thus, seeing the effective organizational architectural as the 
result of a joint discovery process of collective trial-and-error learning (Lounamaa and March, 
1987) or as the outcome of firms' successfully managed search for new architectural options and 
the exploitation of these options once found (Siggelkow, 2002), it is evident that architectural 
knowledge plays a pivotal role in this process. 
 
The organizational reconfiguration of offshoring 
From an architectural perspective, offshoring describes an organizational reconfiguration in 
which originally co-located activities become relocated abroad in different governance modes 
(Contractor et al., 2010; Kumar et al., 2009; Srikanth and Puranam, 2011). The organizational 
architecture is reconfigured on issues such as the contractual ownership and relationship of the 
offshoring setup (Hutzschenreuter et al., 2011a), the geography of the host location (Graf and 
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Mudambi, 2005), the interdependencies and coordination mechanisms between the spatially 
differentiated organizational tasks and activities (Kumar et al., 2009; Srikanth and Puranam, 
2011), and the overall coherency of the globally dispersed organizational system (Ernst and Kim, 
2002).  
 In the reconfiguration process, the organizational architecture incurs new complexities by 
adding distances (e.g., geographical, institutional, and cultural) to the interdependencies between 
the organizational activities. When activities are co-located, firms may not see the rationale of 
formalizing coordination mechanisms as day-to-day challenges can be solved in an informal 
face-to-face manner (Storper and Venables, 2004). However, as activities become dispersed, 
opportunities for informal coordination are reduced (Allen, 1997) and project teams find it more 
difficult to build collegial social environments and common ground due to less communication 
and shared context (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Clark and Brennan, 1991; Kraut et al., 2002; 
Martinez and Jarillo, 1989). Moreover, research suggests that firms have a tendency of 
disaggregating or ‘fine-slicing’ their value chain activities as they engage in offshoring processes 
(Contractor et al., 2010; Mudambi and Venzin, 2010; Tanriverdi et al., 2007). Consequently, 
with increased offshoring firms are often presented with a higher number of organizational 
activities and interdependencies that must be coordinated across distance. In other words, 
decision makers need to take decisions that can restore fit among the geographically dispersed 
organizational elements so that they can be supportive of the organizational objectives.  
 Obviously, the governance mode of the offshoring implementation (captive vs. 
outsourced) has important implications for the extent to which the decision maker in the 
offshoring firm are able to implement architectural decisions. For example, it is less likely that a 
decision maker is able to exercise decision-making authority in outsourced arrangement where 
106 
 
the activity is conducted by an external provider. However, we argue that firms’ organizational 
architecture encapsulates both captive and outsourced implementations by stressing that a central 
task in offshoring relates to reintegrating offshored organizational activities (irrespective of 
governance mode) into a value-adding system (Mudambi and Venzin, 2010). The decision-
maker possesses control in terms of facilitating the reintegration process and can make important 
architectural decisions on issues such as how the offshored activities should interact, to what 
extent they should be interdependent on one another, and where tasks and organizational 
boundaries should be drawn. In this respect, the offshoring companies presume the role of 
systems integrators in which they “lead and coordinate from a technological and organizational 
viewpoint the work of suppliers involved in the network” (Brusoni et al., 2001: 613). 
 Thus far, little research has questioned and investigated how the organizational 
reconfiguration of offshoring impacts firms’ strategies. Indeed, much research has successfully 
pointed out that firms are driven by offshoring for a number of reasons, such as achieving lower 
costs, gaining market proximity, and securing strategic resources (Manning et al., 2008; Kedia 
and Lahiri, 2007). Moreover, research suggests that firms with predefined corporate-wide 
offshoring strategies that articulate deliberate plans and guidelines for the adoption and 
implementation of offshoring activities are more likely to generate higher offshoring 
performance compared to firms that engage in offshoring more opportunistically (e.g., Heijmen 
et al., 2008; Lewin and Couto, 2007; Massini et al., 2010). However, we know little about the 
consequences on firms’ strategies as they reconfigure their organizations on a global scale. For 
example, how do firms accommodate for the new complexities in the organizational architecture 
after relocating activities abroad? Is the successful offshoring implementation only attainable by 
firms with overarching and supportive corporate strategies? Or, is it also possible that firms 
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approach offshoring more as a learning-by-doing process? Accordingly, the research question we 
pose in this paper is: How does the organizational reconfiguration of offshoring influence firms’ 
strategies? 
In order to operationalize this research question, we discriminate between two types of 
offshoring strategies to illustrate how firms’ strategies may change as a response to the 
organizational reconfiguration of offshoring. On the one hand, firms’ offshoring strategies can be 
oriented towards objectives such as new markets, lower production costs, talented labor, etc. 
Indeed, the main objective for most firms engaging in offshoring is to access labor and other 
costs in low-cost locations (Lewin and Peeters, 2006). Whether firms offshore knowledge 
intensive services or more standardized IT activities, a main offshoring objective relates to 
cutting costs by accessing labor and resources at a comparatively lower cost than in the home-
country. We thus label the strategies directed towards achieving benefits derived from the 
environment as locational strategy orientation. This strategy thus captures firms’ desire to 
achieve objectives derived from being present in the host location.  
 On the other hand, research has also pointed out that firms’ offshoring drivers can be 
devoted toward more organizational objectives. For example, firms may focus on objectives such 
as reducing systems redundancy, increasing operational and organizational flexibility, improving 
business process redesign, etc. (Lewin and Peeters, 2006). As such, firms view offshoring as a 
facilitator for organizational change (e.g., Jensen, 2009). We label these strategies as 
organizational strategy orientation.  
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4.3  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
We employ a mixed method approach that combines qualitative and quantitative methodologies 
(Edmondson and McManus, 2007) to investigate how the organizational reconfiguration of 
offshoring influences firms’ strategies. More specifically, first we employ an inductive analysis 
of a qualitative case study of the organizational reconfiguration of an offshoring event to 
accurately examine the phenomenon and eventually derive a testable hypothesis (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Yin, 2003; Siggelkow, 2007). This enables us to capture the evolution of the offshoring 
process; from the offshoring decision to the organizational reconfiguration and further to the 
strategic response. However, in order to better discuss the generalizability of our finding, we 
subsequently use quantitative methods on comprehensive survey data to test the hypothesis 
induced from the qualitative results. Accordingly, we use the two methodological approaches as 
compliments to explore and explain how the organizational reconfiguration of offshoring 
influences firms’ strategies. 
The unit of analysis for both methodological approaches is firms’ specific offshoring 
implementations, defined as relocations of particular tasks or processes to locations outside the 
home country. Thus, rather than investigating firms’ general experience with offshoring, the aim 
of this study is to study the strategic implications of offshoring a specified firm activity. Hence, 
we investigate how the added complexities and distances (e.g., geography, institutions, and 
cultures) to the interdependencies in the organizational architecture (Contractor et al., 2010) 
affect firms’ strategies.  
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Qualitative data 
The qualitative part of this study consists of a case study of an offshoring decision in Nokia 
Denmark in which certain product development activities were offshored to China. Nokia 
Denmark was founded in 1996 as a subsidiary of the Nokia Corporation, one the largest mobile 
phone manufacturers in the world, and contains the largest Nokia R&D unit outside Finland 
concentrating on the development of mobile phones. The Danish site houses approximately 
1,200 employees, in which 60% are engineers, equally distributed between software and 
hardware engineers. In 2007, Nokia Denmark received instructions from corporate headquarters 
to drastically increase the number of mobile phones developed. Motivated by the need to release 
pressure on its in-house capacity, Nokia Denmark decided to offshore certain product 
development projects to the Taiwanese company Foxconn in a joint R&D (JRD) setup. Foxconn, 
one of the world’s largest electronic component manufacturers, who was also developing 
products for many of Nokia’s competitors, was given the responsibility of developing and testing 
selected standardized and less complex mobile phones, while more complex and sophisticated 
technology projects were retained in Denmark. 
 The case of Nokia Denmark was theoretically selected for this research (Eisenhard and 
Graebner, 2007; Pettigrew, 1990) as it highlights a process whereby a firm decides to offshore 
certain organizational tasks to a foreign location in order to release capacity and reduce costs. It 
can be argued that this case rather deals with international joint ventures rather than offshoring 
(e.g., Geringer and Herbert, 1989; Inkpen and Beamish, 1997; Lou, 2002) in which two 
companies establish a joint architecture for product development. However, since the theoretical 
motivation of using this case relates to the transfer of product development tasks from Denmark 
to China, rather than the choice of contractual governance mode, we argue that the case is well 
110 
 
positioned to discuss the organizational reconfiguration of offshoring. Moreover, the case 
concerns offshoring of a technologically complex process (product development of mobile 
phones) rather than more standardized activities such as volume production. Accordingly, as the 
case pinpoints a number of central challenges and complexities of offshoring (Contractor et al., 
2011; Srikanth and Puranam, 2011), it is well-positioned to investigate how an organizational 
reconfiguration influences firm strategy. 
 We use both archival and interview data to gather longitudinal information of the case, to 
generate interference, and for triangulation (Silverman, 2006). The archival data consist of 
published academic cases, academic papers, company reports, industry reports and news articles 
related to the Nokia Corporation, Nokia Denmark, and Foxconn. The interview data consist of 
six semi-structured interviews with central JRD stakeholders at Nokia Denmark (head of 
program management, product development manager, product program manager). Each 
interview ranged from one to two hours and was conducted in-person by either both authors or 
one of the authors of this paper. The interviews were used to gain an in-depth picture of 
offshoring in Nokia, and particularly the evolution of the JRD with Foxconn. Moreover, a 
number of informal discussions with informants during site visits also served as an important 
source of data. Since the offshoring process started prior to our involvement in the case, some 
events relevant to the study had to be captured in retrospect. 
 
Quantitative data 
For the quantitative part of this study, we use comprehensive survey data from the Offshoring 
Research Network (ORN). Accordingly, our study connects to a stream of research utilizing 
ORN data (Manning et al., 2008, Lewin et al., 2009, Massini et al., 2010). Since its foundation 
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in 2004, the ORN research team has primarily conducted two major annual surveys based on 
which offshoring-related data has been collected: the corporate client survey and the service 
provider survey. Both surveys are utilized for this particular study. The corporate client survey 
collects data from U.S. firms and European firms on their offshore implementations, including 
information on tasks offshored, launch year, location choice, choice of delivery model (both 
captive and outsourced) and performance data. The dataset used for this study consists of data 
from 129 firms, out of which 73 are U.S. based and 56 are European. These firms reported a total 
of 353 offshoring implementations. Tasks may include IT infrastructure, administrative services 
(e.g., HR, legal, finance and accounting), call centers, software and product development, 
marketing and sales, and procurement. The statistical analysis is conducted on the level of these 
353 offshore implementations.  
In addition, we also use data from the ORN service provider survey. The service provider 
survey annually collects a range of firm- and service-specific data from service providers in the 
U.S., Western and Eastern Europe, India, China, Latin America and other regions. The survey 
informs about features of services provided (e.g., degree of commoditization), locations from 
which services are provided, and performance of service delivery. Particularly important for us 
are control variables measuring the degree of standardization and commoditization of particular 
services, from the perspective of service providers. Moreover, using data from two independent 
and unrelated surveys helps us address the common method variance problem (Chang et al., 
2010). 
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4.4  QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 
Product Development in Nokia Denmark 
The primary activity of Nokia Denmark is the development of new mobile phone models, 
including every aspect from R&D to sourcing and logistics to marketing and market 
segmentation. The development of the mobile phone can be divided into the following sub-
categories: mechanics, electro-mechanics, electronics and software. In support of these are 
operations, product validation, quality, display, sourcing and customer care. Together, these 
groups form the organization of the project development unit in Nokia Denmark in which each 
team is responsible for optimizing the different technologies and supply chain of the mobile 
phone. Each year, about six to ten new mobile phones are developed in Denmark. The Danish 
site is renowned in the global Nokia organization for the many bestselling and path-breaking 
products and technologies it has developed. For example, the Nokia 3310—one of the most 
successful Nokia mobile phones with almost 200 million units sold around the world—was 
developed in Denmark. Moreover, the Series 40 software platform and application user interface 
software used on Nokia’s broad range of mid-tier mobile phones was also developed in Denmark 
The organizational architecture of Nokia’s product development process describes how 
different activities located in Denmark follow a generic process with the purpose of developing 
new products and related process capabilities based on orders from the product and portfolio 
management (see Figure 4.1). The different activities are organized according to five distinct 
milestones (PD0 to PD4) that can only be reached if an assigned steering committee approved 
the development. PD0 marks the initiation of the product program; PD1 the product development 
release (full functionality of the product); PD2 the manufacturing release (full performance of 
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the product); PD3 the delivery release (ready for the market); and PD4 the determination of 
product development (handover to product maintenance). 
 
Figure 4.1 – Nokia product development 
 
 
The intention of this setup is to funnel and convert ‘good ideas’ into marketable products. 
One product development manager explained it as follows: 
 
“Concept mapping is creating a lot of different ideas and finding the ones with most 
promise; product development is basically maturing what we now have—a concept; and 
product maintenance is to keep the product alive and integrate different components. We 
have divided the process into these three parts as each phase requires different 
competences and mindsets.” 
 
Offshoring to China 
In 2007, the management of the Nokia product development unit located in Denmark decided to 
offshore parts of selected product development projects to the Chinese facilities of Foxconn—a 
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major multinational electronics components manufacturer—in a joint R&D (JRD) setup. Faced 
with internal capacity constraints, the Danish Nokia management approached Foxconn with the 
purpose of cutting costs, reducing time to market, and tapping into Foxconn’s rich pool of 
technological knowledge. In the JRD setup, Nokia would be responsible for development of the 
advanced parts of new mobile phones, while Foxconn would be responsible for the development 
of more standardized parts, such as the molding and fitting of plastic components.  
This JRD presented a new situation for the Danish Nokia management. The product 
development of the mobile phones had traditionally been regarded a core competence at Nokia 
Denmark, and had previously been carried out in-house. The Nokia management therefore had 
little experience or knowledge on how to best design and manage a JRD project across vast 
geographical and cultural distances. According to one Nokia JRD manager: 
 
“It wasn’t a top-down, but a bottom-up decision. The individual development sites were 
told that they should make X number of products, and then it was up to the local 
management to find out what we should do. We didn’t have the capacity to make all these 
products, and our guys couldn’t deliver it. We then found out that we should make some 
joint R&D.” 
 
Specifically, in the JRD Foxconn presumed responsibility of the product development 
phase (PD0-PD4) of selected projects (carried out in China) while the product portfolio 
management and the product maintenance was still done in Denmark (see Figure 4.1). This 
meant that the entire product development function was reconfigured from being exclusively co-
located in Denmark to become dispersed between Denmark and China. An effective 
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organizational architecture would consequently depend on the extent to which the remaining in-
house product development activities in Denmark and the activities outsourced to Foxconn were 
fully consistent and reinforcing of each other. While the architecture may have been effective 
while the activities were still co-located in Denmark, the decision to relocate certain activities to 
China incurred new complexities for the Nokia management in the coordination of the 
development projects. For example, while the crucial interdependencies between concept 
mapping and product development release and between product development determination and 
product maintenance could originally be coordinated through more informal mechanisms such as 
face-to-face coordination in Denmark, the introduction of the JRD signified that new and 
alternative mechanisms that could account for the distances.  
 
From a locational to an organizational strategy orientation  
Nokia’s initial expectations for the JRD had been that they would simply hand the product 
specification over to Foxconn after the Concept Mapping phase and receive it back for Product 
Maintenance some months later. The Danish management saw the JRD as a case of simple 
outsourcing with limited communication with the Foxconn between the ordering and final 
delivery of the tasks. The attention and strategy was more concerned with the benefits of 
offshoring to China and Foxconn. Besides the obvious cost-saving motivation of relocating 
product development capacity to China, Foxconn—as one of the largest companies in the field of 
electronic component manufacturing—had much relevant knowledge and expertise that Nokia 
Denmark saw the potential of tapping into. For instance, it had a long history of developing 
technological products for major contractors around the world and possessed much experience of 
optimizing product development processes. In addition, Foxconn had supplied electronics 
116 
 
components to Nokia for a number of years prior to the full-scale offshoring decision. Their 
already established relationship would therefore ease the process of relocating entire product 
development projects to China. 
During the process of implementing the JRD, however, the Nokia management began to 
face challenges of aligning and reintegrating the two geographically dispersed organizational 
units. For example, while the Nokia management had hoped that the outsourced activities would 
be largely self-manageable and requiring minimum intervention from their side, they soon 
realized that safe-guarding against misinterpretations and misbehavior required substantially 
more resources than initially expected. Moreover, the increased engagement with Foxconn 
created internal resistance among Nokia engineers toward relocating PD projects to a supplier 
and toward teaching a partner how to make Nokia phones. One JRD manager elaborated:  
 
“People in Nokia see it as if we are selling our core competences. On a design level, 
people have been very nervous and cautious towards the JRD. In the old days, it was 
rocket science to make good mobile phones. That’s not the case today, however. 
Everybody can easily buy all the necessary phone components on the market. But if you 
have made these components internally for the last 20 years, you will think that it is still a 
core competence for the company.”  
 
Consequently, the Danish management began to experiment with different architectural 
solutions, such as disaggregating the value chain differently, standardizing the interdependencies 
and implementing new coordination mechanisms. For example, the Nokia management learned 
that frequent meetings and monitoring of the tasks were highly necessary to ensure that the 
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products were developed according to Nokia standards. Among other things, they experienced 
that they needed to diligently control and coordinate the JRD to ensure the projects’ adherence to 
Nokia’s quality standards. They also realized that it was necessary to transfer substantially more 
knowledge to Foxconn on how the products should be developed. It was only after Nokia 
Denmark had faced the challenges of aligning technological and organizational specifications 
between the Danish site and the Chinese site that it began to use weekly video conference 
meetings.  
The realized challenges of offshoring product development to China therefore prompted 
the Nokia management to align the coordinative task with the requirements of geographically 
dispersed work. This was particularly increasing the monitoring of the JRD. For example, eight 
full-time Nokia employees were assigned to follow the JRD from Denmark while the product 
was being developed by 30 to 50 engineers in China. In order to supervise the life-cycle of the 
PD projects, Nokia Denmark and Foxconn arranged weekly video conference meetings to 
discuss the status of each project as well as specific technological and organizational challenges 
or alterations that might have occurred. Moreover, the two partners also met either in Denmark 
or in China every six to eight weeks. Nokia also began to experiment with different ways of 
transferring the required knowledge, such as extensive process codification and frequent 
coordination. Eventually, the collaboration turned into becoming a Joint R&D rather than just 
outsourcing of R&D, in which the Nokia management presumed more responsibility regarding 
integrating the Chinese activities with the remaining Danish activities. Over time, the Nokia 
management gained knowledge on how the different organizational activities in China and 
Denmark functioned both individually in the two locations and together in an organizational 
system, and started to form its strategies on improving the collaboration. Based on this 
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knowledge, the Nokia management learned how to most appropriately take decisions for the 
inter-organizational architecture in which better fit between the two dispersed units could be 
achieved. According to a Nokia JRD manager:  
 
“It’s really learning-by-doing. Nokia is kind of a cowboy company. We plunge into 
things, muddle our way through and eventually become wiser. It is not that much design 
in the things we do. We go out and try, and then we adjust”. 
 
Theoretical implications from qualitative study 
The findings of this case are to a large extent supportive of much offshoring research that views 
the offshoring process as a learning-by-doing process (e.g., Jensen, 2009; Manning et al., 2008; 
Maskell et al., 2007). For instance, Maskell et al. (2007) suggest how offshoring to low-cost 
countries is best described as a learning-by-doing process in which “over a period of time the 
outsourcing experience lessens the cognitive limitations of decision-makers as to the advantages 
that can be achieved through outsourcing in low-cost countries: the in-sourcer/vendor may not 
only offer cost advantages, but also quality improvement and innovation” (Maskell et al., 2007: 
239). Equally, based on evolving organizational learning in both home and host country firms, 
Jensen (2009) proposes how offshoring of advanced services should be understood as an 
antecedent for strategic business development and organizational change.  
The uniqueness of the Nokia case relates to how experience is an important antecedent of 
architectural knowledge. It was only after the Nokia management had gained experience on the 
collaboration with Foxconn (in China) that they were able to understand the nature of the 
challenges and thus to take architectural decisions that could improve the effectiveness of the 
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newly derived organizational architecture. Nokia’s experience with the JRD was therefore 
central in the accumulation of architectural knowledge on the dispersed activities and how they 
could be integrated and linked into one value-adding system. Thus, as Nokia accumulates 
architectural knowledge over time, its decision makers increasingly understood the nature of the 
organizational activities and how these are interdependent on each other.  
 We therefore induce that firms with low offshoring experience are less likely to have 
acquired architectural knowledge, and do therefore not have the propensity to include 
architectural considerations in their offshoring strategies. The firms only have little experience 
with the implementation, and have therefore not yet been faced with the challenges of 
reintegrating the international organizational architecture. Without architectural knowledge, the 
decision maker has no aspiration to consider the organizational architecture, and will therefore 
devote less attention to (cf., Ocasio, 1997).  
 With higher offshoring implementation maturity, however, firms are more likely to have 
been exposed to architectural challenges and thereby gained architectural knowledge. 
Accordingly, firms are more likely to include organizational objectives in their offshoring 
strategies with the purpose of increasing organizational performance. Massini et al. (2010) find 
that more experienced firms are more likely to adopt a corporate-wide offshoring strategy with a 
more nuanced view of offshoring that looks beyond short-term costs advantages, but also 
includes a broader set of drivers and risks. Similarly, both Maskell et al. (2007) and Jensen 
(2009) show how offshoring experience mediates a sophistication of firms’ offshoring 
operations. Thus, we argue that the more experience a firm has with an offshoring 
implementation, the more likely it is to have accumulated architectural knowledge, and, as a 
result, the more likely they are to include organizational objectives in their offshoring strategies. 
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With architectural knowledge, the decision maker has therefore aspiration to consider the 
organizational architecture, and will therefore devote more attention on. Based on the Nokia case 
and the previous reasoning, we formulate the following research hypothesis to be tested on a 
large-N sample: 
 
Research hypothesis: Offshoring experience has a positive effect on firms’ organizational 
strategy orientation. 
 
4.5  QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
Methods and variable construction 
Building on the insights of the qualitative analysis, we go a step further by testing the effect of 
experience on firms’ offshoring strategies using data from the Offshoring Research Network 
(ORN). The variables include a dependent variable—organizational strategy orientation—one 
independent variable—offshoring experience—and a number of control variables. For this 
analysis, we run ordinary least square (OLS) regression analysis. The OLS models are most 
suitable for this analysis as both our dependent and independent variables are measured on a 
continuous scale. The operationalization of these variables is outlined in the following.  
Organizational strategy orientation is measured by asking respondents to indicate on a 
5-point Likert scale about the importance of different strategic drivers (1=not important at all and 
5=very important). The three strategic drivers that constitute the organizational strategy 
orientation variable are: “Enhancing efficiency through business process redesign”, “Enhancing 
system redundancy” and “Improving service levels”. The three items have a Cronbach Alpha 
value of 0.64 indicating that they are manifest items of an underlying variable that we label and 
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interpret as “Organizational strategy orientation”. The three items are averaged in order to form 
the composite measure of organizational strategy orientation. The mean value of the 
organizational strategy orientation variable is 3.29 with a standard deviation 0.96 (see Table 4.1), 
which indicate that we have substantial variation in our dependent variable. This variable should 
thus be seen in contrast to locational strategy orientation, which captures the strategy 
orientation towards more external factors like customers, suppliers, etc. The locational strategy 
orientation is measured by asking respondents to indicate on a 5-point Likert scale about the 
importance of different strategic drivers (1=not important at all and 5=very important). The three 
strategic drivers that form the organizational strategy orientation variable are: “Access to new 
markets for products and services”, “Increasing speed to market” and “Growth strategy”. The 
three items that are averaged in order to form the composite measure of locational strategy 
orientation have a Cronbach Alpha value of 0.65. This variable is included as a control variable 
to investigate the effect of firms’ general strategy orientation. 
  Offshoring experience is a measure of time (in years) since the focal offshoring 
implementation was launched. The assumption is that the longer the firm has been engaged in 
this particular offshoring project the more experience is accumulated related to this offshoring 
implementation. This approach is akin to other papers investigating the role of offshoring 
experience (e.g., Lewin et al., 2009; Maskell et al., 2007). While the firm may have offshoring 
experience from other offshoring activities, the gist of this measure is that it measure the 
experience specific to the particular offshoring implementation. However, we will control for 
other types of offshoring experience. The mean value of offshoring experience with the focal 
implementation is 8.88 years and it varies from 0 (two very recent implementations) to 44 years 
of offshoring experience (see Table 4.1).  
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Firms will gain more general offshoring experience through other offshoring projects 
than the focal one and this general offshoring experience might in a similar way speed up the 
accumulation of architectural knowledge. Therefore, we control for this more general offshoring 
experience by taking into account number of employees, functions and locations that the firm 
previously has offshored to. More specifically, we construct a variable measuring the number of 
service functions (e.g., IT, HR, legal, finance and accounting) that the firm has previously 
offshored and a variable measuring the number of locations that the firm has offshoring projects 
in. The third variable capturing the general offshoring experience is a measure of the number of 
employees that has previously been offshored. 
In addition, we control for the nature of the offshored tasks as firms response to the 
organizational reconfiguration of offshoring may vary with the nature of the activities; e.g., one 
would expect that more standardized and self-manageable tasks provide less need for strategic 
response than less standardized activities (e.g., Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996). For this reason, we 
first control for the degree of standardization of tasks in each function. Another variable, taken 
from the ORN Provider Survey, include commoditization of tasks since offshoring projects in 
functions with high level of commoditization might be less prone to architectural challenges (see 
e.g., Manning et al., 2011). Commoditization refers to a process by which services and processes 
become more standardized, and knowledge less specific to firm or product characteristics, 
lowering transaction and coordination costs for firms offshoring these processes (see Davenport 
(2005) for a similar definition). The use of collaborative technologies in the function is added to 
control for the use of information- and communication technology in the firm (Manning et al., 
2008). The above mentioned three control variables are measured as 5-point-Likert scale 
variables based on the perception of service providers. Assuming that international 
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interdependencies are more challenging to coordinate than co-located interdependencies 
(Srikanth and Puranam, 2011), we have added control variables for interaction distance that are 
based on secondary data on the distance between the home location and the foreign location of 
the offshore implementation. The interaction distance includes three dimensions: geographical 
distance measured as air miles between the home location and the offshore location, cultural 
distance between two locations based on the Kogut & Singh-index (Kogut and Singh, 1988), and 
language distance as a dummy variable indicating whether the same language is spoken both in 
the home location and in the offshore location. Finally, two dummies were added to control for 
whether the offshoring implementation was a business process offshoring (BPO) or a knowledge 
process offshoring (KPO). The third possible type, information technology outsourcing (ITO), 
was omitted and therefore serves as the baseline when interpreting the coefficients for BPO and 
KPO.  
 
Results  
The descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values) and 
correlation matrix for all variables are provided in Table 4.1. Since the data included some high 
correlation coefficients, in particular between functional and country experience and between the 
BPO- and KPO-dummies, we tested for the variance inflation factor (VIF) in all models as well 
as tested the models with and without the highly correlated variables. However, since the high 
correlations were only among our control variables the results for our key variables remained 
qualitatively the same irrespective of the specification of the model. The VIF values for all 
models were below six which is considered to be the threshold for detection of problems of 
multicolinearity (expect for KPO which has a VIF value slightly above the threshold, however,  
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Table 4.1 – Correlation matrix including all variables (N=353)*  
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Table 4.2 – OLS-regression models (standard error in parentheses, VIF-values in italics) 
  Organizational strategy 
orientation 
Offshoring experience  0.02* 
(0.01)  1.25 
Function experience 0.02 
(0.01)  2.64 
Country experience -0.01 
(0.03)   2.80 
Employees offshored  -0.01 
(0.01)   1.07 
Standardization of task -0.46* 
(0.20)  1.66 
Commoditization of task -0.95** 
(0.32)  4.09 
Collaborative technologies 0.26 
(0.47)   1.97 
Locational strategy orientation 0.40*** 
(0.05)  1.09 
BPO -0.20 
(0.20)  4.98 
KPO -0.06 
(0.26)   6.41 
Geographical distance 0.01* 
(0.01)   1.53 
Cultural distance -0.01 
(0.01)   1.83  
Language distance -0.19 
(0.14)   2.34 
Intercept 5.21* 
(2.24)   
F-value 
R-square 
Adjusted R-square 
10.50 
0.287 
0.260 
                                         
***, ** and * indicate significance on 0.1, 1 and 5% level, respectively 
 
 
this is expected as KPO, BPO and ITO is negatively correlated by design). See Table 4.2 where 
all VIF-value are included. 
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 The results of the OLS regressions are presented in Table 4.2. The model includes our 
independent variable, offshoring experience, and all the control variables. Our independent 
variable comes out significant and positive (β=0.02 and p<0.05) indicating that offshoring 
experience related to the focal implementation is explaining the organizational strategy 
orientation. Stronger organizational strategy orientation is following with more experience on the 
focal offshore implementation. It is further notable that the other more general experience 
variables are all insignificant (functional experience, country experience and number of 
employees offshored) signifying that it is specific experience related to the focal offshoring 
implementation that matters rather than more general offshoring experience. As expected the 
more standardized and commoditized the offshored tasks the less scope for organizational 
strategy orientation, therefore both of these variables are significant negative. Locational strategy 
orientation, on the other hand, is significant positive reflecting that locational and organizational 
strategy orientation is not at the expense of each other, but rather that they reinforce each other. 
Among the distance variables it is only the geographical distance that turns significant. 
 In order to test for potential multilevel problems, a random coefficient model was 
conducted with Region (i.e., the region that hosts the implementation) as the group variable. 
However, only 5% of the variation in our dependent variable could be related to the region (i.e., 
an intra-class correlation of 0.05 in the empty models) and the random effects of the intercept at 
the between-level was insignificant (p = 0.04). This indicates that a random coefficient model is 
inferior to the applied OLS-models. 
 
4.6  DISCUSSION 
This paper investigates how the organizational reconfiguration of offshoring impacts firms’ 
strategies. Offshoring describes the disintegration and relocation abroad of business services that 
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support domestic or global operations (Contractor et al., 2010; Manning et al., 2008). A major 
challenge in this respect is thus reintegration of the offshored activities into the organizational 
architecture (Mudambi and Venzin, 2010). In respect to offshoring, the organizational 
architecture can be defined as decision makers’ more or less intentional choices to ensure that 
geographically dispersed organizational components and activities co-exist and are linked to one 
another in an effective way (cf., Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004a; Nadler and Tushman, 1997; Sah 
and Stiglitz, 1986).  
Using a mixed methods approach, we have first presented the case of Nokia Denmark and 
its decision to offshore certain product development activities to Taiwanese Foxconn in a joint 
R&D model. The case shows how the decision to offshore was initially driven by external 
objectives such as lower costs and access to strategic resources, but that this changed over time 
towards internal objectives. Based on this analysis, we induced a testable research hypothesis 
that argues that firms with offshoring experience are more likely to acknowledge and consider 
the organizational architecture in their strategies than firms with little experience. The 
assumption is therefore that firms with experience are more likely to have been exposed to 
architectural challenges, and are as a result more likely to have accumulated architectural 
knowledge. We found empirical support for this hypothesis using a dataset with 353 offshoring 
implementations reported by 129 U.S. and European firms. This suggests that the more 
experience the firm has with a specific offshoring project, the more likely it is to encapsulate the 
organizational architecture in its strategies. Interestingly, while we found experience measured in 
years since the implementation to be significant in explaining organizational strategy orientation, 
other experience measures such the number of countries and activities on a firm level turned out 
insignificant. This may suggest that architectural knowledge within the single implementation is 
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residual and sticky (von Hippel, 1994) and, as such, is difficult to transfer across 
implementations and organizations. 
This paper contributes to research on the organizational design and architecture of 
offshoring as well as on the dynamics of organizational architectures. First of all, previous 
research on offshoring has been biased towards understanding either the antecedents or the 
outcomes of offshoring implementations (Lewin et al., 2009; Doh et al., 2009; Kedia and 
Mukherjee, 2009; Mol et al., 2005), and has ignored how firms actually approach offshoring. In 
contrast, this paper seeks to investigate the organizational architecture of offshoring 
implementations and how this impacts offshoring strategies. By showing that firms only seem to 
acknowledge the organizational architecture of offshoring with experience, we add a perspective 
on firm behavior that is in support of research that finds that most offshoring decisions are taken 
opportunistically, without corporate-wide strategies that delineate specific plans and guidelines 
for the adoption and implementation of offshoring activities (Lewin and Peeters, 2006; Massini 
et al., 2010). However, rather than assuming that the successful architecture of firms’ offshoring 
activities can a priori be planned and implemented, we suggest that this is more a subject of 
continuous learning and improvement through accumulation of architectural knowledge within 
the given implementation. An interesting topic for future research thus relates to understanding 
firms’ specific offshoring knowledge strategies and how this impacts performance. Moreover, 
while this research has focused on strategic orientation to illuminate this strategic response, 
future research could investigate how firms actually interact with the organizational design—i.e., 
which changes they implement—as they gain offshoring experience and architectural 
knowledge. 
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More broadly, this research has implications for literature that seeks to understand how 
different architectural forms and practices correlate to organizational performance (e.g., Datta, 
1991; Foss et al., 2011; Zott and Amit, 2008; Sah and Stiglitz, 1986). In particular, our argument 
is that firms adopt their strategies to accommodate for architectural inefficiencies. As such, we 
pose that strategy follows structure (Hall and Sajas, 1980), but that this causality is contingent 
upon the accumulation of architectural knowledge. Thus, while certain organizational 
architectures may prove superior to others, this research suggest that superior organizational 
performance is more a result of a process where decision makers accumulate architectural 
knowledge than it is a result of a conscious strategy. Decision makers need to identify and 
uncover underlying interdependency structures in the organizational architecture by 
systematizing and accumulating knowledge and learning processes within the firm. This is in line 
with research that notes that architectural effectiveness is an outcome of the organization’s 
ability to balance the search for organizational decisions and the exploitation of these once found 
(Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003; Siggelkow, 2002). However, we extend this research by 
suggesting that it is the bounded rational decision maker who incrementally gains and 
accumulates knowledge on how to design the organizational architecture with the purpose of 
optimizing performance.  
 
Limitations  
This study does not go without limitations. For example, we argue that firms’ organizationally 
oriented strategies can be explained by firms’ experience. As firms face organizational 
challenges deriving from an international architecture, they will begin to search and accumulate 
architectural knowledge that can be deployed in offshoring strategies. However, our quantitative 
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research design does not allow us to consider the actual challenges that firms face following the 
implementation (although the qualitative part provides some indications). Similarly, we have not 
empirically been able to say anything about different types of experience within the single 
implementation. For example, Madsen and Desai (2010) find that experience with failure leads 
to higher organizational performance than experience with success. Thus, future research could 
investigate what type of experience contributes more to the successful organizational adaptation 
following the offshoring implementation.  
 
Concluding remarks 
A key issue in this paper is how organizational architectures evolve to become more effective. 
By studying how offshoring experience prompts firms to formulate more organizationally 
oriented strategies, we have emphasized the role of knowledge accumulation following an 
organizational reconfiguration (i.e., the offshoring implementation). This conceptualization 
builds on previous research on architectural evolution that observes that the successful 
organizational architecture is the result of a process in which the organization is able to search 
for new and good organizational decisions and to exploit these decisions once found (Rivkin and 
Siggelkow, 2003; Siggelkow, 2002). Yet, we go beyond this by aligning the theoretical 
development with the bounded rational decision maker who incrementally gains and accumulates 
knowledge on how to most appropriately design the organizational architecture with the purpose 
of optimizing performance. The Nokia management’s decision to relocate product development 
activities to China disrupted the effectiveness of the organizational architecture, which 
consequently prompted them to search for alternative architectural arrangements so that the fit 
could be restored. Thus, we propose an evolutionary view on the organizational architecture that 
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can be depicted as an iterative process between decision makers’ search for architectural 
opportunities and the accumulation of architectural knowledge which increases the likelihood of 
taking decisions that will lead to more effective organizational architectures. Accordingly, 
strategy follows structure (Hall and Sajas, 1980), but only to the extent that the decision maker 
successfully accumulates architectural knowledge. 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
 
Organizational adaptation in offshoring: 
The difference between an experimental and 
experiential learning strategy1 
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Abstract: This paper builds a model that examines the performance implications of how firms 
adapt when offshoring. We emphasize that firms must accumulate architectural knowledge for 
efficient adaptation and that this can be done through either an experimental learning strategy 
(home-based learning before the offshoring implementation) or an experiential learning strategy 
(learning-by-doing after the offshoring implementation). Our analysis suggests that the relative 
attractiveness of the experiential strategy decreases with distance and coordination costs but 
increases with uncertainty. Moreover, uncertainty has a positive moderating effect on the 
relationship between distance and the experiential strategy. Accordingly, by formalizing two 
different architectural knowledge strategies in the context of offshoring we show how important 
contingencies can lead to significant performance tradeoffs in the identification of optimal 
organizational configurations. 
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5.1  INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to build a model that examines the performance implications of how 
firms adapt when offshoring; i.e., relocating organizational activities to foreign locations 
(Contractor et al., 2010; Lewin and Peeters, 2006; Manning et al., 2008). There is much 
literature on organizational change that investigates how firms adapt through the patching, 
recombination and reconfiguration of firm activities (Eisenhardt and Brown, 1999; Karim and 
Mitchell, 2004), resources (Galunic and Rodan, 1998), and divisional boundaries (Hoskisson and 
Johnson, 1992; Birkinshaw and Lingblad, 2005). Faced with suboptimal configurations, firms 
therefore reconfigure their organizations with the purpose of increasing efficiency (Chandler, 
1962; Helfat and Eisenhardt, 2004; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Karim, 2009).  
However, when a firm decides to relocate organizational activities to foreign locations, it 
needs to accommodate for how the added distance (e.g., geographic, cultural and institutional) 
between different organizational activities impacts performance (Kumar et al., 2009; Larsen et 
al., 2012; Srikanth and Puranam, 2012). For example, firms that fail to anticipate and align the 
complexity of dispersing organizational activities into the offshoring strategy encounter 
significant gaps between expected and achieved performance (Larsen et al., 2012). As such, the 
international component of offshoring characterizes a contingency that complicates the more 
conventional understanding on the organizational change and reconfiguration. 
In an attempt to bridge the abovementioned literatures, we build a model that allows us to 
systematically analyze the performance implications of firm adaptation in the context of 
offshoring. Central to our model is the accumulation of architectural knowledge; i.e., knowledge 
on firms’ underlying technological landscape describing how the components of their 
organizational systems are related to each other (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Brusoni and 
134 
 
Prencipe, 2006; Ethiraj and Levinthal 2004a; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Puranam et al., 2012). 
Based on this knowledge, firms can reconfigure the organizations in a way that matches their 
underlying technological landscape. In this respect, we argue that firms can choose between two 
opposing strategies. On the one hand, firms can pursue an experimental learning strategy in 
which they seek to accumulate architectural knowledge prior to the actual offshoring relocation 
takes place. Here, firms can accumulate architectural knowledge by experimenting with different 
configurations while the activities are still co-located at home. On the other hand, firms can 
pursue an experiential learning strategy in which they accumulate architectural knowledge after 
the reconfiguration has taken place (i.e., learning-by-doing). 
Our model allows us to suggest that firms face a trade-off when choosing how to 
approach offshoring. We find that the attractiveness of the experimental learning strategy 
increases with distance and coordination costs. As the cost of coordinating an international 
organization are higher than the gains of production abroad, firms benefit from accumulating 
architectural knowledge prior to the international reconfiguration. However, when the 
uncertainty of firms’ underlying technological landscape increases, they are better off by 
choosing an experiential learning strategy. Uncertainty creates noise which makes it increasingly 
difficult for firms to estimate the impact and consequences of the organizational reconfiguration. 
Moreover, we find that uncertainty has a positive moderating effect on the relationship between 
distance and the attractiveness of the experiential learning strategy, as it lowers the effect of 
learning at home and leaves the firm more vulnerable to higher coordination costs once it goes 
abroad. As such, uncertainty signifies a lower signal-to-noise ratio which leads to situations of 
causal ambiguity (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982), and the value of accumulating architectural 
knowledge through the experimental learning strategy is undermined. 
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A main contribution of this paper lays in the portrayal of firm adaptation in the context of 
offshoring. Specifically, by modeling the process of adaptation in the context of offshoring, we 
emphasize the importance of accumulating architectural knowledge when relocating 
organizational activities abroad as well as how the impact of distance may undermine deliberate 
efforts to reconfigure firms’ organizations. Moreover, by proposing a performance trade-off 
between the experimental and experiential learning strategy, we counter conventional wisdom on 
the value of preparation in offshoring (e.g., Heijmen et al., 2008; Lewin and Couto, 2007; 
Massini et al., 2010). We do this by showing how the two approaches to offshoring can have 
different consequences, and that a home-based, experimental learning strategy is not always 
beneficial. In addition, we argue that adaptation within a given configuration is not always a 
result of cumulative learning-by-doing over long periods of time (Nelson and Winter, 1982; 
Adler and Clark, 1991), but can rather be planned ahead. As such, we provide impetus to a 
paradox that firms face when deciding to reconfigure internationally by stressing that the optimal 
strategy is subject to learning and depends on the signal-to-noise ratio.  
Our paper proceeds as follows: In the next section, we introduce the theoretical 
background of the paper by elaborating on offshoring and the role of architectural knowledge in 
organizational adaptation. Next, we introduce the model employed to investigate the 
performance implications of the experimental and the experiential learning strategies. We then 
present and discuss the findings the model, before we finally discuss the implications of the 
paper. 
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5.2  OFFSHORING, ORGANIZATIONAL RECONFIGURATION, AND 
ARCHITECTURAL KNOWLEDGE  
The decision to offshore organizational activities can be driven by a number of different factors, 
including market proximity, access to cheap labor, knowledge and other strategic resources (Doh 
et al., 2009; Lewin et al. 2009; Kedia and Mukherjee 2009). For example, Lewin et al. (2009: 
901) find that firms are increasingly offshoring innovation activities in an “emerging global race 
for talent” in which domestic shortages of qualified engineers force firms to relocate R&D 
activities to foreign locations. Evidently, the pursuit of offshoring strategies has been a prolific 
adventure for numerous firms in which expectations have been met or even surpassed by the 
actual offshoring performance (e.g., Dossani and Kenney, 2003). At the same time, many 
companies are experiencing that the practice of offshoring entails additional challenges and 
greater costs than were originally anticipated (e.g., Aron and Singh 2005). For example, a firm 
may realize that the relocation of activities abroad undermines previously coherent flows of 
knowledge between different business units, and that spending additional resources on 
communication technologies are required to uphold necessary knowledge flows. Recent research 
on the hidden costs of offshoring suggests that unanticipated costs of implementing offshoring 
activities abroad may eventually undermine performance (Dibbern et al. 2008, Larsen et al., 
2012; Stringfellow et al. 2008). 
 In order to further our understanding of the performance implications of offshoring, we 
contend that firms must reconfigure their organizations to accommodate for the shift from 
originally co-located activities to an organization with geographically dispersed activities. In this 
respect, the literature on organizational change and reconfiguration is helpful (e.g., Brusoni and 
Prencipe, 2006; Eisenhardt and Brown, 1999; Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004a; Karim, 2006; 2009; 
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Zhou, 2011). Organizational reconfiguration can be defined as the changes and rearrangements 
to firms’ structural organization—i.e., the resource allocations within firms, use of internal 
routines and communication network, and the flow of information and tasks—with the purpose 
of increasing effectiveness and efficiency (Chandler, 1962; Levitt and March, 1988; Galunic and 
Eisenhardt, 1996; Helfat and Eisenhardt, 2004; Karim 2009). This includes the recombination 
and redeployment of activities, resources, and divisional boundaries (Birkinshaw and Lingblad, 
2005; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Karim and Mitchell, 2004). 
A central component of firms’ reconfiguration efforts is the adaptation to underlying 
technological landscapes describing the micro-level activities that constitute their business and 
the structure of knowledge links between those activities (Ethiraj and Levinthal 2004a; Rivkin 
and Siggelkow, 2003). For example, a firm may consist of a number of interdependent activities, 
such as designing components, producing and assembling products and marketing efforts, that is 
crucial for the firm’s existence and survival (Van de Ven et al., 1976). The structure and 
interdependencies of these underlying activities constitute a firm’s technological landscape, and 
as such represents the firm’s “true underlying structure of the system of interdependent choices” 
(Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004b: 162). The purpose of reconfiguring elements in firms’ structural 
organization (e.g., the resource allocations, use of internal routines and communication network, 
and the flow of information and tasks) is therefore to match the underlying technological 
landscape. The firm may over time make configurational changes such as recombining and 
redeploying activities, resources and divisional boundaries as a means of adapting to the 
underlying technological landscape. The closer the match between the organizational 
configuration and the technological landscape, the better is the firms’ optimal utilization of its 
resources and thus performance (Levinthal, 1997). 
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However, for firms to successfully adapt to a technological landscape, a high level of 
architectural knowledge is necessary (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Brusoni and Prencipe, 2006; 
Ethiraj and Levinthal 2004a; Henderson and Clark, 1990; von Hippel, 1990). Architectural 
knowledge can be defined as an “understanding of how components in an organizational system 
are related to each other” (Puranam et al., 2012: 420), and comprises knowledge about 
individual organizational activities and how these are integrated into an orchestrated 
organizational system. For example, Henderson and Clark (1990) refer to architectural 
knowledge as consisting of knowledge about the different components underlying a distinct 
system (i.e., product technology) and knowledge about how the components are integrated into 
an orchestrated systemic whole. When firms alter their organizational configurations, they need 
knowledge on how the underlying technological landscape with its sub-activities and 
interdependencies function so that successful adaptation to the new environment can be 
exercised. For example, firms need knowledge on whether and how change in one activity 
affects the performance of another activity so that they can efficiently allocate resources among 
the two activities. Thus, the firm needs architectural knowledge to identify how to best adapt to 
an unknown but inherent technological landscape (Ethiraj and Levinthal 2004a). 
At the same time, a technological landscape is inevitably characterized by various 
degrees of uncertainty that complicates adaptation (Anderson and Tushman, 1990; Fleming, 
2001). In general, uncertainty refers to the inability to predict and foresee (Anderson and 
Tushman, 1990). Factors such as demand fluctuations (Storper, 1996) and technological change 
(Teece and Pisano, 1994) create an uncertain technological landscape that undermines firms’ 
adaptation efforts. For example, in product and organizational life cycles, uncertainty is 
generally assumed to be higher in early stages and decreases once a dominant design has been 
139 
 
found (Klepper, 1997). Thus, the higher the uncertainty is, the more difficult is it for the firm to 
accumulate appropriate architectural knowledge so that successful adaptation can be exercised. 
 Based on this, the research question we pose in this paper is: What are the performance 
implications of how firms adapt when offshoring? As offshoring signifies that originally co-
located activities are relocated to foreign locations, a substantial reconfiguration is initiated with 
consequences for issues such as the interdependencies and coordination mechanisms between the 
spatially differentiated organizational tasks and activities (Kumar et al., 2009) and the overall 
coherence of the globally dispersed organizational system (Srikanth and Puranam, 2011). In this 
process, firms need to adapt to the technological landscape by accumulating architectural 
knowledge through incremental changes within the new configuration (e.g., small alterations to 
the division of labor to reduce coordination costs) so that organizational performance can be 
optimized. In this respect, firms’ level of architectural knowledge is crucial as it enables the 
firms to identify how the underlying structures in which the individual activities are integrated 
and linked together in a coherent organizational system.  
 However, when firms offshore activities, distance is added to the interdependencies 
between organizational activities (e.g., geographic, cultural and institutional). A firm that 
relocates disaggregated organizational tasks and sub-components abroad must coordinate an 
international chain of activities across geographies, cultures and different institutional systems 
(Kumar et al., 2009; Niederman et al. 2006; Srikanth and Puranam, 2011). This may prove 
challenging on a number of dimensions. For example, not only may offshoring provoke internal 
resistance (e.g., Lewin and Couto, 2007), but it may also hamper operational efficiency due to 
lack of trust, status differences between domestic and foreign units, and lack of understanding 
and communication in the process of delivering tasks, and interacting with offshore units (e.g., 
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Vlaar et al., 2008; Levina and Vaast, 2008). Employees with cultural and language differences at 
geographically dispersed locations are refrained from informal face-to-face coordination, and are 
forced to rely on less superior technology-based coordination mechanisms (Storper and 
Venables, 2004). Thus, with distance coordination costs are likely to increase (Srikanth and 
Puranam, 2011). 
 
5.3  THE MODEL 
We build a model that allows us to investigate how a firm adapts in the contexts of offshoring 
where a firm changes from consisting of solely co-located activities to a having configuration 
with geographically dispersed activities. In the model, the firm faces a fixed, exogenous 
technological ‘landscape’ describing the micro-level activities that constitute its business and the 
structure of knowledge links between those activities. Given this landscape, the firm may over 
time make incremental changes to the configuration as a means of adaptation by assigning and 
reassigning different activities to different organizational units (e.g., departments, plants, 
research centers, groups, or other organizational units) so that it matches the technological 
landscape. 
 
Two learning strategies 
In the model, we assume that the company initially has no architectural knowledge and that it 
needs architectural knowledge to successfully adapt to the technological landscape. In this 
respect, we argue that the firm can choose between two different strategies. On the one hand, a 
firm can accumulate architectural knowledge prior to the actual offshoring implementation by 
employing different measures to understand how to best adapt to the underlying landscape. This 
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would entail a comprehensive task of understanding, mapping, and documenting the role and 
function of the activities to be offshored and how these are interconnected while these are still 
co-located. This strategy is in accordance with the literature suggesting that firms with corporate-
wide strategies articulating how the offshoring process should be exercised are generally better 
off in terms of performance (e.g., Heijmen et al., 2008; Lewin and Couto, 2007; Massini et al., 
2010).  
To illustrate this strategy: when the Danish-based Maersk Line, the world’s largest 
shipping company, decided to offshore its purchasing logistics department from Denmark to the 
Philippines, it embarked on a process of formalizing, standardizing and specifying the 
interdependencies surrounding the activity to be offshored while these were still domestically 
located. Mærsk did this by hiring a project manager with the responsibility of ‘tapping’ the 
knowledge of the operational purchasers and to write scripts about how to handle the purchasing 
request. This way, Mærsk was better able to understand the technological landscape underlying 
the activity to be offshored. Once the activity was relocated to the Philippines, ambiguity 
regarding how the processes were managed was reduced, and as a result, the risk of unexpected 
challenged to emerge was undermined. We term this an experimental learning strategy as the 
firm would experiment with different adaptations efforts while the activities are still co-located.  
On the other hand, a firm can choose to approach offshoring as a learning-by-doing 
process. In this respect, the firm commences the search for optimal organizational configurations 
based on the technological landscape during the offshore delivery phase as they encounter the 
actual coordination costs of offshoring. The firm would thus avoid up-front investments in 
accumulating architectural knowledge during the onsite transition phase, but would rather 
accumulate architectural knowledge through experiential learning with offshoring. As firms 
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encounter the challenges of offshoring, they are then better able to understand how to adapt to 
this with the purpose of increasing performance. This approach is therefore supportive of 
research that views offshoring as a learning-by-doing process (e.g., Jensen, 2009; Manning et al., 
2008; Maskell et al., 2007), and more generally of literature that holds that adaptation should be 
seen as a result of cumulative learning-by-doing over long periods of time (Nelson and Winter, 
1982; Adler and Clark, 1991).  
For example, in the early 2000s, LEGO Group decided as part of a comprehensive 
restructuring process to rather rapidly offshore up to 80 percent of its production to a number of 
different international sites. In this process, LEGO did not significantly experiment with different 
configurations prior to offshoring, and consequently faced major unexpected coordination 
challenges after the activities were relocated. For example, after offshoring LEGO experienced 
that the effective knowledge transfer and coordination were much more challenging than 
originally expected. As a result, LEGO began to search for alternative coordination mechanisms, 
and eventually pursued a rigorous strategy of codification and standardization of the 
organizational interdependencies and processes. Based on this international experience, LEGO 
increasingly learned how to reconfigure its processes to ensure operating efficiency. We 
therefore term this an experiential learning strategy.  
Accordingly, in our model the firm can adapt to the technological landscape by 
accumulating architectural knowledge either prior to the offshoring implementation (the 
experimental learning strategy) or after the offshoring implementation (the experiential learning 
strategy). 
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Modeling the technological landscape 
Consider a firm that performs a number of different activities that are to various extents 
interdependent on one another. The technological landscape describes whether the activities are 
interdependent, in which case they need to be coordinated (by, for example, meetings between 
the workers responsible for the different activities or other types of knowledge transfer). Without 
loss of generality we assume 100 activities, in which case the maximum number of 
interdependencies is 4,950 (i.e., (100*99)/2).  
The structure of the interdependencies in technological landscape is of course not 
completely random. Often, activities can be grouped according to their natural 
interdependencies. For example, some activities might be described as ‘research’, and these 
activities may generally be more tightly coupled with each other than they are with activities 
described as ‘production’ (and vice versa). To capture this idea we assume that the landscape 
consists of two larger ‘natural modules’, in which activity 1-50 belongs to Module A and activity 
51-100 belongs to Module B. Modularity theory suggest that a landscape is modular if the 
interdependencies of the activities between the modules is low and the interdependencies of the 
activities within the modules is high (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996). In 
contrast to an integral landscape in which the performance of different activities is highly 
dependent on each other, a modular landscape is characterized by standardized and minimized 
interdependence between different modules so that these can operate as controlled ‘black-boxes’ 
in a larger organizational system (Schilling 2000; Ulrich 1995). Based on this, we define the 
technological landscape’s degree of modularity (x) as the extent to which the interdependencies 
between activities occur within, rather than across, Modules A and B. 
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As an example of these concepts, consider Figure 5.1 in which the interdependencies 
between 10 different activities are marked by “X”. With low modularity  0x  , activities are 
interdependent on other activities both within the same and the other module. Hence, there is no 
obvious way for the firm to group its activities into two modules, and regardless of the way it 
chooses to do this there will remain a significant need for coordination across units. With full 
modularity  1x  , on the other hand, each activity is only interdependent on other activities 
within the same module. Presumably, this will make it much easier for the firm (once it has 
accumulated the architectural knowledge to do this) to group its activities into two neatly defined 
modules which then become more or less self-contained with a minimal need for coordination 
with other modules.  
 
Figure 5.1 – The technological landscape 
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X
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Such a grouping, in turn, may mitigate the coordination costs of offshoring in a number 
of ways. For example, a major source of coordination costs in offshoring relates to facilitating 
and communicating transfer of information and knowledge between the globally dispersed and 
disaggregated business modules (Dibbern et al. 2008, Kumar et al. 2009). A high degree of tacit, 
non-standardized knowledge causes misalignment and misunderstandings between the dispersed 
units, which in turn are intensified by the distance and intensity of the interactions between the 
units (Stringfellow et al. 2008). However, as modularity would signify a minimization, 
codification, and standardization of the linkages between different separately located activities, it 
would thus reduce the need for coordination.  
Realistically, most configurations will of course neither be completely integral  0x   
nor completely modular  1x  , but something in between those two extremes. The extent to 
which a pair of activities are interdependent on each other is decided by a binominal choice (0, 1) 
and is determined by the probability  12 1ij ijp xM x   , where 1ijM   if activities i and j are 
in the same natural module (in other words, both in A or both in B) and 0 otherwise. The higher 
x, the more modular is the landscape. To see that, setting 0x   results in 12ijp  —implying that 
the natural modules have no impact on the random structure of interdependencies (and hence are 
not really natural at all)—while setting 1x   results in ij ijp M  which makes the 
interdependencies fall predictably into the two natural modules. The derived technological 
landscape with its predefined interaction structure remains constant throughout the individual 
runs of the model.
4
  
                                                 
4
 Our modeling of the technological landscape is similar to ones proposed by Ethiraj and Levinthal (2004a; 2004b) 
as we model a configuration that has an unknown but inherent interaction structure to which the firm needs 
architectural knowledge to identify how to best adapt to the configuration. In contrast to NK-performance 
landscapes with rugged or purely random interaction structures (e.g., Kauffman, 1993; Levinthal, 1997), this type of 
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Modeling performance 
Given the organization’s configuration, managers make adaptation choices regarding the 
structure of the activities; i.e., each activity’s assignment to a module and thus also its location 
(at home or abroad). Unlike the technological landscape which is fixed, the adaptation efforts are 
endogenous to the decisions of managers. At any given time, there is no guarantee that the 
adaptation of activities in the firm’s modules reflects the grouping implied by the natural 
modules (although, ceteris paribus, the coordination costs of the firm would be lower if it did). 
The purpose of accumulating architectural knowledge is therefore to understand the 
technological landscape so that efficient adaptation can be exercised. 
We assume that the company will adapt with the purpose of increasing performance. We 
model performance as the result of a constant revenue (denoted I) from which we subtract the 
costs of production at home  HC  and abroad  FC , and the costs of coordination (K). We 
assume that the activities can be conducted at a lower cost level abroad  H FC C . Finally, we 
add a stochastic term    whose variance    captures the degree of uncertainty (see Nelson 
and Winter, 1982; Klepper, 1996, for similar approaches to modeling uncertainty). Performance 
is thus given by 
 H H F FI A C A C K       [1] 
 where HA  is the number of activities at home location and FA  is the number of activities at the 
foreign location. In the model, we set 1,000I  , 1HC  , and 0.6FC  . 
                                                                                                                                                             
modeling uses modularity to create locally correlated landscapes (Bar-Yam, 1997), which is particularly beneficial 
as we model the process of relocating organizational activities that to various extents are modular to foreign 
locations (Contractor et al., 2010).  
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We assume a ‘marginal coordination cost’ k is incurred for every activity pair that is 
linked by interdependencies (e.g., marked with an X in Figure 5.1). We assume that the cost of 
coordinating two activities within the same module is lower than the cost of coordination 
activities between the two modules (e.g., Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996), even if these two 
modules are located in the same country. As activities within each module may share common 
input, develop their own tacit knowledge, informal communication styles and formal 
communication channels, and value systems, the cost of coordination within a module becomes 
lower than the cost of coordination between modules (Schilling 2000; Ulrich 1995; Zhou, 2011). 
Thus, intra-module activities can to a larger extent base their coordination on common ground 
and knowledge whereas inter-module activities rely more on costly ongoing communication 
(Srikanth and Puranam, 2011). Formally, this can be expressed as LW LBk k , where the subscript 
L refers to local coordination and W and B refers to within and between modules, respectively. 
For simplicity and without loss of generality, we set 0LWk   in the model. 
Moreover, geographic distance compounds the costs of coordinating across modules. For 
example, the lack of face-to-face contact makes it more difficult to exchange tacit knowledge 
over distance. We capture this by assuming that LB IBk k , where I  subscripts marginal 
coordination costs of international activities, so that there is a hierarchy of coordination costs 
LW LB IBk k k  . We set  1IB LBk D k   and let 0D   capture the impact of geographic 
separation on coordination costs, where 0D   means that geographically dispersed 
coordination is no more difficult or costly than co-located dispersion (no impact of separation) 
and D  that geographically dispersed coordination is completely impossible (prohibitive 
impact). Hence, D can be interpreted as the distance between the home base and the offshoring 
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location, broadly defined as geographic, cultural, psychic, institutional or other dimensions of 
distance to the extent that these have an impact on coordination costs. 
With these assumptions, the total cost of coordination is determined by the number of 
local inter-module ( LBN ), and international inter-module ( IBN ) interdependencies, as follows: 
   1LW LW LB LB IB IB LB IB LBK N k N k N k N N D k       [2] 
In this formula, the number of activity pairs with interdependencies (N) is multiplied with 
the marginal costs of coordination (k) for each type of interdependency.  
 
Modeling adaptation  
In each period, managers take one activity at random and experiment with reassigning it to the 
other module, observe changes in performance, and cancel the reallocation if it leads to lower 
performance. For each reassignment, firms incur switching costs (e.g., Farrell and Shapiro, 
1988). However, since this is a constant cost for all reassignments efforts, we choose not to 
include this in our model. A moved activity will thus retain its new location if the sum of the 
marginal change leads to a cost reduction. If the opposite is the case, the activity will be 
relocated back to its original location. The decision maker is therefore suffering from bounded 
rationality to the extent that he or she does not know ex ante what the optimal configuration is 
before the actual performance implications are experienced. Hence, an activity is ultimately 
moved only if it leads to a decline in costs: 
   0H H F FA C A C K     [3] 
In sum, the model portrays the process of adapting to a technological landscape by 
accumulating architectural knowledge by allocating activities between domestic and foreign 
locations with the purpose of increasing performance. In other words, our model is a model of 
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adaptation (cf., Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004a; Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003) towards the optimal 
locational distribution of organizational activities in an international setting. 
 
5.4  ANALYSIS 
In the following, we use our model to examine the performance implications of how firms adapt 
when reconfiguring internationally. In conjunction with the architectural knowledge 
accumulation strategies portrayed above, we construct and compare two scenarios: one in which 
the firm searches for an optimal configuration prior to the offshoring implementation while the 
activities are still at home (the experimental strategy), and one in which the firm searches for an 
optimal configuration after the actual offshoring implementation (the experiential strategy). In 
the experimental strategy the firm initially divides its activities into two modules at random 
(reflecting its initial lack of architectural knowledge) and then over time experiments with 
reallocations of activities between these two modules while it observes the effects on 
performance (and thus accumulates architectural knowledge). After a period of learning has 
passed, it moves one of the two modules to the foreign location where the adaptation process 
continues. In contrast, in the experiential approach the firm also divides its activities into two 
modules, but not until the actual time of offshoring. Only then does it react to the increased 
coordination costs by reallocating activities (i.e., learning-by-doing). 
We estimate current and accumulated performance over 500 periods, in which the firm 
begins to offshore activities abroad after 200 periods. This means that the firm can use period 
 0,199t  to identify the optimal configuration for offshoring in the first scenario (using the 
experimental strategy), whereas in the second scenario (using the experiential strategy) the firm 
does nothing prior to offshoring but only pursues a learning-by-doing approach after offshoring 
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  200,500t . The following analysis is two-pronged: First, we describe and compare the 
performance profiles of the two knowledge accumulation strategies with the purpose of 
understanding how performance evolves and deviates over time. Second, we subject the model to 
a Monte Carlo simulation and apply empirical estimation techniques to derive testable research 
propositions regarding the relative attractiveness between the experimental and experiential 
strategies. 
 
Understanding the process of adaptation 
The performance profiles of the two knowledge accumulation strategies are shown in Figure 5.2. 
With the experimental strategy, the firm experiments with the activities’ configuration prior to 
the actual offshoring (i.e., when all activities are still kept domestically) to gain architectural 
knowledge and understand how different configurations performance. As the figure depicts, a  
 
Figure 5.2 – Performance profile of the two strategies 
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firm that pursues an experimental strategy sees that the costs of accumulating architectural 
knowledge reduce immediate performance prior to offshoring. However, this effect is only 
temporary. As the firm incrementally learns and accumulates knowledge of how to configure in a 
most profitable manner prior to offshoring in a domestic context, it experiences increasing 
performance. The firm’s performance increases over time as it discovers new configurations for 
its activities that yield higher performance. Moreover, since the firm has utilized the period prior 
to offshoring to identify a configuration that reduces the coordination costs, the added 
coordination costs when actually relocating activities abroad  200t   will only be marginal. 
The firm can therefore relocate the activities abroad without major disruptive performance 
implications. Thus, the firm accumulates architectural knowledge while the activities are still co-
located which subsequently reduces the increased coordination costs of offshoring. 
With the experiential strategy, in contrast, the firm does not experiment with different 
organizational configurations prior to offshoring. Rather, the firm embarks on a learning-by-
doing approach to identify the optimal configuration for its activities after the offshoring 
implementation, and only experiments with different configurations once the activities have been 
relocated and the extra coordination costs encountered. This approach is akin to a scenario where 
a firm chooses to offshore activities more opportunistically, without having invested in 
significant preparation measures prior to offshoring. A consequence of this is that the firm does 
not accumulate any architectural knowledge prior to the actual offshoring. Because of this, the 
performance is held constant up to the point of implementation, as demonstrated in Figure 5.2. 
However, at the point where the firm commences offshoring  200t  , it will due to the added 
distance between the domestic and foreign activities experience that the cost of coordination is 
significantly higher than prior to the implementation. It is therefore at this point that the firm will 
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begin the process of experimenting with different configurations with the purpose of increasing 
performance. Thus, the firm does not utilize the period when the activities are still co-located to 
identify a configuration that can reduce the increased coordination costs of offshoring, but rather 
investigates different configurations based on its international experience. 
As evident in the figure, the differences in performance between the two approaches 
present firms with a dilemma. In case the added coordination costs of offshoring (the right-most 
area between the two curves) are higher than the costs of accumulating architectural knowledge 
prior to offshoring (the left-most area between the two curves), the experimental approach to 
offshoring displays higher accumulated performance than the other strategy. Conversely, in case 
the costs of accumulating architectural knowledge prior to offshoring are higher than the added 
costs of coordination of offshoring, the experiential strategy displays higher accumulated 
performance.
5
 
The inclusion of uncertainty to the model makes the picture more complicated, however. 
As illustrated in Figure 5.3, a firm pursuing an experimental strategy to offshoring would in the 
absence of uncertainty incrementally learn and accumulate knowledge of how to configure the 
organization to increase performance. By contrast, if there is high uncertainty in the 
technological landscape, it is evident that this learning is less likely to occur and the firm’s 
performance does not increase prior to offshoring despite an experimental search for new 
configurations that yield higher performance. Thus, uncertainty creates noise in the performance 
                                                 
5
 Of course, our use of accumulated performance as an objective is a simplification which deserves some 
elaboration. Arguably, it would be more realistic to assume that the firm’s objective was to maximize the net present 
value of the profits resulting from the strategies, in which case early performance is weighed more heavily than late 
performance. However, because the temporal ordering of the two strategies are always similar (the experiential 
strategy has higher performance than the experimental strategy before offshoring and lower performance after) such 
an assumption would not change our results, but merely shift the point of equivalence towards the experiential 
strategy. Hence, myopic firms with high discount rates would be more attracted towards the experiential strategy, 
whereas future-oriented firms with low discount rates would be more attracted towards the experimental strategy, 
everything else being equal. These predictions are so obvious, however, that we do not elaborate further on them. 
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which overwhelms the relative low coordination costs at home, leading to situations of causal 
ambiguity (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982). As a result, the decision maker cannot evaluate the 
effects of its organizational decisions before offshoring. Decision makers may thus find that 
organizational configurations and preparation measures taken prior to offshoring in an 
experimental strategy may prove inadequate, and that they need to unlearn the knowledge 
accumulated at home after offshoring implementation, in order to accommodate for the high 
uncertainties of operating in the offshoring locations. As the firm commences offshoring 
 200t  , it will therefore experience a larger drop in performance compared to the scenario 
with no uncertainty, after which marginal performance begins to increase.  
The impact of uncertainty to the experiential scenario is depicted in Figure 5.4. Here, it is 
evident that marginal performance up to the point of offshoring (t: 200) is equal to the scenario  
with no uncertainty (i.e., constant) as the firm does not commence any organizational 
 
Figure 5.3 – Performance scenario 1 with uncertainty (experimental strategy) 
 
 
154 
 
 
Figure 5.4 – Performance scenario 1 with uncertainty (experiential strategy) 
 
 
reconfigurations with the purpose of increasing performance. After offshoring is implemented, it 
will, due to the added distance between the domestic and foreign activities, experience that the 
cost of coordination is significantly higher than prior to the implementation, and performance 
will drop. In contrast to the scenario with no uncertainty, however, the firm will experience that 
the subsequent increase in marginal performance (as it begins to test different configurations as 
the increased coordination costs have been encountered) is lower than in the scenario with no 
uncertainty. Also here, the increased uncertainty creates more noise in the performance function 
which overwhelms the coordination costs. Accordingly, performance suffers as the firm finds it 
more difficult to evaluate the effects of its organizational decisions. 
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A contingency approach to offshoring 
With these basic assumptions, how do the experimental and experiential strategies compare? The 
answer to this question depends on the free parameters of the model—distance, uncertainty, 
coordination costs, and modularity. Moreover, in the real world there is likely to be a significant 
variation in these parameters—some industries have higher uncertainty and rely on more tacit 
knowledge than others and some firms offshore to more distant locations and have more modular 
architectures than others. In order to derive the empirical implications of our model of adaptation 
in offshoring we perform a Monte Carlo simulation of our model and apply empirical estimation 
techniques to this data set.
6
 This allows us to see which values and relationships would be 
uncovered in empirical research if given that the variables in our model are measurable and if 
that model provides a reasonable approximation to reality. These results are reported in Table 5.1 
and 5.2.  
We can see from Table 5.1 that the independent variables, while mutually uncorrelated, 
correlate with the performance measures. The results of Table 5.2, Model 1, reveal interesting 
insights about the determinants of the attractiveness between the experimental and experiential 
strategy to offshoring. First of all, when distance increases, the attractiveness of both strategies 
decreases, but more so for the experiential strategy which is subjects to dispersed learning. Thus,   
                                                 
6
 We generate observations by allowing our independent variables to take on different discrete values, including six 
values of LBk   3 6 15 1880 80 80 80, ,..., , , two values of d  13 ,3 , two values of    110 , 2 , and 11 values of x 
 10 19 201120 20 20 20, ,..., , . Furthermore, since there is a stochastic element in the draw of the modularity matrix, we draw 
two such matrices for each value of x. In order to avoid multicolinearity problems and confounding effects in later 
regression models, we create a completely stratified sample as to their values of the independent variables, i.e. where 
all possible combinations of the independent variable values listed above occur. This results in a total of 
6 2 2 11 2 524      observations. This complete stratification approach enables us to create independent variables that 
are completely uncorrelated. For each observation, we run 500 simulations for the experimental strategy and 500 for 
the experiential strategy, and find the average accumulated performance for each strategy, recording both the 
absolute and the relative cumulative performance of the two strategies. As a robustness check we also conducted the 
simulation where we allowed the firm to take two activities and move them in pairs (and not just one activity at a 
time), but the results were qualitatively similar to the ones presented here. 
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Table 5.1 – Correlations-matrix (N=528)* 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1) Modularity (x) 1 
      
2) Coordination costs 
(Klb) 
0 1 
     
3) Distance (d) 0 0 1 
    
4) Uncertainty (s) 0 0 0 1 
   
5) Accumulated 
performance – 
Experiential strategy 
0.02 -0.65 -0.67 -0.05 1 
  
6) Accumulated 
performance – 
Experimental strategy 
-0.01 -0.72 -0.49 -0.38 0.88 1 
 
7) Accumulated 
performance difference 
(experiential – 
experimental strategy) 
0.03 -0.52 -0.7 0.18 0.95 0.68 1 
Mean 0.75 0.13 1.67 1.05 396,435 414,086 -17,651 
Std. Dev. 0.16 0.06 1.33 0.95 38,725 17,067 25,011 
Minimum 0.5 0.04 0.33 0.1 298,885 369,045 -81,149 
Maximum 1 0.23 3 2 448,521 447,405 23,381 
*All coefficients above .09 are significant at 5% level of significance 
 
with high distance between the onshore and offshore activities, firms benefit from searching for 
an optimal configuration prior to the offshoring implementation while the activities are still co-
located. Specifically, when a firm decides to offshore activities to a location where the impact of 
distance on coordination is high due to factors such as institutional and cultural differences (i.e., 
Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Martinez and Jarillo, 1989), an experimental strategy to offshoring 
will yield higher accumulated performance than an experiential strategy. These effects are in 
accordance with extant literature that argues that offshoring preparation—such as predefined 
corporate-wide offshoring strategies that ex ante articulate deliberate plans and guidelines for the   
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Table 5.2 – OLS-models (N=528) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Accumulated performance 
difference (experiential – 
experimental strategy) 
Accumulated performance – 
experiential strategy 
Accumulated performance – 
experimental strategy 
Modularity 
4,512 4,512 4,482 4,482 -30 -30 
Coordination 
costs 
-203,173*** -203,173*** -394,721*** -394,721*** -191,548*** -191,548*** 
Distance 
-13,189*** -14,979*** -19,478*** -19,961*** -6,289*** -4,982*** 
Uncertainty 
4,617*** 1,775* -2,124*** -2,892** -6,742*** -4,667*** 
Distance * 
Uncertainty 
 1,705***  460  -1,245*** 
Intercept 22,765*** 25,749*** 479,574*** 480,380*** 456,809*** 454,631*** 
F-value 
R-square 
F-test for 
increment in 
R-square 
517*** 
.798 
- 
432*** 
.806 
19.24*** 
964*** 
.880 
- 
772*** 
.881 
0.87 
1,184*** 
.901 
- 
1,044*** 
0.909 
44.30*** 
*, ** and *** indicates 5%, 1% and 0.1% level of significance, respectively. 
 
adoption and implementation of offshoring activities—is generally positively correlated with 
actual performance (e.g., Heijmen et al., 2008; Lewin and Couto, 2007; Massini et al., 2010). 
Hence:  
 
Proposition 1: Increasing distance is positively associated with the relative attractiveness 
of the experimental strategy to offshoring. 
 
Second, the results of Table 5.2 suggest that a similar effect occurs when the marginal 
coordination costs increase. For example, the successful coordination in a firm may depend on 
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costly face-to-face coordination (in contrast to formalized coordination mechanisms such as 
standardization and centralization) where employees need to be physically co-located to ensure 
joint work (e.g., research and development). This may be the case in industries characterized by 
tacit and complex knowledge, which is difficult and costly to communicate. In these cases, it is 
thus beneficial to search for an optimal organizational configuration while the activities are still 
co-located so that the activities requiring costly coordination are placed only in one country and 
not across countries. We thus propose the following:  
 
Proposition 2: Increasing coordination costs is positively associated with the relative 
attractiveness of the experimental strategy to offshoring. 
 
Uncertainty has both a direct effect and a moderating effect on the impact of distance. To 
distinguish these two effects it is useful to compare the two strategies’ profiles under high and 
low uncertainty. We see that the degree of uncertainty has a direct positive effect on the relative 
attractiveness of the experimental strategy. With increasing uncertainty in firms’ technological 
landscape, noise in the profit function overwhelms the low coordination costs at home, leading to 
a situation of causal ambiguity (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982) where the firm cannot evaluate the 
effects of its organizational decisions. Contingencies such as product and organizational life-
cycles or demand fluctuations may create increased uncertainty in the technological landscape 
which consequently undermines the decision maker’s ability to effectively estimate and predict 
how to most effectively adapt in the context of offshoring. As such, in situations with high 
uncertainty surrounding the offshoring decision, firms benefit from choosing an experiential 
strategy to offshoring in which the successful adaptation would be the result of cumulative 
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learning by doing over long periods of time (cf., Nelson and Winter, 1982; Adler and Clark, 
1991). Accordingly: 
 
Proposition 3: Increasing uncertainty is positively associated with the attractiveness of 
the experiential strategy to offshoring. 
 
Furthermore, we see that uncertainty has a positive moderating effect on the negative 
relationship between distance and the attractiveness of the experiential strategy to offshoring. 
Looking at the regressions for the individual strategies, we can see that this reflects a negative 
interaction between the two variables on the experimental strategy. While distance increases the 
costs of coordination after offshoring, uncertainty lowers the effect of learning at home leaving 
the firm more vulnerable to high coordination costs once it offshores, and hence results in a more 
negative relationship between distance and performance (Model 3). A similar negative 
moderating effect does not exist for the experiential strategy, which does not even attempt to 
learn at home, and hence this effect shows up as positively moderating effect on the relative 
attractiveness of the experiential strategy (Model 2). This leads to the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 4: The relationship between distance and the relative attractiveness of the 
experiential strategy to offshoring is positively moderated by uncertainty. 
 
The degree of modularity of the technological landscape does not seem to have any direct 
effect on the attractiveness of the two strategies. The coefficients on the relative and absolute 
attractiveness of experiential strategy to offshoring are positive, but not significant. Modularity 
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as an organizing principle has been suggested an effective tool to manage complexity (Sanchez 
and Mahoney, 1996; Baldwin and Clark, 2000). For example, Simon (1962: 482) argues that 
complex systems achieve more and are easier to manage if they possess hierarchical and ‘near 
decomposable’ structures. Since we hold the underlying technological landscape constant in the 
model, these results are therefore not unexpected. 
 
5.5  DISCUSSION 
In this paper, we have built a model that examines the performance implications of how firms 
adapt when relocating organizational activities to foreign locations (i.e., engaging in offshoring). 
Prior research suggests that firms adapt by using measures such as patching, recombination and 
reconfiguration of firm activities (Eisenhardt and Brown, 1999; Karim and Mitchell, 2004), 
resources (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Galunic and Rodan, 1998), and divisional boundaries 
(Hoskisson and Johnson, 1992; Birkinshaw and Lingblad, 2005). However, little offshoring 
research has embraced the insights generated from the literature on organizational change and 
reconfiguration to understand how firms optimize performance when relocating activities abroad. 
At the same time, it is not clear how firms’ adaptation efforts are influenced by factors such as 
the added distance between home and host countries as signified by offshoring.  
Accordingly, we have modeled the process of adapting to an underlying technological 
landscape through the accumulating architectural knowledge in the context of offshoring. As 
such, we have modeled a firm that after a certain point in time relocates a number of activities to 
a foreign location. In this process, the firm needs to adapt to an underlying technological 
landscape by making incremental changes to the configuration by assigning and reassigning 
different activities to different organizational units. In order to do this, however, the firm needs 
161 
 
architectural knowledge to understand the components of the organizational system and how 
these interact (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Brusoni and Prencipe, 2006; Ethiraj and Levinthal 
2004a; Henderson and Clark, 1994; von Hippel, 1990).  
Our results are two-fold: First, we portray how firms adapt in the context of offshoring. 
We do this by juxtaposing two knowledge accumulation strategies: an experimental learning 
strategy, in which the firm experiments and searches for an optimal configuration prior to the 
offshoring implementation while the activities are still at home; and an experiential learning 
strategy, where the firm searches for an optimal configuration after the actual offshoring 
implementation based on its experiences. We show that a firm pursuing an experimental strategy 
will experience a comparatively lower performance while the activities are still co-located, but 
this increases as the firm identifies configurations which reduce coordination costs. Conversely, 
a firm pursuing the experiential strategy will rather experience a significant drop in performance 
following the offshoring implementation when coordination costs become higher due to the 
added distance, after which it experiments with different configurations to increase performance. 
However, we also show that these general adaptation patterns are largely dependent on 
uncertainty, which to a large extent hampers deliberate learning efforts. With increasing 
uncertainty, the ability to evaluate the appropriateness of the architectural knowledge is 
undermined, and the likelihood of committing inefficient design decisions increases. Thus, 
growing uncertainties of offshoring leads to situation of causal ambiguity (Lippman and Rumelt, 
1982) where the decision maker will find it increasingly difficult to separate the effects of their 
reconfiguration experiments from the effects of other influences, and thus unable to prepare. 
Second, in order to derive empirically testable research propositions, we subject our 
model to a Monte Carlo simulation and apply empirical estimation techniques to investigate the 
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relative attractiveness of the experimental and experiential strategies, respectively. The results 
suggest that the attractiveness of the experimental strategy increases with distance and 
coordination costs, but that it decreases with uncertainty. As such, the effective adaptation within 
a given configuration needs not always be a result of cumulative learning-by-doing over time 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982; Adler and Clark, 1991), but can rather be planned ahead. However, as 
the uncertainty of offshoring to new locations increases, the attractiveness of the experiential 
strategy where the firm approaches offshoring as a learning-by-doing process grows. Moreover, 
we found that uncertainty has a positive moderating effect on the negative relationship between 
distance and the attractiveness of the experiential strategy. Thus, with uncertainty, firms benefit 
from learning-by-doing despite vast distances. These are interesting observations as they counter 
conventional wisdom on the value of preparation in offshoring (e.g., Heijmen et al., 2008; Lewin 
and Couto, 2007; Massini et al., 2010). Rather than assuming that firms preparing upfront by 
implementing predefined corporate-wide offshoring strategies with deliberate plans and 
guidelines for the adoption of offshoring activities are more likely to generate higher offshoring 
performance, our results suggest that in some cases it may be more attractive for firms to pursue 
a learning-by-doing strategy to offshoring, particularly if the uncertainty inherent in the 
technological landscape is high.  
 
Theoretical implications 
This paper set out by drawing on the literature of organizational reconfiguration (e.g., Eisenhardt 
and Brown, 1999; Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004a; Karim, 2006; Zhou, 2011) to provide a more 
complete view of how firms relocate organizational activities to international locations. In this 
regards, the question of how firms adapt to underlying technological landscapes given the impact 
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of distance has been emphasized. In contrast to existing views on internationalization 
emphasizing how firms need to adapt to new foreign environments (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; 
Lord and Ranft, 2000; Makino and Delios, 1996), the perspective taken in this paper rather 
stresses the performance implications of how firms gain architectural knowledge when going 
abroad. In particular, we argue that the added distance between organizational activities increases 
firms’ coordination costs and that they must search for new configurations in accordance with 
the international dispersion in order to optimize performance. As such, besides accumulating 
local market knowledge (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Lord and Ranft, 2000; Makino and Delios, 
1996), firms must also accumulate architectural knowledge (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Brusoni 
and Prencipe, 2006; Ethiraj and Levinthal 2004a; Henderson and Clark, 1994). Future research 
could therefore to a larger extent acknowledge how distance impacts the interdependencies 
between organizational units when reconfiguring and how this eventually impacts performance 
(see also Kumar et al., 2008; Srikanth and Puranam, 2011). 
Moreover, this paper provides impetus to a paradox that firms face when choosing 
between an experimental and an experiential strategy to offshoring by emphasizing both the 
process before and after offshoring implementation as well the accumulated performance 
implications between the two strategies. This has important implications for research on 
offshoring and the global distribution of work (Contractor et al., 2010; Manning et al., 2008; 
Srikanth and Puranam et al., 2011). Besides formally modeling a process of offshoring, we have 
articulated two distinct strategies to offshoring that each yield different performance implications 
based on a number of contingencies such as the marginal coordination costs, the impact of 
distance on firms’ ability to coordinate international activities, and the role of uncertainty in 
firms’ technological landscapes. It therefore becomes erroneous to presume either that firms that 
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invest more resources into preparing for offshoring generally perform better than firms that do 
not (e.g., Heijmen et al., 2008; Lewin and Couto, 2007; Massini et al., 2010) or that an optimal 
organizational adaptation is always the result of cumulative learning-by-doing (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982; Adler and Clark, 1991). In contrast, we suggest that the optimal strategy considers 
how offshoring alters the organizational configuration and takes into account both coordination 
costs, the comparative costs advantages between the two locations, and uncertainty. Moreover, 
we suggest that the firm’s ability to identify the optimal organizational configuration for 
offshoring is subject to the accumulation of architectural knowledge and depends on the signal-
to-noise ratio (i.e., coordination costs to the uncertainty parameter). In line with this, future 
research could therefore empirically investigate how decision makers accumulate architectural 
knowledge in the process of offshoring, and to what extent this is influenced by the uncertainty 
of firms’ underlying technological landscapes. 
More broadly, our study suggests that the task of accumulating architectural knowledge 
(Ethiraj and Levinthal 2004a; Henderson and Clark, 1990) presents firms with a paradox in 
which they need to balance the tradeoff between strategic rationales such as lower production 
costs in foreign locations and the changing costs of coordination when implementing such 
strategic rationales. In particular, we argue that uncertainty surrounding such decisions can lead 
to situations of causal ambiguity (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982), in which efforts to learn prior to 
implementation may turn out wrong and even counterproductive. While we examined this 
paradox in the context of a simulation study of offshoring, future research could empirically 
operationalize this by investigating which organizational and environmental contingencies are 
more relevant to how firms approach this. 
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Practical implications  
These results have important strategic implications for firms that decide to internationalize and 
offshore. As we suggest, there is no clear-cut answer to whether one learning strategy yields 
higher performance than another. Thus, decision makers need to weight the choice to engage in 
offshoring upon several contingencies such as distance, coordination costs, modularity and 
uncertainty. For example, firms can take different measures to address coordination costs by 
replacing costly tacit coordination mechanisms such as pre-project familiarity among team 
members with more codified or ICT enabled coordination mechanisms (Srikanth and Puranam, 
2011). Instead of relying on people-based integration mechanisms, firms can choose to 
implement more cost-effective information or formalization integration mechanisms (Kim et al., 
2003). Moreover, a crucial factor in offshoring strategy planning relates to the impact of distance 
on coordination. Obviously, this is a decision that is largely influenced by other factors such as 
cost levels, supply of qualified labor, and access to resources and markets. However, our study 
indicates that the choice between ‘near-shoring’ and ‘far-shoring’ (Carmel and Abbott, 2007) can 
have important performance implications stemming from how the organization configured. 
As a result, the managerial task of preparing for internationalization and offshoring is not 
straightforward. For example, a decision maker may overestimate the impact of distance between 
domestic and foreign activities on coordination costs, and thus decide to pursue an experimental 
strategy by encountering costs of accumulating architectural knowledge at home, while it would 
have been more profitable to pursue an experiential strategy. However, by doing this, the firm 
would risk that some of the learning achieved at home can turn out to be irrelevant once 
offshoring has been implemented. Thus, rather than responding to actual coordination 
challenges, the firm would need to forecast and project future coordination scenarios while 
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activities are co-located. Yet, these scenarios may not reflect the actual coordination challenges 
in an international situation, and, as a consequence, the firm would need to ‘unlearn’ knowledge 
on optimal configurations once the activities have been relocated. Equally, an underestimation of 
the impact of distance between domestic and foreign activities on coordination costs may lead 
the decision maker to pursue an experiential strategy, even though the opposite would have been 
more profitable. This is amplified by situations in which short-termism and incentives for current 
profit maximization may lead the decision maker to pursue the strategy that yields immediate 
highest performance (i.e., the experiential strategy), while the experimental strategy might prove 
more profitable over time. 
 
Concluding remarks 
By presenting and comparing two different architectural knowledge accumulation strategies, this 
study has investigated the performance implications of firm adaptation in the context of 
offshoring. Obviously, our approach leaves us with substantial limitations, in which our 
parsimonious model may omit important factors that explain firm behavior. That being said, we 
believe that the clarity, ease of comparability, logical power and transparency offered by 
modeling (Harrison et al., 2007) allows us to pinpoint central aspects of offshoring and 
organizational reconfiguration that are otherwise neglected in empirical research designs. 
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Chapter 6 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
6.1 SUMMARY 
Guided by the research question—what are the organizational consequences of offshoring?—
this thesis investigates offshoring as an organizational reconfiguration in which co-located 
activities are relocated to foreign locations. Whether firms offshore with the purpose of accessing 
resources or as a response to environmental pressures, this thesis argues that a consequence of 
offshoring relates to the increased need for coordinating and integrating globally dispersed 
activities. Unless the complexity of coordinating offshored activities is managed, the initial 
rationales of offshoring become jeopardized and the likelihood of failure increases.  
The thesis consists of four research papers using various datasets and methodologies that 
investigate different aspects of the organizational process of relocating firm activities to locations 
outside the home country. The first paper (Chapter 2) argues that the organizational complexity 
of offshoring leads to ‘hidden costs’ of reconfiguring the organization when implementing 
activities abroad. Complexity subjects decision makers to bounded rationality and consequently 
undermines their ability to foresee and estimate the costs of offshoring (leading to cost 
estimation errors). However, it also is argued that the organizational design orientations of firms’ 
offshoring strategies and offshoring experience are positively moderating the relationship 
between complexity and cost estimation errors. With design orientation and experience, firms are 
more likely to anticipate and align offshoring complexity with corresponding organizational 
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structures and processes. Thus, organizational design orientation and experience nurture decision 
makers’ ability to anticipate the costs of complex organizations.  
The second paper (Chapter 3) follows up on the first paper by arguing that a consequence 
of the hidden reconfiguration costs is a negative impact on the process performance of the 
offshored activity. The opportunity costs of wrongly estimating reconfiguration costs negatively 
influence the process performance of the activity as the operations of the activity are likely to be 
disrupted by managerial responses to the cost estimation errors. However, it is also argued that 
the modularity of the offshored activities positively moderates process performance. Arguing 
that complexity and the increasing need for coordination are important sources of cost estimation 
failures, modularity offers an important mechanism to reduce the need for coordination when 
offshoring, and thus moderate the negative performance implications of cost estimation errors. 
The third paper (Chapter 4) argues that firms’ experience with particular offshoring 
implementations has a positive impact on the extent to which firms consider organizational 
objectives in their strategies. Since the organizational reconfiguration of offshoring encapsulates 
new architectural challenges and complexities, firms subsequently need to reintegrate the 
geographically dispersed organizational elements so that they can be supportive of the 
organizational objectives. Firms thus need architectural knowledge in order to identify and 
uncover how the distances imposed by geographies, cultures and institutions impact the 
interdependencies between organizational activities. As firms gain experience with the 
offshoring implementation and thereby accumulate architectural knowledge, firms increasingly 
understand the true nature of the organizational activities and the interdependencies between 
these, and will therefore acknowledge this in their strategies.  
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The final paper (Chapter 5) builds on the third research paper, but rather argues that 
architectural knowledge accumulation need not necessarily be a result of cumulative learning-by-
doing, but can rather be achieved experimentally prior to the actual offshoring relocation takes 
place. The performance implications of the experiential learning strategy (learning-by-doing 
after offshoring implementation) and the experimental learning strategy (home-based learning 
before offshoring implementation) are then compared, and it is argued that when the increased 
cost of coordinating an international organization are higher than the gains of production abroad, 
firms benefit from accumulating architectural knowledge prior to the international 
reconfiguration. However, when the uncertainty of firms’ underlying technological landscape 
increases, they are better off by choosing an experiential learning strategy. Moreover, uncertainty 
has a positive moderating effect on the relationship between distance and the attractiveness of the 
experiential learning strategy, as it lowers the effect of learning at home and leaves the firm more 
vulnerable to higher coordination costs once it goes abroad. As such, uncertainty signifies a 
lower signal-to-noise ratio which leads to situations of causal ambiguity, and the value of 
accumulating architectural knowledge through the experimental learning strategy is undermined. 
Taken together, these papers regard offshoring as an organizational reconfiguration with 
consequences for aspects such as complexity, the interdependencies between organizational 
activities, decision making, performance, and architectural knowledge. The disintegration and 
relocation of organizational activities create complexity which, in turn, negatively impacts 
decision makers’ ability to accurately estimate the costs caused by the organizational change 
from co-location to geographical dispersion (Chapter 2). While this has negative performance 
implications for the offshored activity (Chapter 3), factors such as organizational design 
orientation, modularity and experience are found to be important to reduce this negative impact. 
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In particular, firms’ level of architectural knowledge is important to anticipate and align 
offshoring complexity with corresponding organizational structures and processes. Firms can 
either accumulate knowledge experientially through learning-by-doing (Chapter 4) or through 
experimental learning (Chapter 5). Thus, in order to understand why some firms fail when 
offshoring and others do not, these papers emphasize that the organizational consequences of 
relocating organizational activities to foreign locations entail complexities that require firms to 
invest additional resources in coordinating the offshored activities so that an efficient 
reintegration can be achieved. 
 
Theoretical implications and future research 
The findings presented in this thesis contain a number of important theoretical implications for 
future research. Specifically, this thesis contributes to the literature by 1) conceptualizing 
offshoring as an organizational reconfiguration; 2) stressing the hidden costs of offshoring; and 
3) pinpointing the role and strategies of architectural knowledge in organizational change. 
 First, the conceptualization of offshoring as an organizational reconfiguration suggests 
that the organizational sphere needs to be acknowledged and incorporated into the analysis of 
offshoring. Much research has successfully established why firms offshore (Contractor et al., 
2010; Dossani and Kenney, 2006; Lewin et al., 2009), the characteristics of the offshoring 
implementation (Demirbag and Glaister, 2010; Doh et al., 2009; Hutzschenreuter et al., 2011), 
and performance outcomes (Bertrant, 2011; Mol et al., 2005; Nieto and Rodríguez, 2011). 
However, less attention has been devoted to the organizational design of offshoring. As is 
demonstrated in this thesis, the organizational design of offshoring is important to understand 
why some firms manage their offshoring activities better than others. For example, it is argued 
171 
 
that the disintegration and relocation of organizational activities results in additional 
complexities and coordination requirements that subsequently challenge the successful 
reintegration of the offshored activities. Thus, while performance can be determined by firms’ 
ability to access low-cost labor in foreign locations, the argument put forth here is that for this to 
materialize firms need to manage the organizational consequences of relocating activities abroad. 
Future research could therefore look more broadly into what is actually signified by the 
organizational reconfiguration. Since this thesis relies predominantly on cross-sectional survey 
data, it omits an in-depth scrutiny of the actual process of both the offshoring reconfiguration and 
the decision-making processes leading up to the reconfiguration. Future studies could therefore 
use qualitative research designs to better address the actual process of implementing activities in 
foreign locations and how this impacts the organization.  
More generally, by emphasizing the change from co-location to geographical dispersion, 
the findings of this thesis may contribute to research on organizational designs in complex 
environments (Brusoni and Prencipe, 2006; Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004a; Nadler and Tushman, 
1997). Particularly, it is emphasized that the process of offshoring may challenge the capacity of 
conventional organizational forms and structures to facilitate and safeguard globally dispersed 
operations. When engaging in offshoring, firms are required to implement coordination 
mechanisms that accommodate for the added distance between interdependent activities in order 
to reintegrate their activities. As such, it is argued that offshoring serves as an important 
empirical research ground to investigate larger organizational questions relating to organizational 
change, design, and integration. For example, the change signified by offshoring challenges 
firms’ ability to manage organizational complexity, but also their estimation of organizational 
changes. While the research papers in this thesis have emphasized factors such as firms’ 
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organizational design orientation, architectural knowledge and modularity to be of importance 
when offshoring, future research could aim to better understand the effects of other design 
alternatives and mechanisms that firms can use when faced with an organizational 
reconfiguration. Moreover, interdependencies can take many different forms (Thompson, 1967; 
Van de Ven et al., 1976). There may also be substantial differences between interdependent 
agents and activities (Puranam et al., 2012). Future research should therefore investigate more 
specifically how and between whom the interdependencies across distances occur. Finally, since 
offshoring require firms to reintegrate the relocated activities into the organization, a relevant 
research topic relates to the role of systems integrators, i.e., agents in the organization that “lead 
and coordinate from a technological and organizational viewpoint the work of suppliers involved 
in the network.” (Brusoni et al., 2001: 613; Hobday et al., 2005). In an organizational system 
consisting of a number of offshored components and entities, the systems integrators thus 
become the architect that integrates and coordinates the different capabilities and resources of the 
different actors into a final output. Future research could therefore investigate how distinct 
agents identify optimal governance and integration mechanisms in a geographically dispersed 
organizational system.   
Second, the findings of this thesis have implications for ongoing research on hidden costs 
in offshoring and strategic decision making. In offshoring research, the idea of hidden costs is 
new and has predominantly been treated conceptually and anecdotally to underscore how 
offshoring might be more challenging than initially expected (e.g., Dibbern et al., 2008; 
Stringfellow et al., 2008). The findings presented here contribute to this research by theoretically 
and empirically pinpointing complexity as a main driver of hidden costs, showing how hidden 
costs deter process performance, and identifying how firms’ may manage hidden costs through 
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strategy orientation, experience and modularity. Future research could aim to better understand 
the actual mechanisms that make decision makers more or less able to foresee future costs of 
reconfiguration. Moreover, future research could endeavor to develop a stronger instrument of 
hidden costs. In this thesis, hidden costs are operationalized as the respondents’ perceptions of 
the difference between the expected and realized costs of offshoring, using cross-sectional 
observations. However, retrospective views about initial expectations may be skewed and 
underestimated. Thus, a research design using observations collected before and after the 
offshoring implementation would have obvious advantages compared to the design used in this 
thesis. 
More generally, the focus on hidden costs contribute to research on estimation in strategic 
decision making (e.g., Durand, 2003; Hogarth and Makridakis, 1981; Kahneman and Lovallo, 
1993; Makadok and Walker, 2000; March and Simon, 1958). As a main function of strategic 
decision making relates to decision makers’ accurate estimation of the costs of implementing 
strategic decisions, this thesis has demonstrated how complexity undermines managers’ ability to 
account for all important decision factors which in turn increases the risk that certain 
performance-detrimental consequences remain hidden in the strategic decision-making process. 
This contributes to research that emphasize the inhibiting role of complexity in decision-making 
processes (Langlois and Robertson, 1992; Loasby, 1976; Nickerson and Zenger, 2002) by 
focusing on the role of the organizational context in decision makers’ estimation ability (e.g., 
Durand, 2003; Hogarth and Makridakis, 1981; March and Simon, 1958) and, in particular, on 
how organizational complexity undermines decision makers’ ability to account for costs of 
implementation.  
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Third, this research contributes to research focusing on the role and strategies of 
architectural knowledge in organizational change (e.g., Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Brusoni and 
Prencipe, 2006; Henderson and Clark, 1990). In particular, the findings of this thesis stress the 
importance of architectural knowledge in the offshoring process. Since offshoring signifies a 
change in the organizational configuration, firms need architectural knowledge on how the 
interdependencies spanning across geographies, cultures and institutions impact the 
organizational system in order to make effective design decisions. Moreover, rather than 
stressing local market knowledge in order to optimize international operations (Johanson and 
Vahlne, 1977; Lord and Ranft, 2000; Makino and Delios, 1996), these findings suggest that firms 
must also accumulate architectural knowledge. Future research should therefore to a larger extent 
acknowledge how distance impacts the interdependencies between organizational units when 
reconfiguring and how this eventually impacts performance. 
Moreover, this thesis has explicated and compared two strategies to accumulate 
architectural knowledge. In this respect, it is argued that one must understand contingencies such 
as distance, coordination costs and uncertainty to determine the strategies’ relative attractiveness. 
It may therefore be misleading to presume either that firms that invest more resources into 
preparing for offshoring generally perform better than firms that do not (e.g., Heijmen et al., 
2008; Lewin and Couto, 2007; Massini et al., 2010) or that an optimal organizational adaptation 
is always the result of cumulative learning-by-doing (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Adler and Clark, 
1991). Future research could therefore investigate more in depth the contingencies that lead to 
successful knowledge accumulation. For example, while different forms of experience and 
learning might contribute differently to organizational behavior and performance (Haunschild 
and Sullivan, 2002; Madsen and Desai, 2010), it has not been possible to disentangle different 
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facets of learning more specifically in this thesis. Future research could therefore investigate 
which types of experience and learning that contribute the most to the identification of 
organizational forms and structures in increasingly complex firms. 
 
Concluding remarks 
Much research has argued that offshoring requires new theories to explain the phenomenon as 
the practice breaks with established theories on international expansion (Doh, 2005; Kedia and 
Mukherjee, 2009; Mol et al., 2005; Youngdahl and Ramaswamy, 2008). In this thesis, offshoring 
is rather regarded as an empirical context in which existing theories on international expansion 
and organizational design can be investigated, extended, and modified. The inherent challenges 
in changing the organization from consisting of co-located activities to dispersed activities make 
offshoring an important empirical field for investigating complexity and design in contemporary 
organizations. Thus, offshoring should not be dealt with in isolation, but rather be viewed as a 
phenomenon that can further more established theoretical fields of international business, 
strategic management and organizational design. According to Tallman (2010: 6), “If we 
continue to look at offshoring and outsourcing as unique, isolated, modern phenomena, we will 
end up as catalogers and scolds, but with little to offer either to practice or, in the end, to 
scholarship.” This thesis concurs with this statement by investigating offshoring in an 
organizational context.  
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